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This Fall 2022 Supplement is the product of our effort to capture important developments in
copyright law since the publication of the second edition of Copyright: A Contemporary Approach. It
includes three new principal cases. The first two are Supreme Court decisions: the 2021 fair use
decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (p. 18), and the 2020 decision about copyright
protection for state statutes in Georgia v. Public.Resources.Org (p. 58).. The third is an excerpt from
the Second Circuit’s fair use decision in Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith (p.37), a decision that
the Supreme Court has decided to review, with oral argument scheduled for October 12, 2022.
The portion of this opinion on “transformativeness” is likely making a one-time appearance in the
supplement, to be replaced by the Supreme Court decision when it is issued, but we thought some
folks would like to teach the Goldsmith case in the fall as the Supreme Court is considering it.
The supplement also includes notes on many other cases, and a few new features that we
thought would enhance study of U.S. copyright law. Because the Copyright Claims Board (“CCB”)
opened up its doors for business this June, we have included a new section at the end of Chapter
6 on the CASE Act and CCB proceedings (p. 50). We have also completely revised Chapter 12.E.,
on digital audio transmission rights, and Chapter 12.F., on rights in pre-1972 sound recordings.
The new Chapter 12.E. in this supplement, “Digital Streaming of Music After the Musical Works
Modernization Act” (p. 84), now consists of a general introduction to copyright and the streaming
of music, covering both rights in sound recordings and rights in musical works, and all of the
relevant exclusive rights.

Chapter 1 Introductions
B. Theoretical Frameworks
p. 9 – Insert the following at the end of the paragraphs on the Restatement of
Copyright:
As of fall 2022, the membership of the American Law Institute has approved three “Tentative
Drafts” of portions of the Restatement of Copyright. You can get copies of them here – if you’re
willing to pay $10 for electronic PDFs. The portions drafted and approved do not address some
of the most controversial topics in copyright law, such as fair use analysis. Nonetheless, the
Restatement project has continued to generate controversy, including articles in support of the
project, see, e.g., Jessica Silbey & Jeanne Fromer, Retelling Copyright: The Contributions of the
Restatement of Copyright Law, 44 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 341 (2021)., and articles
highly critical of it, see, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Peter S. Menell, Restatements of
Statutory Law: The Curious Case of the Restatement of Copyright, 44 Colum. J. L. & the Arts
(2021). The Restatement on Copyright will not be completed anytime soon.

p. 17 – Insert the following above “Alternative Business Models”:
A Taste for Authenticity. In some cases, purchasers of copies of works of authorship may
affirmatively want “the original” – whether the original is a unique, handmade object like a
painting, authenticated as having been executed by a particular painter, or an edition of multiple
2
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copies that was specifically authorized by the author. For types of works for which there is a very
strong taste for authenticity, unauthorized copies will have a market value that is a very small
fraction of that of the original or of an authorized copy. In such markets, protection against
forgery and false advertising is much more important than copyright law. See, e.g., Amy Adler, Why
Art Does Not Need Copyright, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 313, 330-341 (2018)).

p. 26 – Insert the following above the “Test Your Knowledge” box:
4. Copyright and Cultural Theory: Who Should Create Culture?
As human beings, we reflect and comment on our lives, and engage our aesthetic and
critical faculties, by producing and consuming cultural objects and experiences – literature,
music, drama, art, video games, software, and so on. How does and should that process of cultural
creation happen, and who is and should be involved?
At one extreme are cultural experiences in which there is little division between
producers and consumers. You could make your living as a steelworker or a physician, but in your
spare time you could participate as an amateur musician in an improvisatory jam session, in which
there is no division between performer and audience: the entire group is making music that each
member is also enjoying. At the other extreme, cultural production could be accomplished by a
small group of professionals who rely on that production for their livelihoods, and the rest of us
could be passive audience members. A television production company located in one city could
make shows that are stored and transmitted all over the world, and hundreds of millions of people
could sit and watch those shows in their living rooms. In between those extremes, there are a
wide variety of scales and combinations of professional and amateur, market and nonmarket,
individual and cooperative creation. A painter may give her paintings to friends for free while also
selling some paintings for display in local homes. A group of programmers might agree to
cooperatively create software that they all could use and customize; they might later decide to
make that software available to other programmers to develop further. Local a cappella groups
might create and sing arrangements of songs composed by Stevie Wonder or Sara Bareilles. Fans
of J.K. Rowling might write new stories featuring characters in the Harry Potter series.
Many technologies that spread during the twentieth century seemed to favor professional
creation of culture and a sharper distinction between producer and audience. Sound recording
technology and phonographs enabled centralized creation and decentralized enjoyment of
prerecorded music. Motion pictures similarly enabled centralized creation and decentralized
enjoyment of drama and other audiovisual productions. Broadcasting technologies -- radio and
television – enabled instant transmission of performances, spreading their range from a single
room to hundreds of miles. Copyright law aided in the development of professional cultural
production by protecting the results of those activities. Those who produced movies, sound
recordings, books, TV shows, and the like gained ownership rights in them, and could sue those
who made unauthorized copies or performances of them. And, one could argue, this had many
salutary consequences. For example, previously only the wealthy could afford to buy tickets to
see and hear the best performers in the world. After advances in recording and distribution
3
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technologies, with works protected by copyright and often funded by advertising, virtually
everyone could see and hear the best performers in the world.
More recent production and distribution technologies – chiefly, computer software of
various kinds and the internet – have enabled the development of more decentralized, nonmarket,
amateur production of culture. Video and audio software make it relatively easy to create new
audiovisual works and sound recordings and particularly easy to incorporate, combine, and alter
previously created audio and video, creating “remixes” or “mashups.” The concept of “usergenerated content” rose to prominence in the mid-2000s, and in 2006 the Time Magazine Person
of the Year was “You,” to mark the rise of broadly distributed amateur content, from America’s
Funniest Home Videos to millions of creative works posted on YouTube. See Lev Grossman, “You
– Yes, You – Are TIME’s Person of the Year,” Time, December 13, 2006. Similarly, the internet has
greatly aided distribution of “fan fiction,” or “fanfic” – fiction written by amateurs that
incorporates characters and settings from professionally published written works.
Some have argued that these developments have fostered a “remix culture” or “mashup
culture” in which amateur participation has risen. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art
and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (2008); Eduardo Navas, Remix Theory: The
Aesthetics of Sampling (2012). (Professor Lessig also coined the term “read-only culture” to refer
to a system of cultural production in which most people could only passively consume cultural
products, and “read-write culture” to refer to a system in which people could more actively shape
and reshape the cultural products that circulated in society.) Yochai Benkler has argued that this
rise in nonmarket and nonproprietary cultural production, both by individuals and collaborative
groups, “holds great practical promise: as a dimension of individual freedom; as a platform for
better democratic participation; as a medium to foster a more critical and self-reflective culture;
and, in an increasingly information-dependent global economy, as a mechanism to achieve
improvements in human development everywhere.” Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks 2
(2006). William Fisher articulates a vision of a “semiotic democracy” in which “all persons would
be able to participate in the process of meaning-making. Instead of being merely passive
consumers of cultural artifacts produced by others, they would be producers, helping to shape the
world of ideas and symbols in which they live.” William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on
the Internet, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1203, 1237 (1998). Eric von Hippel expresses a similarly
optimistic view of user innovation in Democratizing Innovation (2005).
Academics and cultural critics have argued that copyright law can both hinder and aid
decentralized, nonmarket, amateur, collaborative cultural production. Companies that
professionally produce books, movies, and sound recordings can try to use copyright law to stop
others from incorporating excerpts from or elements of those works in remixes, fan fiction, and
other user-generated content. See, e.g., Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of
Politics: Intellectual Property Law and Democratic Dialogue, 69 Texas L. Rev. 1853 (1991); cf.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397 (1990). If protection of works – especially protection of
characters and settings in those works – is expanded broadly, and if the fair use doctrine is
interpreted narrowly, those companies will succeed in many of their attempts. For some
commentators, that is not what copyright should do. Martin Skladany, for example, argues that
4
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copyright law should “maximiz[e] the number of authors, rather than the number of works
created, by encouraging citizens to consume less and create more.” Martin Skladany, Copyright
Versus The People: How Major Content Providers Are Destoying Creativity And How to Stop
Them 116 (2018).
Conversely, copyright licensing can be used to facilitate and organize collaboration and
sharing, and to stop some efforts to propertize cultural creation. For example, Creative Commons,
a nonprofit organization founded in 2001, has created many varieties of copyright licenses that
enable easy sharing of content. As of January 2016, there were an estimated 1.1 billion works
licensed under Creative Commons licenses. Open-source licenses of various kinds can facilitate
the development of collaboratively created software by setting the conditions under which an
addition to or alteration of a release of collaboratively created software will become incorporated
into the next official release. And so-called “viral,” “recursive,” or “copyleft” licenses typically
require those who add to or alter software to make their additions and alterations available to the
public on the same terms that the software was previously licensed – a requirement that could
not be enforced if the software were merely dedicated to the public domain.
It is clear that copyright law has the potential to influence the mix of culture that is
produced by professionals or by amateurs; that is produced for economic gain or for other reasons;
and to mediate the relationship between creator and audience. It is not clear what the optimal
mix is, or whether copyright law can be neutral as to different mixes. Those are questions that
we should all continue to consider. (Special thanks to Prof. Laura Heymann for her contributions
to this essay; anything that is still wrong with it is ours.)

Chapter 2: The Basic Hurdles of Copyright Protection
B. Originality
2. Originality and Derivative Works
page 88 – Insert at the end of Note 9, above the “Language Tip” Box
A recent example of the application of these
principles in the area of musical works is We Shall
Overcome Foundation v. The Richmond Organization,
Inc., 2017 WL 3981311 (S.D.N.Y.). The case
involved the copyright status of the famed
African-American spiritual and protest song We
Shall Overcome. Several precursors to the song
exist in the public domain, including versions
that date back more than a century. In 1960 a
company called Ludlow Music filed a copyright
registration application for a purported
derivative version of the song. The application
claimed changes in lyrics and melody (it also
included 3 new verses for the song, which were

FOOD FOR THOUGHT
The We Shall Overcome opinion suggests that
changes to a work that would be “standard
fare” to “competent musicians” lack sufficient
originality to sustain a derivative work
copyright. Readers who are acquainted with
the patent scheme may sense something
familiar about this. It resembles the rule that
“obvious” improvements over the previous
state of technology are not worthy of a patent.
However the patent system is based on a
requirement of novelty rather than originality.
Do you think this court has conflated the two
ideas? If so, is that a good thing?
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not at issue in the lawsuit.). The changes to the lyrics involved, changing the phrase “we will
overcome” to “we shall overcome,” and changing the phrase “down in my heart” to “deep in my
heart”. The melodic changes involved some changes in two measures of the song, designed, in
part, to make it easier to sing. The court found these changes too trivial to support the originality
necessary for a copyrightable derivative work. As the court said, “the changes of ‘will’ to ‘shall’
and ‘down’ to ‘deep’ and the melodic differences in the opening measures and the seventh measure,
do not create a distinguishable variation. These differences represent ‘variations of the piece that
are standard fare in the music trade by any competent musician.’” The copyright claimants argued
that they sought protection for the song to prevent others from using it in inappropriate or
disrespectful ways, but the court was unmoved, noting that the “gap in the proof of originality
cannot be filled by good intentions.” A few months after the decision the parties reached a
settlement confirming the public domain status of the song. For a short story from the New York
Times describing the litigation, the settlement, and the economic significance of the song, you can
click here.

C. “Work of Authorship” and the Enumerated Categories Thereof:
Independent Limitations on Copyrightable Subject Matter?
p. 105 – Insert the following in place of Note 9 :
9.

Authorship: Humans Only, Animals and Machines Need Not Apply. Even if Ms. Garcia’s
performance was not a “work” as that term is understood under copyright law, there is little
doubt that she “authored” it. It was her facial expressions, gestures, and body language that
made the performance what it was (we would have included “her vocal intonation,” but that
was edited out when her performance was dubbed). What happens, however, when a claim
of authorship is made on behalf of an animal, or a computer? As of this writing, the Ninth
Circuit has held that animals have no standing to sue for infringement under the Copyright
Act, and the Copyright Office has rejected a claim of authorship by a computer. Thus, under
U.S. law as it stands, authors have to be human beings.

6
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The claim of animal authorship arose when a macaque monkey named Naruto pressed a
camera’s shutter release button while he was standing in front of the lens, making a “monkey
selfie.”. David Slater, a British photographer who owned the camera used to make the
photos, and who put it in the location where Naruto pressed the shutter button, had claimed
ownership of copyright in the monkey selfies. The group People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals (“PETA”) sued Slater on behalf of Naruto. In Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th
Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment against Naruto and PETA. It held that
unless a statute provides explicitly to the contrary, animals lack standing to raise federal
statutory claims, including claims for copyright infringement. To bolster this reasoning, the
court noted that several provisions of the Copyright Act refer to an author’s widow or
widower, provisions which suggest an intent to exclude animals from asserting rights under
the statute because animals do not marry.
The claim of computer authorship arose when a gentleman named Steven Thaler, who has
made something of a hobby of trying to get computers recognized as authors and inventors
around the globe, applied to register a graphic art work, titled
GO ONLINE
“A Recent Entrance to Paradise,” with the U.S. Copyright
Office. Thaler listed the author of the work as “Creativity Curious about what kind of
Machine,” and himself as claimant, as owner of the machine. illustration a “Creativity
The Copyright Office Review Board accepted Thaler’s Machine” would create?
representation that “the work was autonomously created by Click here to see “A Recent
artificial intelligence without any creative contribution from Entrance to Paradise”
a human actor.” U.S. Copyright Office Review Board, Re:
Second Request for Reconsideration for Refusal to Register A Recent Entrance to Paradise
2 (Correspondence ID 1-3ZPC6C3; SR # 1-7100387071) (February 14, 2022). However,
“[a]fter reviewing the statutory text, judicial precedent, and longstanding Copyright Office
practice, the Board . . . conclude[d] that human authorship [was] a prerequisite to copyright
protection in the United States and that the Work therefore [could not] be registered.” Id.
at 3.
As we will explore in greater detail in Chapter 8, § 201(a) of the Copyright Act deems the
author of a work to be the initial owner of copyright in a work. Is a monkey or a computer
program in any position to assume ownerhship of a work, and make and implement
decisions about how it should or should not be used of licensed? Perhaps seeking to avoid
that problem, Steven Thaler argued that he was the constructive author and initial owner of
“A Recent Entrance to Paradise” under the “work made for hire” provision of § 201(b)
(which we will also explore in Chapter 8). However, for a work to be a “work made for
hire,” the actual creator of a work must have entered into an employment arrangement, or
signed a written agreement deeming a work to be a specially commissioned work made for
hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“work made for hire”). We don’t believe that monkeys or computer
programs have the capacity to enter into such arrangements or agreements. (Will an
“artificial intelligence” someday have enough cognitive power, self-awareness, and selfdetermination that it will be recognized as a legal actor? Maybe, but that day is still far in
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the future.) Thus, the Copyright Act’s ownership provisions are among those which make
clear that the Act contemplates only human authors.

Chapter 3: Fundamental Limitations on Copyright Protection
C. Utility and Functionality
5. Application Programming Interfaces
p. 196 - Replace first full paragraph with the following:
On remand, the case went to trial on the issue of whether Google had made fair use of the Oracle
API. In May 2016, the jury entered a verdict in favor of Google. See Oracle America, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., No. C-10 03661, Docket No. 1982, Special Verdict Form (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2016). Oracle
appealed to the Federal Circuit, which reversed the jury’s verdict, holding that Google’s use of
portions of the Java API were not fair use. See Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, LLC, 886 F3d 1179
(Fed. Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court then agreed to review the Federal Circuit’s decisions both
on the copyrightability of the Java API and on whether Google’s use of a portion of it was a fair
use. In April 2021, it held that Google’s use of the Java API was a fair use. See Google, LLC v.
Oracle America, Inc., 141 S.Ct. 1183 (2021) (presented as a principal case below in Chapter 5). The
Court decided not to address the issue of whether the “declaring code” of the Java API was
copyrightable, a decision heavily criticized by Justice Thomas in dissent. See id. at 1211 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).

6. Useful Articles
Page 218 – Insert the following new Note after Note (4):
4A. Early Lower Court Applications. Two recent court of appeals decisions that have had to
apply Star Athletica—one dealing with a chalk holder and the other with a banana costume—
may shed a bit more light on the Supreme Court’s test, though we fear not enough.
In Lanard Toys Ltd. v. Dolgencorp LLC, 958 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2020) plaintiff Lanard sold a
chalk holder in the shape of a conventional yellow No.2 pencil. It claimed protection for this
device under all three branches of intellectual property law—it held a design patent, it claimed
trade dress protection under the law of trademarks, and most relevant for this discussion, it
held a copyright registration as well. When the defendants begin selling copycat versions of
the chalk holder, plaintiff sued under multiple theories, including copyright infringement.
Here are the products of the two parties as reproduced in the court’s opinion.

8
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The plaintiff argued that the product was an exaggerated “cartoonish” pencil which could
be imagined as a sculptural work, independent of its function as a chalk holder. However, the
court noted that because the plaintiff sought copyright protection for the overall design of the
entire object (for the “dimensions and shape of the useful article itself”), and not for some
separable subpart (like the chevrons on the uniforms in Star Athletica), it could not prevail. The
court cited as a second ground for its decision the fact that plaintiff was seeking protection
for “any and all expressions” of a pencil-shaped chalk holder, and to go that far would be to
protect an abstract idea, rather than expression.

The Third Circuit undertook a considerably more detailed analysis in Silvertop Assoc., Inc. v.
Kangaroo Mfg. Inc., 931 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2019) in determining that plaintiff held a valid copyright
in a full body banana costume. In the illustration above, the plaintiff’s costume is on the left,
and the defendant’s two costumes are in the center and on the right:
9
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First, the court found that the costume did contain sculptural elements that were
separable from the overall useful article. As it explained:
Those sculptural features include the banana’s combination of colors, lines, shape,
and length. They do not include the cutout holes for the wearer’s arms, legs, and face;
the holes’ dimensions; or the holes’ locations on the costume, because those features
are utilitarian. Although more difficult to imagine separately from the costume’s “nonappearance related utility” (i.e., wearability) than many works, . . . one can still imagine
the banana apart from the costume as an original sculpture. That sculpted banana,
once split from the costume, is not intrinsically utilitarian and does not merely
replicate the costume, so it may be copyrighted.
Second, the court rebuffed defendant’s claim that the depiction of a banana, even taken as
a whole, lacked originality, because it concluded that this particular vision of a banana met
the very low bar of creativity set by the case law. Along the way the court rejected defendant’s
invitation to consider each element separately for both utility and originality, stressing that
the focus must remain on the combination of all the elements taken as a whole.
Do you find these cases reconcilable? If the look of the costume was “separable” because
it could be imagined without the arm and head holes, why wasn’t the look of the chalk holder
similarly separable because it could be imagined separate from the hole from which the chalk
protrudes? Do you think the depiction of the banana in the costume is more original than the
depiction of the pencil embodied in the chalk holder? Regarding that last question, try
searching for “banana costume” online to get a sense of the different appearance of such
costumes.

Chapter 4: Proving Infringement of the Reproduction Right
B. Establishing That the Defendant Copied from Plaintiff’s Work
P. 255 – Insert the following after Note 4:
5. The “Inverse Relationship” or “Inverse Ratio” Rule Rejected by the Ninth Circuit. In Price,
Judge Scheindlin states a rule of thumb that is often recited in copying-in-fact cases: the more
substantial the evidence presented of access, the less evidence is needed of similarity, and vice
versa. That rule has become known as the “inverse relationship” or “inverse ratio” rule. In
Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (2020), which involved a claim that the classic Led
Zeppelin rock song “Stairway to Heaven” infringed a song called “Taurus,” the Ninth Circuit
rejected that rule. Skidmore, the plaintiff, had requested a jury instruction regarding the
inverse ratio rule. Presumably, there was strong evidence of Led Zeppelin’s access to “Taurus,”
and Skidmore thought that such an instruction would increase the likelihood that jurors would
find copying even if they concluded that there wasn’t a high degree of similarity between the
two songs. The District Court refused to give the instruction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed
that refusal. The principal problem with the inverse ratio rule, according to the Ninth Circuit,
10
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is that it suggests that liability may be imposed when there is complete evidence of access – we
are sure that the defendant knew the plaintiff’s work, or the defendant admits it – and yet there
are no similarities between the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s work. See id. at 1068. That
suggestion is erroneous, states the Skidmore court, because copyright infringement requires
copying, and if there are no similarities between the two works, there has been no copying.
The Skidmore court is undoubtedly correct that, carried to such an extreme, the “inverse ratio”
rule is wrong. Consider, however, two qualifications to the court’s rejection of the rule. First,
some of the court’s concern stems from a worry that the jury – or the judge – will confuse the
two separate issues of copying in fact and improper appropriation. If the finder of fact mixes
those two issues, then the inverse ratio instruction may be taken to suggest that the more
evidence of access there is, the lower the standard is for improper appropriation, so that minute
similarities will suffice for a finding, not just that the defendant copied from the plaintiff’s
work, but that those similarities rise to the (lowered) threshold for finding improper
appropriation and hence infringement. That may be true, but the issue of confusion between
copying in fact and improper appropriation is separate from the issue of the correct approach
to determining copying in fact. Unfortunately, as the Skidmore court admits, the Ninth Circuit
has contributed to the confusion between copying in fact and improper appropriation by using
the term “substantial similarity” in both contexts. Id. at 1067; see also the discussion in the
“Language Tip” box on pages 256-257 of the main volume of the casebook. It will always be
useful to understand that similarities need to be considered once in the context of determining
whether there has been copying in fact, and then again, but from a different perspective and
with different rules, to determine if copying has risen to the level of improper appropriation.
Second, while is it true that the “inverse ratio” rule is wrong if taken to mean that copying in
fact can be inferred from certain access but no similarity, is it necessarily wrong if taken to
mean something more modest? After all, the rule, which is surely properly considered a rule of
thumb rather than a mathematical formula, was likely created and most often applied, not in
extreme cases where one type of evidence is extraordinarily strong and the other nonexistent,
but in more common cases where there may be weak-to-moderate evidence of both types. The
more modest meaning is limited to those more common cases, and might be elaborated in three
statements. (1) When coming to a conclusion whether it is more likely than not that elements
of defendant’s work were copied from plaintiff’s, a jury of judge should consider both evidence
of access and evidence of similarities between the works. (2) Sometimes the evidence of access
presented would not be sufficient by itself to sustain a finding of copying in fact, and neither
would the evidence of similarities, and yet they could be sufficient when added together. (3)
Sometimes relatively strong evidence of access can be sufficient when combined with relatively
weak evidence of similarities, and vice versa. So limited, does the “inverse relationship” rule
make sense? If so, is there some way of explaining it a jury that would be helpful, or is the
danger of misunderstanding too great?

11
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D. Introduction to the Modern Cases on Improper Appropriation in NonLiteral Infringement Cases
1. Whose Perspective Controls?
P. 276, Note 3 – The first sentence should read as follows:
In Copeland, Copeland [not Usher and The Bieb, as is mistakenly stated in the main volume] argued
that substantial similarity should have been assessed from the perspective of “industry
professionals” in the music business because that was Copeland’s original target audience for his
demo.

Chapter 5: Fair Use
p. 303 – delete the last two sentences on the page and replace with:
In 1994, however, it fell silent, and did not decide another fair use case until 2021. Thus, it is
possible to become familiar quite quickly with all of the Supreme Court cases that lower courts
could look to for guidance for over 25 years, and we will do just that.

p. 304 – change “A. The Three Supreme Court Cases” to “A. The First Three
Supreme Court Cases.”
p. 352 – Delete existing Note 3 and insert the following in its place:
3. Fair Use and Parodies after Acuff-Rose. Since the Supreme Court’s clarification of the
proper fair use analysis in parody cases, parodists have been able to successfully invoke the fair
use doctrine in a number of cases. Here are two examples:
•

In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit affirmed a
fair use holding in favor of defendant Paramount Pictures, the producer of “Naked Gun 33 1/3:
The Final Insult.” Paramount had created a publicity poster for its movie in the style of a wellknown photograph of actress Demi Moore, taken by photographer Annie Leibovitz when
Moore was eight months pregnant. The Leibovitz photo had been published on the cover of
the August 1991 issue of Vanity Fair magazine.

12
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Paramount had a pregnant model pose for its
photograph in the same pose as Demi Moore
under similar lighting, and then superimposed
the head of actor Leslie Nielsen, star of the
“Naked Gun” series. The Ninth Circuit found
that the Paramount advertisement qualified as
a parody:
[T]he ad . . . differs in a way that may
reasonably be perceived as commenting,
through ridicule, on what a viewer might
reasonably think is the undue selfimportance conveyed by the subject of the
Leibovitz photograph. . . . Apart from
ridiculing pretentiousness, the ad might
also be reasonably perceived as interpreting
the Leibovitz photograph to extol the
beauty of the pregnant female body, and,
rather
unchivalrously,
to
express
disagreement with this message.

Food for Thought
The Vanity Fair cover photograph of Demi
Moore triggered a parade of pregnant
actresses, models, and singers appearing
nude on magazine covers. Cindy Crawford
posed for W Magazine; Claudia Schiffer for
Vogue; Christina Aguilera for Marie Claire;
Britney Spears for Harper’s Bazaar; Monica
Belluci for the Italian edition of Vanity Fair;
Nadia Larguet for Femmes du Maroc. To
see those covers, click here. Unlike the
Naked Gun poster, none of these covers
appears to be parodies. Do you think any or
all of them infringe Annie Leibovitz’s
photograph?

. . . the parodic comment of the ad might reasonably be perceived as reenforced
[sic] by the kidding comments of the movie concerning pregnancy and
parenthood.
Finally, although the court found that Paramount had taken protectable expression from
Leibovitz’s photograph, it seemed to be influenced by the fact that Leibovitz had photographed
Moore in a pose that is so well known in classical art that it has its own name, “Venus Pudica.”
Though Sandro Botticelli by no means originated that pose, he may have painted the most
famous portrayal of it in “The Birth of Venus.” The Leibovitz court commented:
A photographer posing a well-known actress in a manner that calls to mind a
well-known painting must expect, or at least tolerate, a parodist’s deflating
ridicule.

13
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Four Venus Pudicas:
Sandro Botticelli, “The Birth of Venus”; Annie Leibovitz, photograph of Demi Moore for
the cover of the August 1991 issue of Vanity Fair; Paramount Pictures, poster for “Naked
Gun 33 1/3 The Final Insult”; Photo illustration by Darrow, photographs by Danny Kim for
the cover of the October 3, 2011 issue of New York Magazine
•

In Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P., 279 F.Supp.3d 497 (S.D.N.Y 2017), Lombardo’s
work was a stage play that purportedly parodied How the Grinch Stole Christmas by Dr. Seuss.
The play, called Who’s Holiday, featured a single performer playing the role of, as the court put
it, “a rather down and out 45 year-old version of Cindy Lou Who,” a character who appeared
in the original Grinch story as an innocent two-year old girl. The following from the court’s
opinion gives the flavor of defendant’s work:
Throughout the Play, as she shares her history, Cindy–Lou drinks hard alcohol,
abuses prescription pills, and smokes a substance she identifies as “Who
Hash,” which she describes as just “like a prescription” which keeps her in
check to avoid a “conniption.” She engages in this self-medication following her
14
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realization that none of the guests she invited to her party is likely to attend,
as they keep calling throughout the Play to cancel.
As Cindy–Lou recounts her initial encounter with the Grinch and his
subsequent change of heart, paralleling the plot of the original Grinch, she
incorporates age-inappropriate language and details that do not appear in the
original work.
Lombardo sought a declaratory judgment that the play was non-infringing because it fell within
the parameters of fair use. The court concluded that the work was indeed a parody because it
recontextualizes Grinch's easily-recognizable plot and rhyming style by placing
Cindy–Lou Who—a symbol of childhood innocence and naiveté—in outlandish,
profanity-laden, adult-themed scenarios involving topics such as poverty, teenage pregnancy, drug and alcohol abuse, prison culture, and murder. In so doing,
the Play subverts the expectations of the Seussian genre, and lampoons
the Grinch by making Cindy–Lou's naiveté, Who–Ville's endlessly-smiling,
problem-free citizens, and Dr. Seuss' rhyming innocence, all appear ridiculous.
* * *
In the Play, Who–Ville is no longer a place where people can overcome adversity
by smiling and singing together. Who–Ville is now a place where young women
are impregnated by green beasts, families struggle to put food on the table,
paparazzi run rabid, and citizens get high on “Who Hash” to escape problems of
daily life.
As such, the court found the play to be
transformative. Because of that assessment, the court
discounted the commercial nature of the play, which might
normally count against fair use. The court also found that the
amount of material taken from Grinch was not excessive,
given the parodic objectives of the play. Finally, regarding
the effect of the parody on the market, the court noted that
“there is virtually no possibility that consumers will go see
the Play in lieu of reading Grinch or watching an authorized
derivative work, such as the 2000 film Dr. Seuss' How the Grinch
Stole Christmas.” Consequently the court granted a declaratory
judgment of non-infringement in favor of Lombardo.

SEE IT
If you would like to see a short
montage of clips from Who’s
Holiday, you can click here. If
you’d like to relive a slice of
your childhood, or if you are
reviewing these materials near
the end of the fall semester, you
can click here to get in the spirit
of the season and watch an
excerpt from The Grinch Who Stole
Christmas.
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—————
Do you think the courts that decided these two cases were too generous in their
application of the fair use doctrine?

B. Some Applications
p.368 – Insert the following after note 1 (carry-over paragraph)
1A.
Use of Commercial Copy-Shop by Non-Profit Licensee. In the Princeton
University Press case, the faculty members who instigated the copying did not have a license from
the copyright owners. If they had made the copies themselves, they would have been guilty of
prima facie infringement, and would have had to rely on a claim of fair use to defend any suit
against them. What if those faculty members, or their
GO ONLINE
university, had a license to reproduce and distribute the
material in non-profit educational contexts? Would it then be
Has Great Minds in fact altered
permissible for them to use the services of an outside for-profit
its license in light of the Second
copy shop to make the copies? That was the situation the
Circuit’s ruling? Not when we
court confronted in Great Minds v. Fedex Office and Print
last checked. But you can check
too, by examining the license for
Services, Inc., 886 F.3d 91 (2nd Cir. 2018). The plaintiff in that
the
Eureka
Math
Basic
case, Great Minds, is a non-profit organization that publishes,
Curriculum, which forms one
among other things, math textbooks under the name Eureka
part of the Great Minds
Math. Great Minds sells these books, but also makes PDF
website’s terms of service.
copies available on-line, free of charge, subject to a Creative
Commons license, a royalty-free non-exclusive license that among others things, forbids licensees
from using the work for profit. (For a more extensive discussion of these licenses, see Note 5 on p.
685). When a number of school districts asked FedEx copy shops to make copies of the materials
for use by their students, Great Minds sued. It argued that since FedEx was reproducing and
sharing the materials, FedEx was subject to the limits of the license, which forbids copying for
profit. The court said that this argument “fails to account for the mundane ubiquity of lawful
agency relationships, in which ‘one person, to one degree or another . . ., acts as a representative
of or otherwise acts on behalf of another person.’ ” It consequently concluded that the school
districts could rely on non-employee agents – such as FedEx – to validly exercise rights under the
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license. However, it commented that “Great Minds could, if it wished, draft a public license that
specified whether, and under what circumstances, a licensee may rely on employees or nonemployee agents in reproducing or otherwise engaging with the Materials. But Great Minds
included no such specification in the license at issue here.” Would you expect Great Minds to
redraft its license? Is there any reason for them to refrain from doing so?
The Great Minds court distinguished Princeton University Press with the following
observation:
Unlike the defendants in Princeton and Basic Books, FedEx sold the school districts its
copying services, not ready-made copies of the Materials themselves. Moreover, those
cases concern the proper application of the “fair use” defense, which requires a court to
consider the “purpose and character” of each defendant's use of the copyrighted materials,
“including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes.” For purposes of this appeal, however, FedEx has disclaimed reliance on the fair
use defense, and, given our reliance on agency principles and the text of the License to
reach our conclusion, we find these cases inapt.
Are you convinced? Would the Princeton case have come out the other way if the University had
paid the copy shop, a University employee had picked up the course-packs, and then they were
sold to students by the faculty members’ secretaries?

p. 395 – Insert the following above note 8:
7A: A Video Search Engine Exceeds Fair Use Limits.
TVEyes runs a video search engine that is in many respects similar to Google Book Search.
It records 1400 channels of video 24 hours a day. It makes that video text-searchable by recording
and indexing the closed-caption text provided with the video, or by using speech-to-text
software. Yet while Google Book Search only provides “snippets” – very short segments of text –
when it does not have any agreement with the owner of copyright in a book, TVEyes provides 10
minute segments of video, for its approximately $500 per month subscription fee. Those tenminute clips are what made the difference for both the District Court and the Second Circuit,
which held in Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169 (2018) that TVEyes’ use of
Fox News video did not qualify as a fair use. The Second Circuit found that TVEyes’ use was only
“somewhat transformative,” because while it provided search functionality, it presented the tenminute clips “as is,” without alteration or comment. The for-profit service was also “commercial,”
even though it required clients to promise that they would only use the clips for “internal
purposes.” Given the brevity of the average news segment that TVEyes users seek, the 10-minute
clips probably give them the entirety of what they want, weighing against fair use. Finally, the
success of the TVEyes service shows that there is a market for searchable access to televised
content, and TVEyes is thus undercutting Fox News’s ability to license searchable access to
content in which it owns copyright.
Do you agree with the distinctions that the Second Circuit drew between Google Book
Search and the TVEyes service? Should the service be deemed “commercial” even when
subscribers promised to make only “internal use” of the clips, presumably meaning that they
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would not publicly perform or distribute copies of them? Does the $500 per month subscription
fee make the TVEyes market different from the market consisting of ordinary Fox News watchers,
and should that make a different to the fair use analysis? Compare Cariou v. Prince, discussed
above in note 6, in which the Second Circuit seemed to hold that the large price difference
between Patrick Cariou’s photographs and the Richard Prince paintings that incorporated them
weighed in favor of Prince’s having made fair use. Are TVEyes and Prince in tension here?

From the TV Eyes Web Site Home Page
p. 396 – Replace “C. Interoperability and Reverse Engineering,” pp. 396-404,
with the following
C. Fair Use and Computer Programs
In June 2021, after an absence of over 25 years, the Supreme Court returned to consider the
doctrine of fair use in the context of computer programs and “application programming
interfaces”:

Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.
United States Supreme Court, 2021
141 S.Ct. 1183
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. * * *
I
In 2005, Google acquired Android, Inc., a startup firm that hoped to become involved in
smartphone software. Google sought, through Android, to develop a software platform for mobile
devices like smartphones. A platform provides the necessary infrastructure for computer
programmers to develop new programs and applications. One might think of a software platform
as a kind of factory floor where computer programmers (analogous to autoworkers, designers, or
manufacturers) might come, use sets of tools found there, and create new applications for use in,
say, smartphones.
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FOOD FOR THOUGHT
Is the analogy between a software
platform and a factory floor helpful? Note
that there is one way in which it may be
misleading. A toaster or a clothes dryer
might be built with sophisticated
machinery, but once it leaves the factory,
it needs only electricity to work; it
doesn’t need any continuing connection
or support. By contrast, the applications
built with the help of Java SE can only run
on computers running Java, and the
applications built with the Android API
can only run on devices running Android.
Can you see how that could and did make
Oracle’s and Google’s business models
different than the business model of a
traditional appliance manufacturer? The
Google v. Oracle America Court added a
diagram to explain software platforms in
an Appendix to its opinion. You can see
the Appendix and the diagram by
clicking here.

Google envisioned an Android platform that was free and
open, such that software developers could use the tools
found there free of charge. Its idea was that more and more
developers using its Android platform would develop ever
more Android-based applications, all of which would
make Google’s Android-based smartphones more
attractive to ultimate consumers. Consumers would then
buy and use ever more of those phones. Oracle America, Inc.
v. Google Inc., 872 F.Supp.2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2012). That
vision required attracting a sizeable number of skilled
programmers.

At that time, many software developers understood and
wrote programs using the Java programming language, a
language invented by Sun Microsystems (Oracle’s
predecessor). 872 F.Supp.2d at 975, 977. About six million
programmers had spent considerable time learning, and
then using, the Java language.
Many of those
programmers used Sun’s own popular Java SE platform to
develop new programs primarily for use in desktop and
laptop computers. That platform allowed developers
using the Java language to write programs that were able
to run on any desktop or laptop computer, regardless of the underlying hardware (i.e., the
programs were in large part “interoperable”). 872 F.Supp.2d at 977. Indeed, one of Sun’s slogans
was “ ‘write once, run anywhere.’ ” 886 F.3d at 1186.
***
The record indicates that roughly 100 Google engineers worked for more than three years to create
Google’s Android platform software. Id., at 45, 117, 212. In doing so, Google tailored the Android
platform to smartphone technology, which differs from desktop and laptop computers in
important ways. A smartphone, for instance, may run on a more limited battery or take advantage
of GPS technology. Id., at 197–198. The Android platform offered programmers the ability to
program for that environment. To build the platform, Google wrote millions of lines of new code.
Because Google wanted millions of programmers, familiar with Java, to be able easily to work with
its new Android platform, it also copied roughly 11,500 lines of code from the Java SE program.
886 F.3d at 1187. The copied lines of code are part of a tool called an Application Programming
Interface, or API.
What is an API? The Federal Circuit described an API as a tool that “allow[s] programmers to use
... prewritten code to build certain functions into their own programs, rather than write their own
code to perform those functions from scratch.” Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1349
(2014). Through an API, a programmer can draw upon a vast library of prewritten code to carry
out complex tasks. For lay persons, including judges, juries, and many others, some elaboration of
this description may prove useful.
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Consider in more detail just what an API does. A computer can perform thousands, perhaps
millions, of different tasks that a programmer may wish to use. These tasks range from the most
basic to the enormously complex. Ask the computer, for example, to tell you which of two
numbers is the higher number or to sort one thousand numbers in ascending order, and it will
instantly give you the right answer. An API divides and organizes the world of computing tasks
in a particular way. Programmers can then use the API to select the particular task that they need
for their programs. In Sun’s API (which we refer to as the Sun Java API), each individual task is
known as a “method.” The API groups somewhat similar methods into larger “classes,” and groups
somewhat similar classes into larger “packages.” This method-class-package organizational
structure is referred to as the Sun Java API’s “structure, sequence, and organization,” or SSO.
For each task, there is computer code, known as “implementing
code,” that in effect tells the computer how to execute the particular
task you have asked it to perform (such as telling you, of two
numbers, which is the higher). See Oracle, 872 F.Supp.2d at 979–980.
The implementing code (which Google independently wrote) is not
at issue here. For a single task, the implementing code may be
hundreds of lines long. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, for
a programmer to create complex software programs without
drawing on prewritten task-implementing programs to execute
discrete tasks.

GO ONLINE
In another appendix to its
opinion, the Google v. Oracle
America Court presented a
diagram of the Sun Java API.
You can see that diagram by
clicking here. The entire API
specification for Java
Standard Edition 16 is
available here.

But how do you as the programmer tell the computer which of the implementing code programs
it should choose, i.e., which task it should carry out? You do so by entering into your own program
a command that corresponds to the specific task and calls it up. Those commands, known as
“method calls,” help you carry out the task by choosing those programs written in implementing
code that will do the trick, i.e., that will instruct the computer so that your program will find the
higher of two numbers. If a particular computer might perform, say, a million different tasks,
different method calls will tell the computer which of those tasks to choose. Those familiar with
the Java language already know countless method calls that allow them to invoke countless tasks.
And how does the method call (which a programmer types) actually locate and invoke the
particular implementing code that it needs to instruct the computer how to carry out a particular
task? It does so through another type of code, which the parties have labeled “declaring code.”
Declaring code is part of the API. For each task, the specific command entered by the programmer
matches up with specific declaring code inside the API. That declaring code provides both the
name for each task and the location of each task within the API’s overall organizational system
(i.e., the placement of a method within a particular class and the placement of a class within a
particular package). In this sense, the declaring code and the method call form a link, allowing the
programmer to draw upon the thousands of prewritten tasks, written in implementing code. See
id., at 979–980. Without that declaring code, the method calls entered by the programmer would
not call up the implementing code.
The declaring code therefore performs at least two important functions in the Sun Java API. The
first, more obvious, function is that the declaring code enables a set of shortcuts for programmers.
By connecting complex implementing code with method calls, it allows a programmer to pick out
from the API’s task library a particular task without having to learn anything more than a simple
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command. For example, a programmer building a new application for personal banking may wish
to use various tasks to, say, calculate a user’s balance or authenticate a password. To do so, she
need only learn the method calls associated with those tasks. In this way, the declaring code’s
shortcut function is similar to a gas pedal in a car that tells the car to move faster or the QWERTY
keyboard on a typewriter that calls up a certain letter when you press a particular key. As those
analogies demonstrate, one can think of the declaring code as part of an interface between human
beings and a machine.
The second, less obvious, function is to reflect the way in which Java’s creators have divided the
potential world of different tasks into an actual world, i.e., precisely which set of potentially
millions of different tasks we want to have our Java-based computer systems perform and how
we want those tasks arranged and grouped. In this sense, the declaring code performs an
organizational function. It determines the structure of the task library that Java’s creators have
decided to build. . . . The developers of Java, for example, decided to place a method called “draw
image” inside of a class called “graphics.”
***
Now let us consider the example that the District Court used to explain the precise technology
here. Id., at 980–981. A programmer wishes, as part of her program, to determine which of two
integers is the larger. To do so in the Java language, she will first write java.lang. Those words
(which we have put in bold type) refer to the “package” (or by analogy to the file cabinet). She
will then write Math. That word refers to the “class” (or by analogy to the drawer). She will then
write max. That word refers to the “method” (or by analogy to the recipe). She will then make
two parentheses ( ). And, in between the parentheses she will put two integers, say 4 and 6, that
she wishes to compare. The whole expression—the method call—will look like this:
“java.lang.Math.max(4, 6).” The use of this expression will, by means of the API, call up a taskimplementing program that will determine the higher number.
In writing this program, the programmer will use the very symbols we have placed in bold in the
precise order we have placed them. But the symbols by themselves do nothing. She must also use
software that connects the symbols to the equivalent of file cabinets, drawers, and files. The API
is that software. It includes both the declaring code that links each part of the method call to the
particular task-implementing program, and the implementing code that actually carries it out.
Now we can return to the copying at issue in this case. Google did not copy the task-implementing
programs, or implementing code, from the Sun Java API. It wrote its own task-implementing
programs, such as those that would determine which of two integers is the greater or carry out
any other desired (normally far more complex) task. This implementing code constitutes the vast
majority of both the Sun Java API and the API that Google created for Android. App. 212. For most
of the packages in its new API, Google also wrote its own declaring code. For 37 packages,
however, Google copied the declaring code from the Sun Java API. Id., at 106–107. As just
explained, that means that, for those 37 packages, Google necessarily copied both the names given
to particular tasks and the grouping of those tasks into classes and packages.
In doing so, Google copied that portion of the Sun Java API that allowed programmers expert in
the Java programming language to use the “task calling” system that they had already learned. As
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Google saw it, the 37 packages at issue included those tasks that were likely to prove most useful
to programmers working on applications for mobile devices. In fact, “three of these packages were
... fundamental to being able to use the Java language at all.” Oracle, 872 F.Supp.2d at 982. By using
the same declaring code for those packages, programmers using the Android platform can rely on
the method calls that they are already familiar with to call up particular tasks (e.g., determining
which of two integers is the greater); but Google’s own implementing programs carry out those
tasks. Without that copying, programmers would need to learn an entirely new system to call up
the same tasks.
We add that the Android platform has been successful. Within five years of its release in 2007,
Android-based devices claimed a large share of the United States market. Id., at 978. As of 2015,
Android sales produced more than $42 billion in revenue. 886 F.3d at 1187.
In 2010 Oracle Corporation bought Sun. Soon thereafter Oracle brought this lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California.

II
The case has a complex and lengthy history. [After the first trial, the District Court held that the
declaring code and organizational structure of the Sun Java API was not copyrightable, because it
was a “system or method of operation” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). On appeal, the
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that both the API’s declaring code and its structure were
copyrightable. It remanded for another trial on Google’s affirmative defense of fair use. After that
trial, a jury found that Google’s use of the Sun Java API was a fair use. On appeal, the Federal
Circuit again reversed, holding that Google’s use was not a fair use. The Supreme Court granted
Google’s petition for certiorari on both the copyrightability and fair use issues.]
III
****
B
Given the rapidly changing technological, economic, and business-related circumstances, we
believe we should not answer more than is necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. We shall
assume, but purely for argument’s sake, that the entire Sun Java API falls within the definition of
that which can be copyrighted. We shall ask instead whether Google’s use of part of that API was
a “fair use.” Unlike the Federal Circuit, we conclude that it was.
IV
* * * [I]n our view, fair use can play an important role in determining the lawful scope of a
computer program copyright, such as the copyright at issue here. It can help to distinguish among
technologies. It can distinguish between expressive and functional features of computer code
where those features are mixed. It can focus on the legitimate need to provide incentives to
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produce copyrighted material while examining the extent to which yet further protection creates
unrelated or illegitimate harms in other markets or to the development of other products. In a
word, it can carry out its basic purpose of providing a context-based check that can help to keep
a copyright monopoly within its lawful bounds. . . .
***
By defining computer programs in § 101, Congress chose to place this subject matter within the
copyright regime. Like other protected works, that means that the owners of computer programs
enjoy the exclusive rights set forth in the Act, including the right to “reproduce [a] copyrighted
work” or to “prepare derivative works.” 17 U.S.C. § 106. But that also means that exclusive rights
in computer programs are limited like any other works. Just as fair use distinguishes among books
and films, which are indisputably subjects of copyright, so too must it draw lines among computer
programs. And just as fair use takes account of the market in which scripts and paintings are
bought and sold, so too must it consider the realities of how technological works are created and
disseminated. We do not believe that an approach close to “all or nothing” would be faithful to
the Copyright Act’s overall design.
V
[The Court held that the question of whether a use is a “fair use” is a mixed question of fact and
law. Although reviewing courts should appropriately defer to the jury’s findings of underlying
facts, the ultimate question of whether those facts showed a “fair use” is a legal question for judges
to decide de novo. It also held that judges’ de novo review of a jury’ decision on fair use did not violate
the Seventh Amendment.]
VI
We turn now to the basic legal question before us: Was Google’s copying of the Sun Java API,
specifically its use of the declaring code and organizational structure for 37 packages of that API,
a “fair use.” In answering this question, we shall consider the four factors set forth in the fair use
statute as we find them applicable to the kind of computer programs before us. . . . For expository
purposes, we begin with the second.
A. “The Nature of the Copyrighted Work”
The Sun Java API is a “user interface.” It provides a way through which users (here the
programmers) can “manipulate and control” task-performing computer programs “via a series of
menu commands.” Lotus Development Corp., 49 F.3d at 809. The API reflects Sun’s division of
possible tasks that a computer might perform into a set of actual tasks that certain kinds of
computers actually will perform. Sun decided, for example, that its API would call up a task that
compares one integer with another to see which is the larger. Sun’s API (to our knowledge) will
not call up the task of determining which great Arabic scholar decided to use Arabic numerals
(rather than Roman numerals) to perform that “larger integer” task. No one claims that the
decisions about what counts as a task are themselves copyrightable—although one might argue
about decisions as to how to label and organize such tasks (e.g., the decision to name a certain task
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“max” or to place it in a class called “Math.” Cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S., 99, 25 L.Ed. 841 (1880)).
***
[T]he copied declaring code and the uncopied implementing programs call for, and reflect,
different kinds of capabilities. A single implementation may walk a computer through dozens of
different steps. To write implementing programs, witnesses told the jury, requires balancing such
considerations as how quickly a computer can execute a task or the likely size of the computer’s
memory. One witness described that creativity as “magic” practiced by an API developer when he
or she worries “about things like power management” for devices that “run on a battery.” This is
the very creativity that was needed to develop the Android software for use not in laptops or
desktops but in the very different context of smartphones.
The declaring code (inseparable from the programmer’s method calls) embodies a different kind
of creativity. Sun Java’s creators, for example, tried to find declaring code names that would prove
intuitively easy to remember. They wanted to attract programmers who would learn the system,
help to develop it further, and prove reluctant to use another. See post, at 1215 (“Declaring code ...
is user facing. It must be designed and organized in a way that is intuitive and understandable to
developers so that they can invoke it”). Sun’s business strategy originally emphasized the
importance of using the API to attract programmers. It sought to make the API “open” and “then
... compete on implementations.” The testimony at trial was replete with examples of witnesses
drawing this critical line between the user-centered declaratory code and the innovative
implementing code.
These features mean that, as part of a user interface, the declaring code differs to some degree from
the mine run of computer programs. Like other computer programs, it is functional in nature. But
unlike many other programs, its use is inherently bound together with uncopyrightable ideas
(general task division and organization) and new creative expression (Android’s implementing
code). Unlike many other programs, its value in significant part derives from the value that those
who do not hold copyrights, namely, computer programmers, invest of their own time and effort
to learn the API’s system. And unlike many other programs, its value lies in its efforts to encourage
programmers to learn and to use that system so that they will use (and continue to use) Sunrelated implementing programs that Google did not copy.
Although copyrights protect many different kinds of writing, we have emphasized the need to
“recogni[ze] that some works are closer to the core of [copyright] than others,” Campbell, 510 U.S.,
at 586, 114 S.Ct. 1164. In our view, for the reasons just described, the declaring code is, if
copyrightable at all, further than are most computer programs (such as the implementing code)
from the core of copyright. That fact diminishes the fear, expressed by both the dissent and the
Federal Circuit, that application of “fair use” here would seriously undermine the general
copyright protection that Congress provided for computer programs. And it means that this
factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” points in the direction of fair use.
B. “The Purpose and Character of the Use”
In the context of fair use, we have considered whether the copier’s use “adds something new, with
a further purpose or different character, altering” the copyrighted work “with new expression,
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meaning or message.” Id., at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Commentators have put the matter more broadly,
asking whether the copier’s use “fulfill[s] the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for
public illumination.” Leval 1111. In answering this question, we have used the word
“transformative” to describe a copying use that adds something new and important. Campbell, 510
U.S., at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164. An “ ‘artistic painting’ ” might, for example, fall within the scope of fair
use even though it precisely replicates a copyrighted “ ‘advertising logo to make a comment about
consumerism.’ ” 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05[A][1][b] (quoting Netanel, Making Sense of Fair
Use, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 715, 746 (2011)). Or, as we held in Campbell, a parody can be
transformative because it comments on the original or criticizes it, for “[p]arody needs to mimic
an original to make its point.” 510 U.S., at 580–581, 114 S.Ct. 1164.
Google copied portions of the Sun Java API precisely, and it did so in part for the same reason that
Sun created those portions, namely, to enable programmers to call up implementing programs
that would accomplish particular tasks. But since virtually any unauthorized use of a copyrighted
computer program (say, for teaching or research) would do the same, to stop here would severely
limit the scope of fair use in the functional context of computer programs. Rather, in determining
whether a use is “transformative,” we must go further and examine the copying’s more specifically
described “purpose[s]” and “character.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
Here Google’s use of the Sun Java API seeks to create new products. It seeks to expand the use
and usefulness of Android-based smartphones. Its new product offers programmers a highly
creative and innovative tool for a smartphone environment. To the extent that Google used parts
of the Sun Java API to create a new platform that could be readily used by programmers, its use
was consistent with that creative “progress” that is the basic constitutional objective of copyright
itself. Cf. Feist, 499 U.S., at 349–350, 111 S.Ct. 1282 (“The primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ ” (quoting
U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
The jury heard that Google limited its use of the Sun Java API to tasks and specific programming
demands related to Android. It copied the API (which Sun created for use in desktop and laptop
computers) only insofar as needed to include tasks that would be useful in smartphone programs.
App. 169–170. And it did so only insofar as needed to allow programmers to call upon those tasks
without discarding a portion of a familiar programming language and learning a new one. Id., at
139–140. To repeat, Google, through Android, provided a new collection of tasks operating in a
distinct and different computing environment. Those tasks were carried out through the use of
new implementing code (that Google wrote) designed to operate within that new environment.
Some of the amici refer to what Google did as “reimplementation,” defined as the “building of a
system ... that repurposes the same words and syntaxes” of an existing system—in this case so
that programmers who had learned an existing system could put their basic skills to use in a new
one. Brief for R Street Institute et al. as Amici Curiae 2.
The record here demonstrates the numerous ways in which reimplementing an interface can
further the development of computer programs. The jury heard that shared interfaces are
necessary for different programs to speak to each other. App. 125 (“We have to agree on the APIs
so that the application I write to show a movie runs on your device”). It heard that the
reimplementation of interfaces is necessary if programmers are to be able to use their acquired
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skills. Id., at 191 (“If the API labels change, then either the software wouldn’t continue to work
anymore or the developer ... would have to learn a whole new language to be able to use these API
labels”). It heard that the reuse of APIs is common in the industry. Id., at 115, 155, 663. It heard that
Sun itself had used pre-existing interfaces in creating Java. Id., at 664. And it heard that Sun
executives thought that widespread use of the Java programming language, including use on a
smartphone platform, would benefit the company. Id., at 130–133.
****
These and related facts convince us that the “purpose and character” of Google’s copying was
transformative—to the point where this factor too weighs in favor of fair use.
[The Court notes that courts have also considered commerciality and good faith as part of the first
factor inquiry. As for commerciality, the Court notes that many fair uses, such as news reporting,
are also often commercial, and also that commerciality will be less important when a use is
transformative. As for good faith, it suggests that skepticism about the role of that consideration
is justifiable, but holds only that alleged bad faith is not determinative in this instance given the
weight of other factors.]
C. “The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used”
If one considers the declaring code in isolation, the quantitative amount of what Google copied
was large. Google copied the declaring code for 37 packages of the Sun Java API, totaling
approximately 11,500 lines of code. Those lines of code amount to virtually all the declaring code
needed to call up hundreds of different tasks. On the other hand, if one considers the entire set of
software material in the Sun Java API, the quantitative amount copied was small. The total set of
Sun Java API computer code, including implementing code, amounted to 2.86 million lines, of
which the copied 11,500 lines were only 0.4 percent. . . .
Several features of Google’s copying suggest that the better way to look at the numbers is to take
into account the several million lines that Google did not copy. For one thing, the Sun Java API is
inseparably bound to those task-implementing lines. Its purpose is to call them up. For another,
Google copied those lines not because of their creativity, their beauty, or even (in a sense) because
of their purpose. It copied them because programmers had already learned to work with the Sun
Java API’s system, and it would have been difficult, perhaps prohibitively so, to attract
programmers to build its Android smartphone system without them. Further, Google’s basic
purpose was to create a different task-related system for a different computing environment
(smartphones) and to create a platform—the Android platform—that would help achieve and
popularize that objective. The “substantiality” factor will generally weigh in favor of fair use
where, as here, the amount of copying was tethered to a valid, and transformative, purpose. Supra,
at 1203 – 1204; see Campbell, 510 U.S., at 586–587, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (explaining that the factor three
“enquiry will harken back to the first of the statutory factors, for ... the extent of permissible
copying varies with the purpose and character of the use”).
***
We consequently believe that this “substantiality” factor weighs in favor of fair use.
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D. Market Effects
The fourth statutory factor focuses upon the “effect” of the copying in the “market for or value of
the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). Consideration of this factor, at least where computer
programs are at issue, can prove more complex than at first it may seem. It can require a court to
consider the amount of money that the copyright owner might lose. * * * As we pointed out in
Campbell, “verbatim copying of the original in its entirety for commercial purposes” may well
produce a market substitute for an author’s work. 510 U.S., at 591, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Making a film of
an author’s book may similarly mean potential or presumed losses to the copyright owner. Those
losses normally conflict with copyright’s basic objective: providing authors with exclusive rights
that will spur creative expression.
But a potential loss of revenue is not the whole story. We here must consider not just the amount
but also the source of the loss. As we pointed out in Campbell, a “lethal parody, like a scathing
theatre review,” may “kil[l] demand for the original.” Id., at 591–592, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Yet this kind
of harm, even if directly translated into foregone dollars, is not “cognizable under the Copyright
Act.” Id., at 592, 114 S.Ct. 1164.
Further, we must take into account the public benefits the copying will likely produce. Are those
benefits, for example, related to copyright’s concern for the creative production of new
expression? Are they comparatively important, or unimportant, when compared with dollar
amounts likely lost (taking into account as well the nature of the source of the loss)? Cf. MCA, INC.
v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (C.A.2 1981) (calling for a balancing of public benefits and losses to
copyright owner under this factor).
We do not say that these questions are always relevant to the application of fair use, not even in
the world of computer programs. Nor do we say that these questions are the only questions a
court might ask. But we do find them relevant here in helping to determine the likely market
effects of Google’s reimplementation.
As to the likely amount of loss, the jury could have found that Android did not harm the actual or
potential markets for Java SE. And it could have found that Sun itself (now Oracle) would not
have been able to enter those markets successfully whether Google did, or did not, copy a part of
its API. First, evidence at trial demonstrated that, regardless of Android’s smartphone technology,
Sun was poorly positioned to succeed in the mobile phone market.
***
Second, the jury was repeatedly told that devices using Google’s Android platform were different
in kind from those that licensed Sun’s technology. For instance, witnesses explained that the
broader industry distinguished between smartphones and simpler “feature phones.” Id., at 237. As
to the specific devices that used Sun-created software, the jury heard that one of these phones
lacked a touchscreen, id., at 359–360, while another did not have a QWERTY keyboard, id., at 672.
For other mobile devices, the evidence showed that simpler products, like the Kindle, used Java
software, id., at 396, while more advanced technology, like the Kindle Fire, were built on the
Android operating system, id., at 206. This record evidence demonstrates that, rather than just
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“repurposing [Sun’s] code from larger computers to smaller computers,” post, at 16, Google’s
Android platform was part of a distinct (and more advanced) market than Java software.
Looking to these important differences, Google’s economic expert told the jury that Android was
not a market substitute for Java’s software. As he explained, “the two products are on very
different devices,” and the Android platform, which offers “an entire mobile operating stack,” is a
“very different typ[e] of produc[t]” than Java SE, which is “just an applications programming
framework.” App. 256; see also id., at 172–174. Taken together, the evidence showed that Sun’s
mobile phone business was declining, while the market increasingly demanded a new form of
smartphone technology that Sun was never able to offer.
Finally, the jury also heard evidence that Sun foresaw a benefit from the broader use of the Java
programming language in a new platform like Android, as it would further expand the network
of Java-trained programmers. Id., at 131–133; see also id., at 153 (“Once an API starts getting
reimplemented, you know it has succeeded”). In other words, the jury could have understood
Android and Java SE as operating in two distinct markets. And because there are two markets at
issue, programmers learning the Java language to work in one market (smartphones) are then able
to bring those talents to the other market (laptops). See 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05[A][4]
(explaining that factor four asks what the impact of “widespread conduct of the sort engaged in
by the defendant” would be on the market for the present work).
Oracle presented evidence to the contrary. Indeed, the Federal Circuit held that the “market
effects” factor militated against fair use in part because Sun had tried to enter the Android market.
886 F.3d at 1209 (Sun sought licensing agreement with Google). But those licensing negotiations
concerned much more than 37 packages of declaring code, covering topics like “the
implementation of [Java’s] code” and “branding and cooperation” between the firms. App. 245;
see also 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05[A][4] (cautioning against the “danger of circularity
posed” by considering unrealized licensing opportunities because “it is a given in every fair use
case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential market if that potential is defined as the theoretical
market for licensing the very use at bar”). In any event, the jury’s fair use determination means
that neither Sun’s effort to obtain a license nor Oracle’s conflicting evidence can overcome
evidence indicating that, at a minimum, it would have been difficult for Sun to enter the
smartphone market, even had Google not used portions of the Sun Java API.
On the other hand, Google’s copying helped Google make a vast amount of money from its
Android platform. And enforcement of the Sun Java API copyright might give Oracle a significant
share of these funds. It is important, however, to consider why and how Oracle might have become
entitled to this money. When a new interface, like an API or a spreadsheet program, first comes
on the market, it may attract new users because of its expressive qualities, such as a better visual
screen or because of its superior functionality. As time passes, however, it may be valuable for a
different reason, namely, because users, including programmers, are just used to it. They have
already learned how to work with it. See Lotus Development Corp., 49 F.3d at 821 (BOUDIN, J.,
concurring).
The record here is filled with evidence that this factor accounts for Google’s desire to use the Sun
Java API. See, e.g., App. 169–170, 213–214. This source of Android’s profitability has much to do
with third parties’ (say, programmers’) investment in Sun Java programs. It has correspondingly
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less to do with Sun’s investment in creating the Sun Java API. We have no reason to believe that
the Copyright Act seeks to protect third parties’ investment in learning how to operate a created
work. Cf. Campbell, 510 U.S., at 591–592, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (discussing the need to identify those harms
that are “cognizable under the Copyright Act”).
Finally, given programmers’ investment in learning the Sun Java API, to allow enforcement of
Oracle’s copyright here would risk harm to the public. Given the costs and difficulties of
producing alternative APIs with similar appeal to programmers, allowing enforcement here
would make of the Sun Java API’s declaring code a lock limiting the future creativity of new
programs. Oracle alone would hold the key. The result could well prove highly profitable to Oracle
(or other firms holding a copyright in computer interfaces). But those profits could well flow from
creative improvements, new applications, and new uses developed by users who have learned to
work with that interface. To that extent, the lock would interfere with, not further, copyright’s
basic creativity objectives. See Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d at 607; see also Sega Enterprises, 977 F.2d at
1523–1524 (“An attempt to monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete
runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression”); Lexmark Int’l, 387 F.3d
at 544 (noting that where a subsequent user copied a computer program to foster functionality,
it was not exploiting the programs “commercial value as a copyrighted work” (emphasis in original)).
After all, “copyright supplies the economic incentive to [both] create and disseminate ideas,”
Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 558, 105 S.Ct. 2218, and the reimplementation of a user interface allows
creative new computer code to more easily enter the market.
The uncertain nature of Sun’s ability to compete in Android’s market place, the sources of its lost
revenue, and the risk of creativity-related harms to the public, when taken together, convince that
this fourth factor—market effects—also weighs in favor of fair use.
***
The fact that computer programs are primarily functional makes it difficult to apply traditional
copyright concepts in that technological world. See Lotus Development Corp., 49 F.3d at 820
(BOUDIN, J., concurring). In doing so here, we have not changed the nature of those concepts.
We do not overturn or modify our earlier cases involving fair use—cases, for example, that involve
“knockoff” products, journalistic writings, and parodies. Rather, we here recognize that
application of a copyright doctrine such as fair use has long proved a cooperative effort of
Legislatures and courts, and that Congress, in our view, intended that it so continue. As such, we
have looked to the principles set forth in the fair use statute, § 107, and set forth in our earlier
cases, and applied them to this different kind of copyrighted work.
We reach the conclusion that in this case, where Google reimplemented a user interface, taking
only what was needed to allow users to put their accrued talents to work in a new and
transformative program, Google’s copying of the Sun Java API was a fair use of that material as a
matter of law. The Federal Circuit’s contrary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice BARRETT took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice ALITO joins, dissenting.
Oracle spent years developing a programming library that successfully attracted software
developers, thus enhancing the value of Oracle’s products. Google sought a license to use the
library in Android, the operating system it was developing for mobile phones. But when the
companies could not agree on terms, Google simply copied verbatim 11,500 lines of code from the
library. As a result, it erased 97.5% of the value of Oracle’s partnership with Amazon, made tens
of billions of dollars, and established its position as the owner of the largest mobile operating
system in the world. Despite this, the majority holds that this copying was fair use.
The Court reaches this unlikely result in large part because it bypasses the antecedent question
clearly before us: Is the software code at issue here protected by the Copyright Act? The majority
purports to assume, without deciding, that the code is protected. But its fair-use analysis is wholly
inconsistent with the substantial protection Congress gave to computer code. By skipping over
the copyrightability question, the majority disregards half the relevant statutory text and distorts
its fair-use analysis. Properly considering that statutory text, Oracle’s code at issue here is
copyrightable, and Google’s use of that copyrighted code was anything but fair.
****
II
The Court wrongly sidesteps the principal question that we were asked to answer: Is declaring
code protected by copyright? I would hold that it is.
Computer code occupies a unique space in intellectual property. Copyright law generally protects
works of authorship. Patent law generally protects inventions or discoveries. A library of code
straddles these two categories. It is highly functional like an invention; yet as a writing, it is also
a work of authorship. Faced with something that could fit in either space, Congress chose
copyright, and it included declaring code in that protection.
[Justice Thomas concludes that declaring code is an original work of authorship that is not
excluded as a “method of operation,” nor by the merger doctrine.]
III
***
Congress has established four statutory fair-use factors for courts to weigh.4 Three decisively
favor Oracle. And even assuming that the remaining factor favors Google, that factor, without
more, cannot legally establish fair use in this context.
* * *
A. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
****
. The Copyright Act protects code that operates “in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result” both “directly” (implementing code) and “indirectly” (declaring code). § 101. And if
anything, declaring code is closer to the “core of copyright.” Ante, at 1202 – 1203. Developers cannot
even see implementing code. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 2016 WL 3181206, *4 (ND Cal., June 8,
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2016); see also ante, at 1201 – 1202 (declaring code is “user-centered”). Implementing code thus
conveys no expression to developers. Declaring code, in contrast, is user facing. It must be designed
and organized in a way that is intuitive and understandable to developers so that they can invoke
it.
Even setting those concerns aside, the majority’s distinction is untenable. True, declaring code is
“inherently bound together with uncopyrightable ideas.” Ante, at 1201 – 1203. Is anything not?
Books are inherently bound with uncopyrightable ideas—the use of chapters, having a plot, or
including dialogue or footnotes.
****
Similarly, it makes no difference that the value of declaring code depends on how much time third
parties invest in learning it. Many other copyrighted works depend on the same. A Broadway
musical script needs actors and singers to invest time learning and rehearsing it. But a theater
cannot copy a script—the rights to which are held by a smaller theater—simply because it wants
to entice actors to switch theaters and because copying the script is more efficient than requiring
the actors to learn a new one.
***
B. Market Effects
****
By copying Oracle’s code to develop and release Android, Google ruined Oracle’s potential market
in at least two ways.
First, Google eliminated the reason manufacturers were willing to pay to install the Java platform.
Google’s business model differed from Oracle’s. While Oracle earned revenue by charging device
manufacturers to install the Java platform, Google obtained revenue primarily through ad sales.
Its strategy was to release Android to device manufacturers for free and then use Android as a
vehicle to collect data on consumers and deliver behavioral ads. With a free product available that
included much of Oracle’s code (and thus with similar programming potential), device
manufacturers no longer saw much reason to pay to embed the Java platform.
****
Second, Google interfered with opportunities for Oracle to license the Java platform to
developers of smartphone operating systems. Before Google copied Oracle’s code, nearly every
mobile phone on the market contained the Java platform. Oracle’s code was extraordinarily
valuable to anybody who wanted to develop smartphones, which explains why Google tried no
fewer than four times to license it.. . . . But by copying the code and releasing Android, Google
eliminated Oracle’s opportunity to license its code for that use.
The majority writes off this harm by saying that the jury could have found that Oracle might not
have been able to enter the modern smartphone market successfully. Ante, at 1206 – 1207. But
whether Oracle could itself enter that market is only half the picture. We look at not only the
potential market “that creators of original works would in general develop” but also those
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potential markets the copyright holder might “license others to develop.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994). A book author need not be able
to personally convert a book into a film so long as he can license someone else to do so. That Oracle
could have licensed its code for use in Android is undisputed.
****
.The majority expresses concern that Oracle might abuse its copyright protection (on outdated
Android versions) and “ ‘attempt to monopolize the market.’ ” Ante, at 1208 – 1209. But it is Google
that recently was fined a record $5 billion for abusing Android to violate antitrust laws. Case
AT.40099, Google Android, July 18, 2018 (Eur. Comm’n-Competition);
C. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The second-most important factor—“the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,” § 107(1)—requires us
to consider whether use was “commercial” and whether it was “transformative.” Campbell, 510 U.S.,
at 578–579, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Both aspects heavily favor Oracle.
Begin with the overwhelming commercial nature of Google’s copying. In 2015 alone, the year
before the fair-use trial, Google earned $18 billion from Android. That number has no doubt
dramatically increased as Android has grown to dominate the global market share.9 On this scale,
Google’s use of Oracle’s declaring code weighs heavily—if not decisively—against fair use.
****
The majority acknowledges that Google used the copied declaring code “for the same reason”
Oracle did. Ante, at 1203. So, by turns, the majority transforms the definition of “transformative.”
Now, we are told, “transformative” simply means—at least for computer code—a use that will
help others “create new products.” Ibid; accord, ante, at 1203 (Google’s copying “can further the
development of computer programs”).
That new definition eviscerates copyright. A movie studio that converts a book into a film without
permission not only creates a new product (the film) but enables others to “create products”—
film reviews, merchandise, YouTube highlight reels, late night television interviews, and the like.
Nearly every computer program, once copied, can be used to create new products. Surely the
majority would not say that an author can pirate the next version of Microsoft Word simply
because he can use it to create new manuscripts.
****
D. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
***
Google does not dispute the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that it copied the heart or focal points
of Oracle’s work. 886 F.3d at 1207. The declaring code is what attracted programmers to the Java
platform and why Google was so interested in that code. And Google copied that code “verbatim,”
which weighs against fair use. Harper, 471 U.S., at 565, 105 S.Ct. 2218. The majority does not
disagree. Instead, it concludes that Google took no more than necessary to create new products.
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That analysis fails because Google’s use is not transformative. Campbell, 510 U.S., at 586, 114 S.Ct.
1164 (recognizing that this fourth factor “will harken back to the [purpose-and-character]
statutory facto[r]”). This factor thus weighs against Google.
Even if Google’s use were transformative, the majority is wrong to conclude that Google copied
only a small portion of the original work. The majority points out that the 11,500 lines of declaring
code—enough to fill about 600 pages in an appendix, Tr. of Oral Arg. 57—were just a fraction of
the code in the Java platform. But the proper denominator is declaring code, not all code. A copied
work is quantitatively substantial if it could “serve as a market substitute for the original” work
or “potentially licensed derivatives” of that work. Campbell, 510 U.S., at 587, 114 S.Ct. 1164. The
declaring code is what attracted programmers. And it is what made Android a “market substitute”
for “potentially licensed derivatives” of Oracle’s Java platform. Google’s copying was both
qualitatively and quantitatively substantial.
***
In sum, three of the four statutory fair-use factors weigh decidedly against Google. The nature of
the copyrighted work—the sole factor possibly favoring Google—cannot by itself support a
determination of fair use because holding otherwise would improperly override Congress’
determination that declaring code is copyrightable.
Notes
1. What’s the Holding? The first function of the Supreme Court, like that of any court, is to
resolve the dispute before it so that the parties can go about their affairs. However, the
Supreme Court usually goes beyond that and, in resolving cases, lays down general principles.
In fact, that is one of the arguments the Google v. Oracle America Court makes in favor of treating
fair use as a mixed question of law and fact – in deciding fair use cases, courts create fair use
law. What do you take away from this case? If there is a general principle, is it limited to
computer programs? Or to all functional works (such as potentially copyrightable
architectural plans, or business forms)? Do you think this captures it: “Copying that facilitates
third party development of new works is a transformative use that is protected under the fair
use doctrine?” Or perhaps a narrower holding limited to the computer field such as: “Copying
that facilitates interoperability of software on different platforms is presumptive fair use?” Or
perhaps something even narrower such as: “Copying of ‘declaring’ code that enables the use of
a popular API familiar to millions of programmers is presumptive fair use?”
2. Who created the value? There is no doubt that the Java declaring code is valuable to Google
in large part because so many programmers have learned it. What should that mean for fair
use analysis? For Justice Breyer, it weighs in favor of fair use, because, he asserts, the declaring
code’s “value in significant part derives from the value that those who do not hold copyrights,
namely, computer programmers, invest of their own time and effort to learn the API’s system”
– and not the time, effort, or creativity that Oracle invested in creating the code. For Justice
Thomas, that is nonsense: “Oracle spent years developing a programming library that
successfully attracted software developers, thus enhancing the value of Oracle’s products.”
Who do you think has the better of this argument? Is it an argument about whether Oracle
deserves a reward, or whether copyright was needed to incentivize creation? If it is about
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incentives, is Justice Breyer arguing that different declaring code would have ended up being
learned by just as many programmers? Is that an easy argument to make?
3. Implementing programs: more or less creative than declaring code? Justice Breyer argues
that writing the implementing programs that actually execute tasks involves more creativity
than writing declaring code. In support of that argument, he cites evidence that in writing
such implementing programs, the programmer must balance considerations like speed, use of
memory, and use of power. Can you imagine how, in another context, Breyer might argue that
those considerations are “functional” rather than matters of “creativity”? Suppose that a
particular task, such as the task of determining which of two numbers is larger, could be
executed by many different implementing programs. Suppose further, however, that there
was one implementing program that was proven to be the fastest, while also using the least
memory and the least power. Lastly, suppose that a programmer copied that superlative
implementing program, and the creator of the program sued for copyright infringement.
Might Justice Breyer (and others) conclude that the program could be protected, if at all,
under patent law, and that a functionality defense could be raised against the copyright
infringement claim?
By contrast, Justice Thomas argues that it is the declaring code that involves more creativity,
because it actually “conveys expression” to developers, whereas the implementing code works
entirely behind the scenes, and is not perceptible. That approach follows a long tradition of
privileging perceptible expression as being at the core of copyright. For example, when Justice
Holmes speaks of originality as involving “the personal reaction of an individual upon nature”
in Bleistein v. Davidson Lithographing Company (casebook p.53), he is undoubtedly thinking of a
visible portrayal of some object in the world. Which approach to the creativity issue do you
find more convincing? Whichever approach you find more convincing, does this breathe life
back into factor two, which Judge Leval all but declared dead in Authors Guild v. Google?
4. The declaring code and language. When Oracle sued Google, it drew a distinction between
Java as a language, in which it did not claim copyright, and the declaring code of the Java API,
in which it did claim copyright. From the point of view of how the language and the declaring
code are learned and used, however, is there any difference? In both cases, aren’t programmers
learning what reusable terms mean, and how to put them together to accomplish various
tasks? No one has ever successfully claimed copyright protection in a language, even one that
was created artificially, like Esperanto. Arguably, a language is not a “work of authorship”
because it is not meant to be presented as a whole, but is rather meant to provide the building
blocks for many different wholes. Moreover, a copyright in a language would presumably give
the creator rights in any substantial expression created in that language, which would give
that copyright vast breadth. And because learning a language takes time, people who have
learned that language will find it difficult to switch. Justice Thomas argues that the Java
declaring code is just like the script for a Broadway musical: it “needs actors and singers to
invest time learning and rehearsing it,” but even though “copying the script is more efficient
than requiring the actors to learn a new one,” we wouldn’t say that unauthorized copying of
the script is fair use. What do you think of Justice Thomas’s analogy? Is memorizing a script
like more like learning reusable declaring code, or like learning a particular implementing
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program? If the Court is really concerned about
copyright in a language, should it have addressed
the issue of copyrightability directly, or is it fine
just to weigh it in a fair use analysis?

GO ONLINE
By one estimate, learning lines for a play takes
“for beginners, 6-8 weeks; for average actors,
4-6 weeks; for professional actors, 2-4
weeks.” By comparison, “[o]n average,
becoming a confident Java programmer takes
about 1–2 years, considering you spend 2–3
hours per day practicing coding.” Does the
difference between those two put Justice
Thomas’s comparison in a new light? In terms
of gauging the comparative economic impact
of copyright protection, note also that while
the Court states that about 6 million
programmers have learned Java, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics estimates that as of May
2020, there were about 44,460 professional
actors in the United States.

5. Transformativeness – even broader? When the
Supreme Court first drew on the concept of
“transformativeness” in the 1994 case of Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (casebook p. 338), it focused
on uses that “alter[ed] the [work used] with new
expression, meaning, or message.” 2 Live Crew’s
parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh Pretty Woman” was
“transformative” because it commented on the
latter by changing it and adding new lyrics and
new musical elements. When Judge Pierre Leval,
originator of the term, applied it in the 2015 case of
(casebook p. 377), Author’s Guild v. Google, he did not require “new expression,” because
Google’s project contributed none: Google was copying entire books verbatim. Rather, opined
Judge Leval, Google’s project was transformative because it provided otherwise unavailable
information about the works copied, namely, whether or not those works contained certain
terms or strings of terms. That information did not overlap with those works’ expressive
content enough to infringe that content. In Oracle America, the Court suggests that Google’s
use of Java declaring code is “transformative” because it “seeks to create new products,”
namely, smartphones, devices for which Java as a whole may not have been particularly well
suited. Does that broaden the concept of “transformativeness” further, and is that broadening
defensible? Justice Thomas argues that “Google used the declaring code for the same exact
purpose as Oracle did” – to allow programmers to accomplish particular tasks with terms that
were memorable individually and as groups. Do you agree?
6. Those pesky partial-work licensing markets. On the Court’s view – deferring to the jury on
findings of fact – Google’s use of part of the Java declaring code in Android did not affect the
market for and value of Java SE, because the market for Java SE had little overlap with the
market for Android. While Android was designed for smartphones and other sophisticated
mobile devices like the Kindle Fire, Java SE worked better with desktops, laptops, and simple
mobile devices like “feature phones” and the original Kindle. However, factor four concerns
not just actual markets, but “potential markets,” and does not exclude licensing markets.
Thus, how should we treat Oracle’s claim that loss of revenues from licensing Java declaring
code should be taken into account in factor four? Recall that both Princeton University Press v.
Michigan Document Services (casebook p. 356) and Authors Guild v. Google (casebook p. 377) dealt
with claims of lost licensing revenue from uses of parts of the plaintiffs’ works. How did those
courts approach those claims? Princeton University Press, following an earlier case, asked
whether the licensing market in question was a “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be
developed market.” How do the Google v. Oracle America facts measure up against that standard?
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The Authors Guild v. Google court concludes that use of the “snippets” furnished as search results
in a Google Book Search would normally not affect the market for the original books, and if it
did, would most often affect the market for uncopyrightable contents of those books, such as
facts. How would application of that approach work out here?
7.

Should benefit to the public be weighed under factor four? In previous fair use
jurisprudence, the benefit of a use to the public has been considered principally, and perhaps
exclusively, under the first factor, “the purpose and character of the use.” In Sony v. Universal
City Studios (casebook p. 304), for example, the Court concludes that “timeshifting [for private
home use] enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness in its
entirety free of charge,” and therefore promotes “access to ideas.” In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music
(casebook p. 338), the Court considers the benefits to the public of transformative works
under factor one: they further “the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts,” by
exposing the public to some “new expression, meaning, or message.” By contrast, in Google v.
Oracle America, the Court states that “the public benefits the copying will likely produce”
should be weighed under factor four, the effect of copying on the market for or value of the
copyrighted work. Does it significantly muddy fair use analysis to import a public benefit
analysis into factor four? Notice that the only precedent Justice Breyer can cite in support of
this move is a 40-year-old Second Circuit opinion that predates all Supreme Court fair use
precedent. Now that we have Supreme Court precedent, however, watch for “public benefit”
to appear in future factor four analyses.

8. Fair Use and “Interoperability.” In connection with its analysis of factor four and the danger
of “lock-in,” the Google v. Oracle America Court cites Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510 (9th Cir. 1992). In Sega Enterprises, Accolade wanted to produce game cartridges that would
run on Sega’s Genesis console. To do so, it copied computer code in the Genesis console, for
the purpose of studying how game cartridges communicated with the console. Accolade then
used that knowledge to create game cartridges that were compatible with the Genesis
console, because they generated and responded to commands that were used in that console.
The Ninth Circuit held that Accolade’s copying of Sega’s code was fair use, because its purpose
was study the uncopyrightable functional requirements for compatibility. In Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2001), another case cited by the Google
v. Oracle America Court, Connectix wanted to build “emulation software” that enabled games
originally designed for the Sony PlayStation to be played on Apple computers. Connectix
similarly made copies of Sony PlayStation code in other to understand how to translate
PlayStation commands into commands that could used and understood by the Apple
operating system. Again the Ninth Circuit held that such copying was a fair use.
The Sega Enterprises and Connectix courts undoubtedly viewed the actions of Accolade and
Connectix as avoiding a kind of “lock-in.” Sega would liked to have required owners of its
Genesis console to buy only game cartridges made or licensed by Sega. Sony would have liked
owners of its games to be able to play them only on PlayStations. Accolade and Connectix
circumvented such “tying” by discovering the commands used by Genesis and PlayStation
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consoles and incorporating them into independently-produced game cartridges (Accolade)
and software that enabled play on independently-produced devices (Connectix).
How does the “lock-in” at issue in Sega Enterprises and Connectix compare with that described
by the Google v. Oracle America Court? Was Google incorporating Java API declaring code into
Android so that existing Java programs could be run on devices using Android? (That would
be similar to Connectix.) Or so that programs developed with Android in mind would also run
on existing Java devices? (That would be similar to Sega Enterprises.) Or is Google v. Oracle
America referring to “lock-in” in quite a different context, referring not to existing devices or
programs owned by consumers, but to programmers and their skills?

Page 404: Insert above the “Test Your Knowledge” Box:
D. Fair Use and Transformativeness before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v.
Goldsmith, on a “Question Presented” that focuses on the meaning of “transformative” in fair use
jurisprudence:
Whether a work of art is “transformative” when it conveys a different meaning or message
from its source material (as this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and other courts of appeals have
held), or whether a court is forbidden from considering the meaning of the accused work
where it “recognizably deriv[es] from” its source material (as the Second Circuit has held).
. Because the Court will be focusing on the meaning of “transformative,” we have reproduced only
that portion of the Second Circuit’s opinion which discusses the issue of “transformativeness”
(along with its recitation of the facts). The Court will hear (or depending upon when you are
reading this, has heard) oral argument on October 12, 2022. How should it rule?

Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith
Second Circuit, 202111 F.4th 26
Gerard E. Lynch, Circuit Judge:
****
[Lynn] Goldsmith is a professional photographer primarily focusing on celebrity photography,
including portrait and concert photography of rock-and-roll musicians. Goldsmith has been
active since the 1960s, and her work has been featured widely, including on over 100 record album
covers. * * *
Andy Warhol, né Andrew Warhola, was an artist recognized for his significant contributions
to contemporary art in a variety of media. Warhol is particularly known for his silkscreen
portraits of contemporary celebrities. Much of his work is broadly understood as “comment[ing]
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on consumer culture and explor[ing] the relationship between celebrity culture and advertising.”
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013). AWF is a New York not-for-profit corporation
established in 1987 after Warhol’s death. AWF holds title to and copyright in much of Warhol’s
work, which it licenses to generate revenue to further its mission of advancing the visual arts . . . .
On December 3, 1981, while on assignment from Newsweek magazine, Goldsmith took a series
of portrait photographs of (then) up-and-coming musician Prince Rogers Nelson (known through
most of his career simply as “Prince”) in her studio. Goldsmith testified that, prior to Prince’s
arrival at her studio, she arranged the lighting in a way to
showcase his “chiseled bone structure.” Id. at 706.
Goldsmith also applied additional makeup to Prince,
including eyeshadow and lip gloss, which she testified was
intended both to build a rapport with Prince and to
accentuate his sensuality. Goldsmith further testified that
she was trying to capture Prince’s “willing[ness] to bust
through what must be [his] immense fears to make the
work that [he] wanted to [make].” Id. at 1557. Goldsmith
took black-and-white and color photographs using a Nikon
35-mm camera and a mixture of 85- and 105-mm lenses,
which she chose to best capture the shape of Prince’s face.
* * * During the truncated session, Goldsmith took 23
photographs, 12 in black and white and 11 in color.
Goldsmith retained copyright in each of the photographs
that she took. Most relevant to this litigation is the
following photograph, hereinafter referred to as the
“Goldsmith Photograph”:
In 1984, Goldsmith, through [her photo agency] LGL, licensed the Goldsmith Photograph to
Vanity Fair magazine for use as an artist reference. Esin Goknar, who was photo editor at Vanity
Fair in 1984, testified that the term “artist reference” meant that an artist “would create a work of
art based on [the] image reference.” Id. at 783. The license permitted Vanity Fair to publish an
illustration based on the Goldsmith Photograph in its November 1984 issue, once as a full page
and once as a quarter page. The license further required that the illustration be accompanied by
an attribution to Goldsmith. Goldsmith was unaware of the license at the time and played no role
in selecting the Goldsmith Photograph for submission to Vanity Fair.
Vanity Fair, in turn, commissioned Warhol to create an image of Prince for its November 1984
issue. Warhol’s illustration, together with an attribution to Goldsmith, was published
accompanying an article about Prince by Tristan Vox and appeared as follows:
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In addition to the credit
that ran alongside the
image,
a
separate
attribution to Goldsmith
was included elsewhere in
the issue, crediting her with
the “source photograph” for
the Warhol illustration.
Vanity Fair did not advise
Goldsmith that Warhol was
the artist for whom her
work would serve as a
reference, and she did not
see the article when it was
initially published.
Unbeknownst to Goldsmith and LGL, Warhol created 15 additional works based on the
Goldsmith Photograph, known collectively, and together with the Vanity Fair image, as the
“Prince Series.” The Prince Series comprises fourteen silkscreen prints (twelve on canvas, two on
paper) and two pencil illustrations, and includes the following images:

* * *.
At some point after Warhol’s death, AWF acquired title to and copyright in the Prince Series.
Between 1993 and 2004, AWF sold or otherwise transferred custody of 12 of the original Prince
Series works to third parties, and, in 1998, transferred custody of the other four works to The
Andy Warhol Museum. AWF retains copyright in the Prince Series images and, through The
Artist Rights Society (a third-party organization that serves as AWF’s agent), continues to license
the images for editorial, commercial, and museum usage.
On April 22, 2016, the day after Prince died, Condé Nast, Vanity Fair’s parent company,
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contacted AWF. Its initial intent in doing so was to determine whether AWF still had the 1984
image, which Condé Nast hoped to use in connection with a planned magazine commemorating
Prince’s life. After learning that AWF had additional images from the Prince Series, Condé Nast
ultimately obtained a commercial license, to be exclusive for three months, for a different Prince
Series image for the cover of the planned tribute magazine. Condé Nast published the tribute
magazine in May 2016 with a Prince Series image on the cover. Goldsmith was not given any credit
or attribution for the image, which was instead attributed solely to AWF.
It was at that point that Goldsmith first became aware of the Prince Series. In late July 2016,
Goldsmith contacted AWF to advise it of the perceived infringement of her copyright. That
November, Goldsmith registered the Goldsmith Photograph with the U.S. Copyright Office as an
unpublished work. On April 7, 2017, AWF sued Goldsmith and LGL for a declaratory judgment
of non-infringement or, in the alternative, fair use. Goldsmith countersued for copyright
infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501.
On July 1, 2019, the district court granted summary judgment for AWF on its fair-use claim. *
* * This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
****
[T]he Supreme Court has explained that courts must “apply [fair use] in light of the sometimes
conflicting aims of copyright law” and that “copyright’s protection may be stronger where the
copyrighted material ... serves an artistic rather than a utilitarian function.” Google, 141 S. Ct. at
1197.
With those competing goals in mind, we consider each factor to determine whether AWF can
avail itself of the fair-use defense in this case. We hold that it cannot.
A. The Purpose and Character of The Use
This factor requires courts to consider the extent to which the secondary work is
“transformative,” as well as whether it is commercial. . . .
1. Transformative Works and Derivative Works
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell, our assessment of this first factor has
focused chiefly on the degree to which the use is “transformative,” * * * We evaluate whether a
work is transformative by examining how it may “reasonably be perceived.” Cariou [v. Prince], 714
F.3d at 707, quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582, 114 S.Ct. 1164 . . . . Paradigmatic examples of
transformative uses are those Congress itself enumerated in the preamble to § 107: “criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching ..., scholarship, or research.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. . . .
Although the most straightforward cases of fair use thus involve a secondary work that
comments on the original in some fashion, in Cariou v. Prince, we rejected the proposition that a
secondary work must comment on the original in order to qualify as fair use. See 714 F.3d at 706. *
** ...
As discussed supra, both the Supreme Court and this Court have emphasized that fair use is a
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context-sensitive inquiry that does not lend itself to simple bright-line rules. See, e.g., Google, 141 S.
Ct. at 1196-97; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78, 114 S.Ct. 1164; Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705. Notwithstanding,
the district court appears to have read Cariou as having announced such a rule, to wit, that any
secondary work is necessarily transformative as a matter of law “[i]f looking at the works side-byside, the secondary work has a different character, a new expression, and employs new aesthetics
with [distinct] creative and communicative results.” Warhol, 382 F. Supp. 3d at 325-26 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alterations adopted). Although a literal construction of certain
passages of Cariou may support that proposition, such a reading stretches the decision too far. . . .
Consider the five works at issue in Cariou that
we did not conclude were transformative as a
matter of law. Though varying in degree both
amongst themselves and as compared to the works
that we did adjudge transformative, each
undoubtedly imbued Cariou’s work with a “new
aesthetic” as that phrase might be colloquially
understood. Prince’s Canal Zone (2007) is a collage of
thirty-six of Cariou’s photographs, most of which
Prince altered by, for example, painting over the
faces and bodies of Cariou’s subjects, in some
instances altering them significantly. See Cariou,
714 F.3d at 711. In Graduation, Prince added blue
“lozenges” over the eyes and mouth of Cariou’s
subject and pasted an image of hands playing a
blue guitar over his hands. Id. Both of these works
certainly imbued the originals from which they
derive with a “new aesthetic;” notwithstanding,
we could not “confidently ... make a determination
about their transformative nature as a matter of
law.” Id.

SEE IT
We mentioned Cariou v. Prince in note 6 on
page 393 of the main volume. The “Prince”
who was the defendant in this case is an
artist named Richard Prince, who is no
relation to the late musician Prince Rogers
Nelson, whose portrait is at issue in the
instant case of Andy Warhol Foundation .v.
Goldsmith.
Click here to see Canal Zone (2007) and
Graduation, as well as the work that
Graduation was copying, and another
example of a Cariou source work and a
Prince use. What do you think? Can you
see why the court drew the distinction it
did? Does it fit the principles and the rules
that the Second Circuit is articulating in its
opinion in Goldsmith?

Moreover, there exists an entire class of secondary works that add “new expression, meaning,
or message” to their source material, Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164, but may nonetheless
fail to qualify as fair use: derivative works. There is some inherent tension in the Copyright Act
between derivative works, reserved to the copyright holder, which are defined in part as works
that “recast[ ], transform[ ], or adapt[ ]” an original work, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added), and
“transformative” fair uses of the copyrighted work by others. Thus, as we have previously
observed, an overly liberal standard of transformativeness, such as that employed by the district
court in this case, risks crowding out statutory protections for derivative works. * * *
We addressed derivative works in Cariou, characterizing them as secondary works that merely
present “the same material but in a new form” without “add[ing] something new.” 714 F.3d at 708
(citation omitted); see also Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 215-16 (“[D]erivative works generally involve
transformations in the nature of changes of form.”) (emphasis in original). While that description
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may be a useful shorthand, it is likewise susceptible to misapplication if interpreted too broadly.
Indeed, many derivative works that “add something new” to their source material would not
qualify as fair use.
Consider, for example, a film adaptation of a novel. Such adaptations frequently add quite a
bit to their source material: characters are combined, eliminated, or created out of thin air; plot
elements are simplified or eliminated; new scenes are added; the moral or political implications of
the original work may be eliminated or even reversed, or plot and character elements altered to
create such implications where the original text eschewed such matters. . . . Despite the extent to
which the resulting movie may transform the aesthetic and message of the underlying literary
work, film adaptations are identified as a paradigmatic example of derivative works. See, e.g.,
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Paradigmatic examples of derivative
works include ... the adaptation of a novel into a movie or a play.”).
In evaluating the extent to which a work is transformative in the fair use context, we consider
the “purpose and character” of the primary and secondary works. Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1204. In Bill
Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., for example, we held that the reproduction in a book about
the Grateful Dead of images of posters originally created to advertise Grateful Dead concerts was
transformative because that use was “plainly different from the original purpose for which they
were created.” 448 F.3d 605, 609-10 (2d Cir. 2006). Likewise, in HathiTrust we held that the
defendants’ creation of a searchable “digital corpus” comprising scanned copies of tens of millions
of books that enabled researchers, scholars, and others to pinpoint the exact page of any book in
the catalogue on which the searched term was used was a “quintessentially transformative use.”
755 F.3d at 97. In Authors Guild, we reached the same conclusion when faced with a larger digital
corpus complete with tools that enabled researchers to track how a specific word or phrase has
been used throughout the development of the English language, despite the fact that, unlike the
database in Hathitrust, Google’s database also permitted the searcher to view a “snippet” from the
original text showing the context in which the word or phrase had appeared. 804 F.3d at 216-17.
And most recently, in Google, the Supreme Court held that fair use protected Google’s “precise[ ]”
copying of certain computer programming language in part because Google sought “to create new
products ... [and] expand the use and usefulness of ... smartphones” with it. Google, 141 S. Ct. at
1203. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded, “the ‘purpose and character’ of Google’s copying was
transformative.” Id. at 1204.
But purpose is perhaps a less useful metric where, as here, our task is to assess the
transformative nature of works of visual art that, at least at a high level of generality, share the
same overarching purpose (i.e., to serve as works of visual art). [The court discusses three previous
Second Circuit cases about fair use of works of visual art: Blanch v. Koons; Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d
301 (2d Cir. 1992), and Prince v. Cariou.]
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A common thread running through these cases is that,
where a secondary work does not obviously comment on or
relate back to the original or use the original for a purpose other
than that for which it was created, the bare assertion of a
“higher or different artistic use,” Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310, is
insufficient to render a work transformative. Rather, the
secondary work itself must reasonably be perceived as
embodying a distinct artistic purpose, one that conveys a new
meaning or message separate from its source material. While
we cannot, nor do we attempt to, catalog all of the ways in
which an artist may achieve that end, we note that the works
that have done so thus far have themselves been distinct works
of art that draw from numerous sources, rather than works that
simply alter or recast a single work with a new aesthetic.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT
The court seems to suggest that a
work is more likely to be
transformative if the author uses
multiple sources rather than
relying on just one. Does this mean
that fair use is more likely if you
infringe multiple copyrights at the
same time? If the answer is
paradoxically “yes,” it is related to
the issue of how much the
defendant’s work substitutes for
the plaintiff’s work or works
under the fourth factor in § 107?

Which brings us back to the Prince Series. The district court held that the Prince Series works
are transformative because they “can reasonably be perceived to have transformed Prince from a
vulnerable, uncomfortable person to an iconic, larger-than-life figure.” Warhol, 382 F. Supp. 3d at
326. That was error.
Though it may well have been Goldsmith’s subjective intent to portray Prince as a “vulnerable
human being” and Warhol’s to strip Prince of that humanity and instead display him as a popular
icon, whether a work is transformative cannot turn merely on the stated or perceived intent of the
artist or the meaning or impression that a critic – or for that matter, a judge – draws from the
work. Were it otherwise, the law may well “recogniz[e] any alteration as transformative.” 4
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05(B)(6).
In conducting this inquiry, however, the district judge should not assume the role of art critic
and seek to ascertain the intent behind or meaning of the works at issue. That is so both because
judges are typically unsuited to make aesthetic judgments and because such perceptions are
inherently subjective. As Goldsmith argues, her own stated intent notwithstanding, “an audience
viewing the [Goldsmith] [P]hotograph today, across the vista of the singer’s long career, might
well see him in a different light than Goldsmith saw him that day in 1981.” Appellants’ Br. at 40.
We agree; it is easy to imagine that a whole generation of Prince’s fans might have trouble seeing
the Goldsmith Photograph as depicting anything other than the iconic songwriter and performer
whose musical works they enjoy and admire.
Instead, the judge must examine whether the secondary work’s use of its source material is in
service of a “fundamentally different and new” artistic purpose and character, such that the
secondary work stands apart from the “raw material” used to create it. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although we do not hold that the primary work must be
“barely recognizable” within the secondary work, as was the case with the works held
transformative in Cariou, id. at 710, the secondary work’s transformative purpose and character
must, at a bare minimum, comprise something more than the imposition of another artist’s style
on the primary work such that the secondary work remains both recognizably deriving from, and
retaining the essential elements of, its source material.
43

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4175694

With this clarification, viewing the works side-by-side,
we conclude that the Prince Series is not “transformative”
within the meaning of the first factor. That is not to deny
that the Warhol works display the distinct aesthetic
sensibility that many would immediately associate with
Warhol’s signature style – the elements of which are absent
from the Goldsmith photo. But the same can be said, for
example, of the Ken Russell film, from a screenplay by
Larry Kramer, derived from D.H. Lawrence’s novel, Women
in Love: the film is as recognizable a “Ken Russell” as the
Prince Series are recognizably “Warhols.” But the film, for
all the ways in which it transforms (that is, in the ordinary
meaning of the word, which indeed is used in the very
definition of derivative works, see 17 U.S.C. § 101) its source
material, is also plainly an adaptation of the Lawrence novel.

GO ONLINE
The reference here is to a 1920 novel
about two sisters living in England in
the period before World War I, and two
local men with whom they become
romantically involved.
The movie
version dates from 1969 and secured a
Best Actress Oscar for Glenda Jackson
and a nomination for Russell in the Best
Director category. Numerous clips from
the movie are available on YouTube. If
you’d like to enjoy a scene of Glenda
Jackson dancing with cattle, you can
click here.

As in the case of such paradigmatically derivative works, there can be no meaningful dispute
that the overarching purpose and function of the two works at issue here is identical, not merely
in the broad sense that they are created as works of visual art, but also in the narrow but essential
sense that they are portraits of the same person. . . . Although this observation does not per se
preclude a conclusion that the Prince Series makes fair use of the Goldsmith Photograph, the
district court’s conclusion rests significantly on the transformative character of Warhol’s work.
But the Prince Series works can’t bear that weight.
Warhol created the series chiefly by removing certain elements from the Goldsmith
Photograph, such as depth and contrast, and embellishing the flattened images with “loud,
unnatural colors.” Warhol, 382 F. Supp. 3d at 326. Nonetheless, although we do not conclude that
the Prince Series works are necessarily derivative works as a matter of law, they are much closer to
presenting the same work in a different form, that form being a high-contrast screenprint, than
they are to being works that make a transformative use of the original. Crucially, the Prince Series
retains the essential elements of the Goldsmith Photograph without significantly adding to or
altering those elements.
Indeed, the differences between the Goldsmith Photograph and the Prince Series here are in
many respects less substantial than those made to the five works that we could not find
transformative as a matter of law in Cariou. Unlike the Prince Series, those works unmistakably
deviated from Cariou’s original portraiture in a manner that suggested an entirely distinct artistic
end; rather than recasting those photographs in a new medium, Richard Prince added material
that pulled them in new directions. See, e.g., Cariou, 714 F.3d at 711 (“Where [Cariou’s] photograph
presents someone comfortably at home in nature, [Prince’s] Graduation combines divergent
elements to present a sense of discomfort.”). Nevertheless, we could not confidently determine
whether those modest alterations “amount[ed] to a substantial transformation of the original
work[s] of art such that the new work[s] were transformative,” and remanded the case to the
district court to make that determination in the first instance. Id.
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In contrast, the Prince Series retains the essential elements of its source material, and Warhol’s
modifications serve chiefly to magnify some elements of that material and minimize others. While
the cumulative effect of those alterations may change the Goldsmith Photograph in ways that give
a different impression of its subject, the Goldsmith Photograph remains the recognizable
foundation upon which the Prince Series is built.
****
Questions and Comments
1. Transformation as Use for a Different Purpose vs. Physical Transformation. The Second
Circuit has arguably developed a “two-step” test for transformativeness. First, it asks if the
alleged infringer is using their work for a different purpose than the purpose the original
author was pursuing. If so, the degree of physical transformation need only be modest, or
perhaps even zero, for fair use to apply. That explains the results in Dorling Kindersley (where
the defendants copied entire Grateful Dead posters, but to document history rather than to
advertise concerts), and in HathiTrust and Authors Guild v. Google (where the defendants copied
entire books, but to allow full-text searching, text corpus research, and text-to-speech
conversion for the visually impaired, not to present the original text in full). However, if the
purposes of the two works are the same, the degree of physical transformation must be
significant.
In Goldsmith, the Second Circuit holds that the purposes of Warhol’s and
Goldsmith’s works are the same – they are both essentially works of visual art, and portraits.
Therefore, Warhol’s works needed to meet higher standards of physical transformation,
which they did not. Do you agree? Can you articulate what “purpose” means in this context?
Does that meaning prevent us from saying that Goldsmith's “purpose” was to display Prince
as vulnerable, whereas Warhol's different “purpose” was to display him as self-confident and
iconic?
2. Can Fair Use Avoid an Inquiry Into “Intent and Meaning”? According to the Second
Circuit, judges “should not assume the role of art critic and seek to ascertain the intent behind
or meaning of the works at issue,” because “judges are typically unsuited to make aesthetic
judgments and because such perceptions are inherently subjective.” Is that possible, and
consistent with precedent? Recall that in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court held that
2 Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman” was transformative with respect to Roy Orbison’s “Oh Pretty
Woman” because it could “reasonably be perceived” as a parody. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 The
lyrics of the 2 Live Crew version could “be taken as a comment on the naiveté of the original
of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the
debasement that it signifies.” Id. at 584. Doesn’t that require an inquiry into the meaning of
both works – or at least one of possibly several meanings that can reasonably be perceived?
On the other hand Justice Holmes did tell us in the circus poster case (Bleistein, at page 53 of
the main volume) that “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits.” Is the Second Circuit in Goldsmith just being faithful to
that cautionary observation, or does the difference in context suggest that Holmes’ aphorism
ought not to govern in assessing fair use?
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3. A “Reasonably Perceived to Communicate a New Message or Meaning” Standard? In the
Supreme Court, petitioner Andy Warhol Foundation argues that a work should count as
transformative if it can “reasonably be perceived as conveying a new meaning or message” as
compared to its source material. Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith, No. 21-869, Brief for
Petitioner at 33-37. Should Campbell v. Acuff-Rose be construed that broadly? Recall that
Campbell concerns a work that the Court found could “reasonably be perceived” as criticizing
the work from which it drew, by parodying it. Are there reasons why we would want to
protect criticism of an earlier work more than a non-critical “new meaning or message,” and
why we would see it as less likely to be a substitute? To put the “new meaning or message”
approach to your own test, check out this web site entitled 15 Movie Adaptations
COMPLETELY Different from The Books. Do you think any of the movies would be
considered fair use of the books upon which they were based? If you were arguing for the
AWF in the Supreme Court and Justice Kagan asked you that question, what would you say?
4. The original “Goldsmith Photograph.” As
presented in the declaratory judgement complaint,
the original Goldsmith Photograph is in color and
shows much more of Prince than the cropped,
black-and-white version presented in the Second
Circuit’s published opinion. The conversion to
blank-and-white may be due to the limitations of
printing the Federal Reporter, but should the
Second Circuit have printed the full Goldsmith
Photograph, rather than a cropped version?
5. The District Court’s assessment of changed
meaning and intent. As the Second Circuit
relates, the District Court found that Warhol’s
Prince Series was transformative because while the
Goldsmith Photograph portrays Prince as “not a
comfortable person” and a “vulnerable human
being,” the Prince Series portrays Prince as an
“iconic, larger-than-life figure.” Can you see why
the District Court might have come to that
conclusion?
Why
might
Prince
look
“uncomfortable” and “vulnerable” in the Goldsmith
Photograph? Hands in pockets, a position of timidity? Anything else? The works differ in one
other detail that is subtle, but likely contributes greatly to their different “feel.” Goldsmith’s
camera was placed above Prince’s eye level, and we believe above the top of his head, so that
Prince is looking slightly up towards something larger than him – a position of vulnerability.
That is reflected in the tilt of a line that could be drawn between Prince’s pupils – it would
angle down to the right side of the photograph. Warhol changes that. In Warhol’s version,
the eye pupils are exactly horizontal, suggesting a camera that is at eye level. Prince is not
looking up at the camera, but is directly confronting it at his own level. To achieve that effect,
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Warhol rotated the Goldsmith Photograph about five degrees to the left (See the comparison
below). The eye-level gaze arguably affects how we view Prince – as less vulnerable, and more
assertive. Should we take that into account at all in gauging “transformativeness” for the first
fair use factor?

6. Photography and Creativity. At one point the Second Circuit says “there can be no
meaningful dispute that the overarching purpose and function of the two works at issue here
is identical, not merely in the broad sense that they are created as works of visual art, but also
in the narrow but essential sense that they are portraits of the same person.” Perhaps this is a
good example of how we can’t always take judicial language literally. Prince’s appearance is
not a protectable aspect of Goldsmith’s photo. Before we reach fair use there has to be
appropriation of protectable material. It is only transformations of that material that should
be considered in thinking about fair use.
So what was original about Goldsmith’s
photograph? Recall that in Mannion v. Coors, on p. 65 of the main volume, the court separates
the possible creative acts of photographers into three groups: rendition, timing, and creation
of the subject. According to the Second Circuit, what creative acts can be identified in the
history of creating the Goldsmith Photograph? Which of those remain recognizable in the
Prince Series?
7. Has Transformative Use Become Everything and Nothing? Scholar Jiarui Liu studied all
fair use decisions mentioning transformative use from 1990 through 2016. See Jiarui Liu, An
Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright Law, 22 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 163 (2019).
Over that time period, 94% of decisions that found transformative use also found fair use,
while 94% of decisions that ruled against transformative use also ruled against fair use. Id. at
180. Given that correlation, it is not surprising that transformative use also heavily affects each
factor: “transformative use dominates the outcomes of factor one and four, raises the extent of
copying allowed under factor three, and diminishes the weight that courts allocate to factor
two.” Id. at 181. Yet Liu concludes that while “many judges have an apparent consensus that
only transformative use can rescue fair use, they hardly have any consensus on what
transformative use actually means.” Id. at 204. Now that the Supreme Court has granted
review in Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith, will it use the opportunity to clarify
transformative use? We can only hope.
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Chapter 6: Alternative Enforcement and Protection Strategies: Secondary

Liability, Self-Help, Levies
E. Shielding and Recruiting New Gatekeepers: The Treatment of Online
Service Providers in Section 512
p. 449: Replace note 6 with the following:
6. Inducement and Other Forms of Indirect Liability Under State Law. Grokster and other
cases have established that there can be indirect liability for federal copyright infringement,
under theories of contributory infringement, inducement, and vicarious liability. However,
what if a plaintiff is suing under state law, regarding infringement of a work that is not
protected under federal law? Before the passage of the Music Modernization Act in 2018, this
question most often arose in the context of sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972,
which were not protected by federal law. In an earlier decision in the LimeWire litigation,
Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F.Supp. 2d 481, 519–520 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the court held
that theories of indirect liability were available under state law. It noted that the Grokster Court
drew on the common law of torts in establishing federal inducement liability, and concluded
that state law (in this case, the law of New York) established inducement liability on the same
terms. The Music Modernization Act, discussed in detail below in the versions of Chapters
12.E. and 12.F. in this Supplement, will now preempt state law as to activities concerning pre1972 sound recordings that take place after its effective date (October 11, 2018). Thus, the issue
of indirect infringement liability under state law will soon no longer arise in the context of pre1972 sound recordings. The remaining area in which it could arise – unfixed works – is unlikely
to generate litigation.

p. 464: Replace note 3 with the following:
3. How to Violate the Requirement to Terminate Repeat Infringers. In BMG Rights
Management (US) LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc., 881 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018), the Fourth
Circuit upheld the Eastern District of Virginia grant of partial summary judgment to BMG,
ruling that Cox Communications was not entitled to a § 512 safe-harbor defense because it
had not reasonably implemented a policy of terminating service to repeat infringers. Cox’s
policy for dealing with repeat infringers was weak in a remarkable number of ways. Cox only
considered terminating a subscriber if it had received 14 takedown notices concerning that
subscriber within a six-month period. Cox would only count the first notice concerning a
subscriber received on any particular day; it would not count any other notice concerning that
subscriber received on the same day. As a general matter, Cox would accept no more than 200
takedown notices per day from a copyright holder, regardless of how much infringing material
it might have been hosting. In addition, before 2012, in the relatively few cases in which a
subscriber received fourteen notices in six months, Cox did not actually terminate services to
the subscriber. Rather, it nominally terminated services but reactivated accounts upon
request, as documented in emails reminding Cox employees about how much revenue Cox
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would lose if the subscribers were actually terminated. In 2012, Cox decided that if it was
going to terminate a subscriber, it would do so for at least six months; but that caused it to
virtually cease terminations, dropping from 15.5 terminations per month during the period
from January 2010 through August 2012, to 0.8 terminations per month during the period from
September 2012 through November 2014.
The Fourth Circuit, agreeing with the District Court, concluded that Cox “failed to
implement its policy in any consistent or meaningful way—leaving it essentially with no
policy.” It rejected Cox’s argument that § 512 imposed only an obligation to terminate repeat
adjudicated infringers, which would allow it to do nothing until a court ruled that a subscriber
had repeatedly infringed. That interpretation was not supported by the statutory language,
and as a policy matter, “the risk of losing one’s Internet access would hardly constitute a
‘realistic threat’ capable of deterring infringement if that punishment applied only to those
already subject to civil penalties and legal fees as adjudicated infringers.”
3A. If You’re a Small Business, How Informal Can Your Repeat Infringer Termination Policy
Be? According to a split Ninth Circuit panel, pretty informal. In Ventura Content, Ltd. v.
Motherless, Inc., 885 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018), Joshua Lange was the owner and sole employee
of defendant Motherless, Inc., which operated the website motherless.com. The
approximately 611,000 daily visitors to motherless.com could find 12.6 million user-uploaded
pornographic video clips and photographs. Think mini-YouTube and mini-Flickr combined,
but with content that those sites would not allow. You may be shocked to learn that some of
the users did not own copyright in the material that they uploaded to motherless.com. One
producer of such material, Ventura Content, sued Motherless. The District Court granted
partial summary judgment to Motherless, holding that it qualified for the § 512 safe harbor.
On appeal, Ventura Content’s principal argument was that Motherless had not reasonably
implemented a policy of terminating repeat infringers. Indeed, Motherless completely lacked
any written policy of when to terminate repeat infringers. Mr. Lange, who was solely
responsible for those terminations, apparently made such decisions by weighing a variety of
factors, which evidently were not written in advance either, but reconstructed after the fact.
Those factors included:
(1) the volume of complaints; (2) the amount of linked content in the complaints; (3) the
timespan between notices; (4) the length of time the alleged infringer’s account had been
active; (5) the amount of total content the account has; (6) whether the user is
maliciously and intentionally uploading infringing content or uploading content
without knowing the source; and (7) whether the takedown notices were DMCAcompliant.
Lange estimated that over a three-year period, he had terminated between 1,320 and 1,980 user
accounts for possible copyright infringement, out of a total of about 750,000 active users
(although it is unlikely that all of those were uploading content); there was record evidence
of only nine repeat infringers that Lange had not terminated. The Ninth Circuit held that § 512
did not require Lange to create a written termination policy, nor did it require him to keep
logbooks to aid in identifying repeat infringers, or logbooks of the subscribers whose service
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he had terminated. It appeared to be impressed by the ratio of Lange’s terminations to the
number of subscribers about whom there was evidence of repeat infringement without
termination: very roughly, 1800/9, or 200/1. Judge Rawlinson dissented. He argued that Lange
had failed to articulate a consistent policy for terminating repeat infringers, and that the
paucity of evidence about repeat infringers that Lange had not terminated stemmed from
Lange’s “less than stellar, unautomated recordkeeping system,” and his “casual recordkeeping
system.”
Do you think that what Lange did satisfied the requirements of § 512? Having familiarized
yourself with the Ninth Circuit’s decision, would you ever recommend that a client do what
Lange did? Is it possible that the court’s decision was in some way influenced by its judgment
about plaintiff Ventura Content and the business in which it was engaged?

p. 467: Replace note 9 with the following:
9. The Section 512 Safe Harbor and pre-1972 Sound Recordings. Before the passage of the
Music Modernization Act in 2018, the Copyright Act did not protect sound recordings fixed
prior to February 15, 1972. Those works were protected instead by state “common law”
copyright. Does the section 512 safe harbor, part of the federal copyright scheme, protect claims
against online service providers made under state law? In June 2016, the Second Circuit
answered that question in the affirmative, holding that § 512(c) did indeed apply to pre-1972
recordings that were not protected by federal copyright. See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, 826
F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016). The Music Modernization Act, discussed in detail below in the versions
of Chapters 12. E. and 12.F. in this Supplement, now provides for federal protection for pre-1972
sound recordings. It provides expressly that the liability it creates is subject to the safe harbor
of Section 512. See Music Modernization Act § 202(a)(2) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1401(f)(3)).

p. 497: Insert this new section above the “Test Your Knowledge” box:
H. Administrative Adjudication of Small Claims at the Copyright Claims Board
As the materials in Chapter 4 revealed, proving copyright infringement in court requires a
plaintiff to jump through a lot of hoops. The more hoops, the more work is involved in litigating
the case. And the more work involved, the higher the legal fees and the more time between
infringement and eventual remedy.
The consequence is that smaller creators of copyrighted material who have limited resources
confront practical obstacles to enforcing their rights. If the part-time photo-journalist discovers
that one of her recent photos has been appropriated by a company for use in a print advertising
campaign, she may not be able to afford the cost of a lawsuit. The same might be true for a budding
screenwriter who thinks his script has been appropriated as the basis for an online video, or for a
struggling musical composer who feels their jingle was stolen for use in a radio commercial.
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On the flip side, those who use copyrighted material may be uncertain about whether their
use falls within an exception to the exclusive rights, or would be excused as fair use or “de
minimis” use. Such concerns may be heightened if they have received a “demand letter” from the
copyright holder alleging infringement and insisting that they cease and desist. Faced with the
prospect of expensive and lengthy federal court litigation, they may stop their use of the material,
even though that use might ultimately be found to be lawful, and even though the public might
be deprived of edification or entertainment as a result.
Mindful of these dilemmas, in December 2020 Congress passed the Copyright Alternative in
Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2020 (CASE Act), P.L. 116-260, codified at 17 U.S.C § 1501-1511.
The CASE Act requires the Copyright Office to establish a new entity known as the Copyright
Claims Board (CCB) to function as an administrative “small claims court” to handle copyright
disputes with amounts in controversy of $30,000 or less. This new CCB commenced operations
in June of 2022. Its goal is to provide an inexpensive and expeditious forum in which to resolve
simple claims of infringement.
The CCB process is available to both sides in a copyright controversy. In other words,
copyright owners can bring claims of infringement, and users can bring claims seeking a
declaration of non-infringement. Here is a quick overview of several key features of this new
adjudicative option.
Composition of Board: The CCB consists of three members, known as Copyright Claims
Officers, appointed by the Librarian of Congress, based on recommendations from the Register of
Copyrights. They serve for a term of six years and the appointments are renewable. The bios of
the three current Claims Officers should be available at the bottom of this web page.
Streamlined online procedures: Claims before
the Board are commenced by filing an online form
through the electronic portal on the CCB’s website,
labelled eCCB. The simple form requests basic
information such as the names of the parties, a
description of the copyrighted work, information
about the date and place of infringement and a
description of the infringing activities. Compared to
the typical civil complaint in a copyright case, the
forms are models of brevity.
If you visit https://dockets.ccb.gov/search/cases
you will find a list of all cases pending before the
board. Clicking on the “view” button next to any
listed case will take you to a full electronic docket of
all the filings in that case, the first of which will be the
relevant claim form. Here is a screen shot of a typical
claims form as filed (if the font is too small, you can
read the actual claim by clicking here)
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Once a claim is filed, the CCB reviews it to make sure that it complies with the statute and
relevant CCB regulations, and that it provides enough information to enable the respondent to
answer it. This is called the Compliance Review stage. After compliance review the CCB supplies
the claimant with a set of materials (including the claim form) that must be served on the
respondent. The claimant has 90 days to effectuate service and file proof of service with the Board.
For further details on how to accomplish service in CCB case you can click here.
Discovery is sharply limited in these proceedings. Relevant documents are to be submitted
over the internet and all necessary hearings will be held by video conference. Counterclaims are
permitted, but only for copyright infringement or claims of misrepresentation under § 512 (in
others words for inappropriate DMCA take-down notices). Parties may represent themselves or
be represented by an attorney. There is also a specific provision in the CASE Act that allows
qualified law students to represent parties before the board as well, provided they are properly
supervised and do so on a pro bono basis.
Relaxed Registration Requirements: As we will explore further in Chapter 7, a copyright
registration (or final denial of application to register) is a prerequisite to filing an infringement
suit in federal district court. Before the CCB, a party may commence an action prior to
registration, provided an application to register has been filed, is pending and has not been
refused. The statute provides, however that the Board “may not render a determination” of the
claim until the registration certificate has been issued.
Controlling Law: The Board is to following existing precedent as set out in case law and is
supposed to avoid formulating new interpretations of law. In the event of a circuit split, it is to
follow the law of the circuit where the case could have been filed if the plaintiff had opted for
traditional litigation instead of the administration proceeding. Decisions of the Board have no
precedential effect, and may not be cited as precedent in copyright litigation, not even in
subsequent cases before the Board itself.
Opt-Out Opportunity: As you might expect, there is no requirement for copyright owners
with small claims to use the CCB. They remain free to bring a conventional suit in federal district
court.
Perhaps more importantly, a respondent in a CCB proceeding has 60 days after being served
to opt out and refuse to participate in the case before the Board. Proponents of the CCB thus tend
to say that participation is “voluntary.” The package of materials that must be served on the
respondent must include an opt-out form.
If the respondent does opt-out, the complaining party may choose to bring an infringement
suit in federal court or, of course, to drop the matter. At the expiration of this 60 period, if
respondent has not opted out, the claim, in the parlance of the relevant regulations “becomes
active.”
There is also a mechanism for libraries and archives to opt-out of all CCB proceeding
categorically, in what the Board calls a “blanket” opt-out. The blanket opt-out has quickly
become very popular: as of this writing, almost 700 libraries and archives have taken advantage of
it. See Library and Archive Opt-Out List, https://ccb.gov/libraries-archives-opt-out/. If a
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particular library does not take advantage of this option it may still opt-out of particular claims
filed against it on a case-by-case basis.
This opt-out feature was included, in part, to ensure that the new system would not conflict
with the Constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, as well as to provide an “escape mechanism” for
parties who believe they are merely being harassed with claims that would never warrant seeking
relief in more formal judicial proceeding.
Damage Caps: As noted above the maximum that can be recovered in a CCB proceeding is
$30,000 in either actual or statutory damages. However, for statutory damages there is also a “per
work” maximum of $15,000 (if the work was timely registered) or $7,500 (if not timely
registered). Thus if only one work is at issue and the claimant seeks statutory damages, the award
is likely to be something less than $15,000 and, in many case, likely to be considerably less than
that.
The usual minimum amounts for statutory damages govern in cases before the board (those
are $750 unless the respondent can show he had no reason to believe his conduct constituted
infringement, in which case that minimum drops to $200).
Limited Appellate Rights: In most cases the losing party before the Board is not permitted
to appeal the ruling to the federal courts. The sole options are to seek reconsideration from the
Board, which is only permitted based on a claim of clear error of law or fact material to the
outcome, or a technical mistake. If reconsideration is denied the losing party may appeal to the
Register of Copyrights for a decision limited to question of whether the CCB abused its discretion
in denying reconsideration.
The only situations in which a party may seek judicial review are (1) if the Board’s
determination was issued as a result of fraud, corruption, misrepresentation, or other misconduct;
(2) the Board exceeded its authority or failed to render a final determination; or (3) when the
determination by the Board was based on default by one of the parties, a claim that the default or
failure to prosecute was due to excusable neglect. These situations are likely to be extremely rare,
meaning that as a practical matter, the CCB ruling will be the final word on the matter.
Fees: The claimant must pay an initial fee of $40 at the time the claim is filed. If the respondent
does not opt out, and the claim “becomes active,” the claimant must pay an additional fee of $60.
The fee for filing an appeal is the less friendly sum of $300. By comparison the current cost to file
a civil complaint is U.S. District Court is $402, and the cost to file an appeal is $505.
Annual Usage Limitations: The regulations implementing the CCB system provide that:
(1) A claimant, including a corporate claimant's parents, subsidiaries, and
affiliates, shall file no more than 30 proceedings in any 12–month period.
(2) A sole practitioner or a legal counsel associated with a law firm shall
file no more than 40 CCB proceedings on behalf of claimants in any 12–month
period.
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(3) A law firm shall file no more than 80 CCB proceedings on behalf of
claimants in any 12–month period.
37 C.F.R. § 233.2. We’ve been pretty good, so far, in not annoying you with questions, but you
knew that wasn’t going to last forever. What do you think motivated the adoption of these limits?
Special Smaller Claims Procedure: For claimants seeking $5,000 or less in damages, there is an
even more simplified set of procedures. These claims are heard by only one Copyright Claims
Officer rather than by the whole board and discovery and arguments are even narrowly limited.
Details are set out in 37 C.F.R. § 226.4
_______________
Much more information is available at the CCB website, https://www.ccb.gov/ and in the
Copyright Claims Board Handbook. If curiosity or professional obligations motivate you to take
an even deeper dive into the mechanics of the CCB, you should, of course, read through the CASE
statute and the governing regulations codified in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.) at Chapter II, subchapter B. (37 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-232.2). There is also a useful video of a
panel discussion about the board which you can find by clicking here.
_______________
The CCB is not without its detractors, even though it has just barely come into existence. The
Electronic Frontier Foundation (or EFF) has said “the CCB is likely to disadvantage many people
who are accused of copyright infringement, especially ordinary internet users, website owners,
and small businesses. It also violates the Constitution in ways that harm everyone,” and they
predict that “most knowledgeable parties will choose to opt out of the CCB process.” You can
read their full critique by clicking here.
In our view it is too early to make confident statements about who will be using the CCB
system, how often respondents will opt out, whether the Board will be biased in favor of finding
infringement or, frankly, most anything else. As the copyright world gains experience with this
new system some of these issues will become clear, and hopefully defects can be corrected by
regulatory or statutory amendments. That said, what’s your prediction? CCB — good
development or disaster waiting to happen?

Chapter 7: The 1909 Act Framework and Its Partial Persistence: Of Publication, Notice,
Deposit and Registration
B. Publication
1. Distribution
Page 511 – In the “Food for Thought” box, replace the first sentence with the
following:
Notice that the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences court acknowledges the decision
in the Letter Edged in Black Press case, excerpted below on p. 522, only with a “cf.” cite.
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C. Notice
p. 532: Replace note 4 with the following:
4. All Rights Reserved. Flip open any book you have lying around your apartment and read the
copyright information. It is likely that you will see the phrase “All Rights Reserved” next to
any copyright notice the publisher has included. This phrase is meaningless under current
law, and is included only as a matter of habit and reflex. The practice of using the words
originally developed under the Copyright Act of 1870, which
GO ONLINE
after granting exclusive rights such as copying and vending,
Did authors and publishers
added that “authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to
actually use “All Rights
translate their own works.” The Library of Congress advised
Reserved” in the 1870s and
authors that that provision might require an affirmative
1880s? To examine the title
statement to ensure the retention of rights of dramatization and
and copyright pages of Mark
translation, and suggested that they use the phrase “All Rights
Twain’s “Huckleberry Finn,”
published in 1886, click here.
Reserved.” In 1891, Congress removed the “may reserve”
language, and granted rights of dramatization and translation
outright, thus eliminating the need to use “All Rights Reserved.” Nineteen years later, the
phrase was resurrected by a copyright treaty known as the Buenos Aires Convention, which
provided that copyright in Western Hemisphere countries that were parties to the treaty
could be secured by inserting the phrase in published copies. (For more detail, see the review
of international copyright law provided as an online adjunct to this book by clicking here.)
However, in the century since that treaty was finalized, every party to it has signed the Berne
Convention, which forbids member states from conditioning copyright on any formalities.
Thus, “All Rights Reserved” is now purely vestigial – just like wisdom teeth and goose bumps.

E. Registration
Page 550 – Insert the following in place of the second paragraph in Note 4:
The requirement of final action on a registration application before an infringement suit
can be filed could result in unfairness to copyright owners. For instance, the statute of limitations
might run before the Copyright Office has made a decision on the application, leaving the
copyright owner with no remedy due to administrative foot dragging. This led some plaintiffs to
argue that the requirement of § 411 should be deemed satisfied when the copyright owner filed a
completed registration application, rather than when the registration was ultimately granted or
denied. This argument proved persuasive to some, but not all, of the various circuits. In Fourth
Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S.Ct. 881 (2019), the Court resolved the circuitsplit by unanimously holding that the unambiguous text of § 411 required final action by the
Copyright Office – either an issued registration or a formal denial – before suit could be filed. The
Court found that the alternative reading of allowing suit based solely on a registration-application
would render several other provisions of the statute superfluous. Justice Ginsburg dismissed the
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concern about delay by observing that “the average processing time for registration applications
is currently seven months, leaving ample time to sue after the Register’s decision, even for
infringement that began before submission of an application.”

Page 552 – Insert the following above Note 7:
6A. Inaccuracies in Copyright Registrations: Ignorance of the Law is Sometimes an Excuse.
Suppose that a registration application contains inaccurate information. Maybe it claims that
the work was first published in the United States, when in fact it was first published in Iran,
a country that has no copyright relations with the United States. Maybe it states the wrong
year of birth of the author. Suppose further that the Copyright Office grants the registration
without discovering the inaccuracies. When do the inaccuracies render the registration
invalid, thus stopping the owner of copyright in a domestic work from suing for infringement
(§411), or stopping the owner of copyright in any work from obtaining statutory damages and
attorney’s fees (§412)? Section 411(b)(1) answers that question in a way that is quite forgiving
to the applicant. It states that inaccuracies in the registration will render it invalid for
purposes of §§ 411 and 412 only when “(A) the inaccurate information was included on the
application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and (B) the
inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to
refuse registration.”
A recent Supreme Court case addressed the issue of whether § 411(b)(1)(A) excuses
mistakes of law and mistakes of fact on the same terms. In that case, Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M
Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., 142 S.Ct. 941 (2022), Unicolors had submitted a single application to
register copyright in 31 separate fabric designs. The registration was granted. Unicolors later
sued clothing retailer H&M for infringing one of the designs, and represented that the single
registration it had obtained for 31 designs satisfied its § 411 obligation to register copyright in
the particular design at issue before suing. H&M argued that the registration had been
improperly granted. Copyright Office regulations provide that a group of separate works can
only be registered in a single application if they constitute a “unit of publication,” that is, if
they were published together and at the same time. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4) (2020). (As you
might imagine, this provision prevents applicants from registering many different works, each
of which the Copyright Office has to examine, process, and catalog, while paying only one
registration fee.) Unicolors knew that it had not published the 31 designs together and at the
same time, and it therefore could not claim excusable lack of knowledge under § 411(b)(1)(A)
as to that fact. However, Unicolors argued (in the Supreme Court, at least) that it did not
know of the regulation that required such common publication in order to include all of the
designs in one application, and that its lack of legal knowledge should also excuse its mistake
in representing that a single application was proper.
The Supreme Court agreed. It held that the plain language of § 411(b)(1)(A) does not
distinguish between lack of factual knowledge and lack of legal knowledge. It also noted that
the legislative history of that section indicated that it was intended to make it easier for
nonlawyers to obtain valid copyright registrations, and it evinced sympathy for applicants
who could not follow complicated statutory and regulatory provisions. Do you agree? Would
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you support a provision that required registrants to cure inaccuracies that could be cured, and
gave them some period of time to do so (while allowing them to proceed with a lawsuit in the
meantime)? Without any obligation to cure, is§ 411(b)(1)(A) fair to other registrants who
were diligent in informing themselves of registration requirements, and complying with those
requirements at greater cost to them?

F. Restoration of Copyright in Foreign Works
Page 559 – in the Troll Co. opinion, just before the “Discussion” section, insert the
following text:
[Troll Co. served Uneeda with written notice of its intent to enforce the copyright (a procedure
sometimes required under section 104A, as discussed below) on October 18, 2005.]

Chapter 8: Initial Ownership of Copyright
A. Sole and Joint Authorship
Page 581 – Insert the following at the end of Note 1:
Note, however, that one co-owner cannot grant an exclusive license to use a work without the
consent of the other co-owners, because one co-owner cannot limit the other co-owners’ right to
exploit the copyright. See Tresóna Multimedia, LLC v. Burbank High School Vocal Music Ass’n, 953 F.3d
638, 645-646 (2020).

C. Governments and Legally Binding Works
Page 627 – Replace the subchapter title above, and all material on pages 627-630
before the caption of the Veeck case, with the following:
C. Governments as Authors and Owners, and Legally Binding Works
This section addresses a number of related issues concerning copyright, governments, and law.
The structure of the issues in this area has been affected, but perhaps not entirely clarified, by the
very recent Supreme Court decision in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, presented as a principal case
below. For the moment, we have chosen to organize the issues into three related but distinct
groups. The first group clusters around the question of whether and when governments can be
“authors” within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Because governments are not natural persons,
that question is really the question of whether and when government officials, employees, or
contractors can create works in which copyright can be claimed by the governments that employ
or contract with them. As we will see, the answer is different for different types of officials or
employees, and is also different for the federal government than for state governments. The second
group concerns whether and when governments can become owners of copyright by assignment
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in works authored by private individuals. The third group concerns whether and under what
conditions private individuals can own copyright in works that have become legally binding.

1. Authorship by Government Officials “Empowered to Speak with the Force of
Law”
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.
United States Supreme Court, 2020
140 S. Ct. 1498
ROBERTS, C.J..
The Copyright Act grants potent, decades-long monopoly protection for “original works of
authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The question in this case is whether that protection extends to the
annotations contained in Georgia’s official annotated code.
We hold that it does not. Over a century ago, we recognized a limitation on copyright
protection for certain government work product, rooted in the Copyright Act’s “authorship”
requirement. Under what has been dubbed the government edicts doctrine, officials empowered
to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of—and therefore cannot copyright—the
works they create in the course of their official duties.
We have previously applied that doctrine to hold that non-binding, explanatory legal
materials are not copyrightable when created by judges who possess the authority to make and
interpret the law. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 9 S.Ct. 36, 32 L.Ed. 425 (1888). We now
recognize that the same logic applies to non-binding, explanatory legal materials created by a
legislative body vested with the authority to make law. Because Georgia’s annotations are authored
by an arm of the legislature in the course of its legislative duties, the government edicts doctrine
puts them outside the reach of copyright protection.
I
A
The State of Georgia has one official code—the “Official Code of Georgia Annotated,” or
OCGA. The first page of each volume of the OCGA boasts the State’s official seal and announces
to readers that it is “Published Under Authority of the State.”
The OCGA includes the text of every Georgia statute currently in force, as well as various nonbinding supplementary materials. At issue in this case is a set of annotations that appear beneath
each statutory provision. The annotations generally include summaries of judicial decisions
applying a given provision, summaries of any pertinent opinions of the state attorney general, and
a list of related law review articles and similar reference materials. In addition, the annotations
often include editor’s notes that provide information about the origins of the statutory text, such
as whether it derives from a particular judicial decision or resembles an older provision that has
been construed by Georgia courts. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 51–1–1, 53–4–2 (2019).
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The OCGA is assembled by a state entity called the Code Revision Commission. In 1977, the
Georgia Legislature established the Commission to recodify Georgia law for the first time in
decades. The Commission was (and remains) tasked with consolidating disparate bills into a
single Code for reenactment by the legislature and contracting with a third party to produce the
annotations. A majority of the Commission’s 15 members must be members of the Georgia Senate
or House of Representatives. The Commission receives funding through appropriations “provided
for the legislative branch of state government.” OCGA § 28–9–2(c) (2018). And it is staffed by the
Office of Legislative Counsel, which is obligated by statute to provide services “for the legislative
branch of government.” §§ 28–4–3(c)(4), 28–9–4. Under the Georgia Constitution, the
Commission’s role in compiling the statutory text and accompanying annotations falls “within
the sphere of legislative authority.” Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm’n, 244 Ga. 325, 330, 260 S.E.2d
30, 34 (1979).
Each year, the Commission submits its proposed statutory text and accompanying
annotations to the legislature for approval. The legislature then votes to do three things: (1)
“enact[ ]” the “statutory portion of the codification of Georgia laws”; (2) “merge[ ]” the statutory
portion “with [the] annotations”; and (3) “publish[ ]” the final merged product “by authority of
the state” as “the ‘Official Code of Georgia Annotated.’ ” OCGA § 1–1–1 (2019).
The annotations in the current OCGA were prepared in the first instance by Matthew Bender
& Co., Inc., a division of the LexisNexis Group, pursuant to a work-for-hire agreement with the
Commission. The agreement between Lexis and the Commission states that any copyright in the
OCGA vests exclusively in “the State of Georgia, acting through the Commission.” Lexis and its
army of researchers perform the lion’s share of the work in drafting the annotations, but the
Commission supervises that work and specifies what the annotations must include in exacting
detail. Under the agreement, Lexis enjoys the exclusive right to publish, distribute, and sell the
OCGA. In exchange, Lexis has agreed to limit the price it may charge for the OCGA and to make
an unannotated version of the statutory text available to the public online for free. A hard copy of
the complete OCGA currently retails for $412.00.
B
Public.Resource.Org (PRO) is a nonprofit organization that aims to facilitate public access to
government records and legal materials. Without permission, PRO posted a digital version of the
OCGA on various websites, where it could be downloaded by the public without charge. PRO
also distributed copies of the OCGA to various organizations and Georgia officials.
In response, the Commission sent PRO several cease-and-desist letters asserting that PRO’s
actions constituted unlawful copyright infringement. When PRO refused to halt its distribution
activities, the Commission sued PRO on behalf of the Georgia Legislature and the State of Georgia
for copyright infringement. The Commission limited its assertion of copyright to the annotations
described above; it did not claim copyright in the statutory text or numbering. PRO
counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that the entire OCGA, including the annotations,
fell in the public domain.
The District Court . . . concluded that the annotations were eligible for copyright protection
because they were “not enacted into law” and lacked “the force of law.” In light of that conclusion,
the Court granted partial summary judgment to the Commission and entered a permanent
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injunction requiring PRO to cease its distribution activities and to remove the digital copies of
the OCGA from the internet.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. . . . In a democracy, the Court reasoned, “the People” are “the
constructive authors” of the law, and judges and legislators are merely “draftsmen ... exercising
delegated authority.” The Court therefore deemed the “ultimate inquiry” to be whether a work is
“attributable to the constructive authorship of the People.” The Court identified three factors to
guide that inquiry: “the identity of the public official who created the work; the nature of the
work; and the process by which the work was produced.” The Court found that each of those
factors cut in favor of treating the OCGA annotations as government edicts authored by the
People. It therefore rejected the Commission’s assertion of copyright, vacated the injunction
against PRO, and directed that judgment be entered for PRO.
II
We hold that the annotations in Georgia’s Official Code are ineligible for copyright
protection, though for reasons distinct from those relied on by the Court of Appeals. A careful
examination of our government edicts precedents reveals a straightforward rule based on the
identity of the author. Under the government edicts doctrine, judges—and, we now confirm,
legislators—may not be considered the “authors” of the works they produce in the course of their
official duties as judges and legislators. That rule applies regardless of whether a given material
carries the force of law. And it applies to the annotations here because they are authored by an
arm of the legislature in the course of its official duties.
A
We begin with precedent. The government
edicts doctrine traces back to a trio of cases decided
in the 19th century. In this Court’s first copyright
case, Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834),
the Court’s third Reporter of Decisions, Wheaton,
sued the fourth, Peters, unsuccessfully asserting a
copyright interest in the Justices’ opinions. Id., at
617 (argument). In Wheaton’s view, the opinions
“must have belonged to some one” because “they
were new, original,” and much more “elaborate”
than law or custom required. Id., at 615. Wheaton
argued that the Justices were the authors and had
assigned their ownership interests to him through a
tacit “gift.” Id., at 614. The Court unanimously
rejected that argument, concluding that “no
reporter has or can have any copyright in the
written opinions delivered by this court” and that
“the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter
any such right.” Id., at 668 (opinion).

MAKE THE CONNECTION
You may recall that Wheaton v. Peters appears as a
principal case at the beginning of Chapter 7, on
p. 500 in the main volume. There, we focused on
the Court’s analysis of the relationship between
common-law copyright, which it held ended
with publication, and federal copyright, which it
held could be acquired only by complying with a
series of formalities. It reached those issues
because Wheaton claimed copyright in
annotations that he himself had written, such as
summaries of the attorneys’ arguments. Here, we
learn that Wheaton also argued that the Justices
had tacitly assigned copyright in their opinions
to him. At the time of the oral argument, five of
the seven Justices on the Court had served while
Wheaton was reporter, and hence were the very
Justices who Wheaton was arguing had silently
given him copyright in their opinions.
Awkward?

That conclusion apparently seemed too obvious
to adorn with further explanation, but the Court provided one a half century later in Banks v.
Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 9 S.Ct. 36, 32 L.Ed. 425 (1888). That case concerned whether Wheaton’s
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state-court counterpart, the official reporter of the Ohio Supreme Court, held a copyright in the
judges’ opinions and several non-binding explanatory materials prepared by the judges. Id., at
249–251, 9 S.Ct. 36. The Court concluded that he did not, explaining that “the judge who, in his
judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or
head note” cannot “be regarded as their author or their proprietor, in the sense of [the Copyright
Act].” Id., at 253, 9 S.Ct. 36. Pursuant to “a judicial consensus” dating back to Wheaton, judges could
not assert copyright in “whatever work they perform in their capacity as judges.” Banks, 128 U.S at
253, 9 S.Ct. 36 (emphasis in original). Rather, “[t]he whole work done by the judges constitutes
the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for
publication to all.” Ibid. (citing Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 6 N.E. 559 (1886)).
In a companion case decided later that Term, Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 9 S.Ct. 177, 32
L.Ed. 547 (1888), the Court identified an important limiting principle. As in Wheaton and Banks, the
Court rejected the claim that an official reporter held a copyright interest in the judges’ opinions.
But, resolving an issue not addressed in Wheaton and Banks, the Court upheld the reporter’s
copyright interest in several explanatory materials that the reporter had created himself:
headnotes, syllabi, tables of contents, and the like. Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 645, 647, 9 S.Ct. 177.
Although these works mirrored the judge-made materials rejected in Banks, they came from an
author who had no authority to speak with the force of law. Because the reporter was not a judge,
he was free to “obtain[ ] a copyright” for the materials that were “the result of his [own]
intellectual labor.” 128 U.S. at 647, 9 S.Ct. 177.
These cases establish a straightforward rule: Because judges are vested with the authority to
make and interpret the law, they cannot be the “author” of the works they prepare “in the
discharge of their judicial duties.” Banks, 128 U.S. at 253, 9 S.Ct. 36. This rule applies both to
binding works (such as opinions) and to non-binding works (such as headnotes and syllabi). Ibid.
It does not apply, however, to works created by government officials (or private parties) who lack
the authority to make or interpret the law, such as court reporters. Compare ibid. with Callaghan,
128 U.S. at 647, 9 S.Ct. 177.
The animating principle behind this rule is that no one can own the law. “Every citizen is
presumed to know the law,” and “it needs no argument to show ... that all should have free access”
to its contents. Nash, 142 Mass. at 35, 6 N.E. at 560 (cited by Banks, 128 U.S. at 253–254, 9 S.Ct. 36).
Our cases give effect to that principle in the copyright context through construction of the
statutory term “author.” Id., at 253, 9 S.Ct. 36. Rather than attempting to catalog the materials that
constitute “the law,” the doctrine bars the officials responsible for creating the law from being
considered the “author[s]” of “whatever work they perform in their capacity” as lawmakers. Ibid.
(emphasis added). Because these officials are generally empowered to make and interpret law,
their “whole work” is deemed part of the “authentic exposition and interpretation of the law” and
must be “free for publication to all.” Ibid.
If judges, acting as judges, cannot be “authors” because of their authority to make and interpret
the law, it follows that legislators, acting as legislators, cannot be either. Courts have thus long
understood the government edicts doctrine to apply to legislative materials. See, e.g., Nash, 142
Mass. at 35, 6 N.E. at 560 (judicial opinions and statutes stand “on substantially the same footing”
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for purposes of the government edicts doctrine); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 130–131, 137–138 (CA6
1898) (Harlan, J., Circuit Justice, joined by then-Circuit Judge Taft) (analyzing statutes and
supplementary materials under Banks and Callaghan and concluding that the materials were
copyrightable because they were prepared by a private compiler).
Moreover, just as the doctrine applies to “whatever work [judges] perform in their capacity as
judges,” Banks, 128 U.S., at 253, 9 S.Ct. 36, it applies to whatever work legislators perform in their
capacity as legislators. That of course includes final legislation, but it also includes explanatory
and procedural materials legislators create in the discharge of their legislative duties. In the same
way that judges cannot be the authors of their headnotes and syllabi, legislators cannot be the
authors of (for example) their floor statements, committee reports, and proposed bills. These
materials are part of the “whole work done by [legislators],” so they must be “free for publication
to all.” Ibid.
Under our precedents, therefore, copyright does not vest in works that are (1) created by
judges and legislators (2) in the course of their judicial and legislative duties.
B
Applying that framework, Georgia’s annotations are not copyrightable. The first step is to
examine whether their purported author qualifies as a legislator.
As we have explained, the annotations were prepared in the first instance by a private
company (Lexis) pursuant to a work-for-hire agreement with Georgia’s Code Revision
Commission. The Copyright Act therefore deems the Commission the sole “author” of the work.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b). Although Lexis expends considerable effort preparing the annotations, for
purposes of copyright that labor redounds to the Commission as the statutory author. Georgia
agrees that the author is the Commission.
The Commission is not identical to the Georgia Legislature, but functions as an arm of it for
the purpose of producing the annotations. The Commission is created by the legislature, for the
legislature, and consists largely of legislators. The Commission receives funding and staff
designated by law for the legislative branch. Significantly, the annotations the Commission
creates are approved by the legislature before being “merged” with the statutory text and
published in the official code alongside that text at the legislature’s direction. OCGA § 1–1–1.
***
The second step is to determine whether the Commission creates the annotations in the
“discharge” of its legislative “duties.” Banks, 128 U.S. at 253, 9 S.Ct. 36. It does. Although the
annotations are not enacted into law through bicameralism and presentment, the Commission’s
preparation of the annotations is under Georgia law an act of “legislative authority,” Harrison Co.,
244 Ga. at 330, 260 S.E.2d at 34, and the annotations provide commentary and resources that the
legislature has deemed relevant to understanding its laws. Georgia and Justice GINSBURG
emphasize that the annotations do not purport to provide authoritative explanations of the law
and largely summarize other materials, such as judicial decisions and law review articles. See post,
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at 1523 – 1524 (dissenting opinion). But that does not take them outside the exercise of legislative
duty by the Commission and legislature. Just as we have held that the “statement of the case and
the syllabus or head note” prepared by judges fall within the “work they perform in their capacity
as judges,” Banks, 128 U.S. at 253, 9 S.Ct. 36, so too annotations published by legislators alongside
the statutory text fall within the work legislators perform in their capacity as legislators.
In light of the Commission’s role as an adjunct to the legislature and the fact that the
Commission authors the annotations in the course of its legislative responsibilities, the
annotations in Georgia’s Official Code fall within the government edicts doctrine and are not
copyrightable.
III
Georgia resists this conclusion on several grounds. At the outset, Georgia advances two
arguments for why, in its view, excluding the OCGA annotations from copyright protection
conflicts with the text of the Copyright Act. Both are unavailing.
First, Georgia notes that § 101 of the Act specifically lists “annotations” among the kinds of
works eligible for copyright protection. But that provision refers only to “annotations ... which ...
represent an original work of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). The whole point of the
government edicts doctrine is that judges and legislators cannot serve as authors when they
produce works in their official capacity. . . .
Second, Georgia draws a negative inference from the fact that the Act excludes from copyright
protection “work[s] prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part
of that person’s official duties” and does not establish a similar rule for the States. § 101; see also §
105. But the bar on copyright protection for federal works sweeps much more broadly than the
government edicts doctrine does. That bar applies to works created by all federal “officer[s] or
employee[s],” without regard for the nature of their position or scope of their authority. Whatever
policy reasons might justify the Federal Government’s decision to forfeit copyright protection for
its own proprietary works, that federal rule does not suggest an intent to displace the much
narrower government edicts doctrine with respect to the States. That doctrine does not apply to
non-lawmaking officials, leaving States free to assert copyright in the vast majority of expressive
works they produce, such as those created by their universities, libraries, tourism offices, and so
on.
More generally, Georgia suggests that we should resist applying our government edicts
precedents to the OCGA annotations because our 19th-century forebears interpreted the
statutory term author by reference to “public policy”—an approach that Georgia believes is
incongruous with the “modern era” of statutory interpretation. But we are particularly reluctant
to disrupt precedents interpreting language that Congress has since reenacted. As we explained
last Term in Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 586 U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 628, 202
L.Ed.2d 551 (2019), when Congress “adopt[s] the language used in [an] earlier act,” we presume
that Congress “adopted also the construction given by this Court to such language, and made it a
part of the enactment.” Id., at ––––, 139 S.Ct., at 634 (quoting Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16,
68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948)). A century of cases have rooted the government edicts doctrine
in the word “author,” and Congress has repeatedly reused that term without abrogating the
doctrine.
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***
Georgia also appeals to the overall purpose of the Copyright Act to promote the creation and
dissemination of creative works. Georgia submits that, without copyright protection, Georgia and
many other States will be unable to induce private parties like Lexis to assist in preparing
affordable annotated codes for widespread distribution. That appeal to copyright policy, however,
is addressed to the wrong forum. As Georgia acknowledges, “[I]t is generally for Congress, not the
courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 212, 123 S.Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003). . . .
Turning to our government edicts precedents, Georgia insists that they can and should be read
to focus exclusively on whether a particular work has “the force of law.” Brief for Petitioners 32
(capitalization deleted). * * * But the Act’s reference to “authorship” provides no basis for
Georgia’s rule distinguishing between different categories of content with different effects.
Georgia minimizes the OCGA annotations as non-binding and non-authoritative, but that
description undersells their practical significance. Imagine a Georgia citizen interested in learning
his legal rights and duties. If he reads the economy-class version of the Georgia Code available
online, he will see laws requiring political candidates to pay hefty qualification fees (with no
indigency exception), criminalizing broad categories of consensual sexual conduct, and
exempting certain key evidence in criminal trials from standard evidentiary limitations—with no
hint that important aspects of those laws have been held unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme
Court. See OCGA §§ 21–2–131, 16–6–2, 16–6–18, 16–15–9 (available at www.legis.ga.gov).
Meanwhile, first-class readers with access to the annotations will be assured that these laws are,
in crucial respects, unenforceable relics that the legislature has not bothered to narrow or repeal.
See
§§
21–2–131,
16–6–2,
16–6–18,
16–15–9
(available
at
https://store.lexisnexis.com/products/official - code - of - georgia - annotated - skuSKU6647 for
$412.00).
***
Instead of examining whether given material carries “the force of law,” we ask only whether
the author of the work is a judge or a legislator. If so, then whatever work that judge or legislator
produces in the course of his judicial or legislative duties is not copyrightable. That is the
framework our precedents long ago established, and we adhere to those precedents today.

Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice ALITO joins, and with whom Justice BREYER
joins as to all but Part II–A and footnote 6, dissenting.
According to the majority, this Court’s 19th-century “government edicts” precedents clearly
stand for the proposition that “judges and legislators cannot serve as authors [for copyright
purposes] when they produce works in their official capacity.” And, after straining to conclude
that the Georgia Code Revision Commission (Commission) is an arm of the Georgia Legislature,
ante, at 1508 – 1509, the majority concludes that Georgia cannot hold a copyright in the
annotations that are included as part of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA). This
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ruling will likely come as a shock to the 25 other jurisdictions—22 States, 2 Territories, and the
District of Columbia—that rely on arrangements similar to Georgia’s to produce annotated codes.
Perhaps these jurisdictions all overlooked this Court’s purportedly clear guidance. Or perhaps the
widespread use of these arrangements indicates that today’s decision extends the government
edicts doctrine to a new context, rather than simply “confirm[ing]” what the precedents have
always held. . . .
Like the majority, I begin with the three 19th-century precedents that the parties agree
provide the foundation for the government edicts doctrine. * * * These precedents [ – Wheaton v.
Peters, Banks v. Manchester, and Callaghan v. Myers – ] establish that judicial opinions cannot be
copyrighted. But they do not exclude from copyright protection notes that are prepared by an
official court reporter and published together with the reported opinions. There is no apparent
reason why the same logic would not apply to statutes and regulations. Thus, it must follow from
our precedents that statutes and regulations cannot be copyrighted, but accompanying notes
lacking legal force can be. See Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129 (CA6 1898) (Harlan, J.) (explaining that,
under Banks and Callaghan, annotations to Michigan statutes could be copyrighted). * * *
Allowing annotations to be copyrighted does not run afoul of [the] possible justifications for
the government edicts doctrine. First, unlike judicial opinions and statutes, these annotations do
not even purport to embody the will of the people because they are not law. The General Assembly
of Georgia has made abundantly clear through a variety of provisions that the annotations do not
create any binding obligations. . . . Thus, although the materials “merge” prior to publication in
the “official” code, the very provision calling for that merger makes clear that the annotations serve
as commentary, not law. * * *
Second, unlike judges and legislators, the creators of annotations are incentivized by the
copyright laws to produce a desirable product that will eventually earn them a profit. And though
the Commission may require Lexis to follow strict guidelines, the independent synthesis, analysis,
and creative drafting behind the annotations makes them analogous to other copyrightable
materials.
Lastly, the annotations do not impede fair notice of the laws. As just stated, the annotations
do not carry the binding force of law. They simply summarize independent sources of legal
information and consolidate them in one place. Thus, OCGA annotations serve a similar function
to other copyrighted research tools provided by private parties such as the American Law Reports
and Westlaw, which also contain information of great “practical significance.” Compare, e.g.,
OCGA § 34–9–260 (annotation for Cho Carwash Property, L.L.C. v. Everett, 326 Ga.App. 6, 755 S.E.2d
823 (2014)) with Ga. Code Ann. § 34–9–260 (Westlaw’s annotation for the same).
The majority resists this conclusion, suggesting that without access to the annotations,
readers of Georgia law will be unable to fully understand the true meaning of Georgia’s statutory
provisions, such as provisions that have been undermined or nullified by court decisions. Ante, at
1512 – 1513. That is simply incorrect. As the majority tacitly concedes, a person seeking information
about changes in Georgia statutory law can find that information by consulting the original source
for the change in the law’s status—the court decisions themselves. The inability to access the
OCGA merely deprives a researcher of one specific tool, not to the underlying factual or legal
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information summarized in that tool.
The text of the Copyright Act supports my reading of the precedents. Specifically, there are
four indications in the text of the Copyright Act that the OCGA annotations are copyrightable.
As an initial matter, the Act does not define the word “author,” 17 U.S.C. § 101, or make any
reference to the government edicts doctrine. Accordingly, the term “author” itself does not shed
any light on whether the doctrine covers statutory annotations. Second, while the Act excludes
from copyright protection “work[s] prepared by an officer or employee of the United States
Government as part of that person’s official duties,” § 101; see also § 105, the Act contains no similar
prohibition against works of state governments or works prepared at their behest. “Congress’ use
of explicit language in one provision cautions against inferring the same limitation” elsewhere in
the statute. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 580 U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct.
436, 442, 196 L.Ed.2d 340 (2016). Third, the Act specifically notes that annotations are
copyrightable derivative works. § 101. Here, again, the Act does not expressly exclude from
copyright protection annotations created either by the State or at the State’s request. Fourth, the
Act provides that an author may hold a copyright in “material contributed” in a derivative work,
“as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work.” § 103(b); These aspects of
the statutory text, taken together, further support the conclusion that the OCGA annotations are
copyrightable.
* * *.
In addition to its textual deficiencies, the majority’s understanding of this Court’s precedents
fails to account for the critical differences between the role that judicial opinions play in
expounding upon the law compared to that of statutes. The majority finds it meaningful, for
instance, that Banks prohibited dissents and concurrences from being copyrighted, even though
they carry no legal force. At an elementary level, it is true that the judgment is the only part of a
judicial decision that has legal effect. But it blinks reality to ignore that every word of a judicial
opinion—whether it is a majority, a concurrence, or a dissent—expounds upon the law in ways
that do not map neatly on to the legislative function. Setting aside summary decisions, the reader
of a judicial opinion will always gain critical insight into the reasoning underlying a judicial
holding by reading all opinions in their entirety. Understanding the reasoning that animates the
rule in turn provides pivotal insight into how the law will likely be applied in future judicial
opinions. Thus, deprived of access to judicial opinions, individuals cannot access the primary, and
therefore best, source of information for the meaning of the law. . . .
These differences provide crucial context for Banks’ reasoning. Specifically, to ensure that
judicial “exposition and interpretation of the law” remains “free for publication to all,” the word
“author” must be read to encompass all judicial duties.But these differences also demonstrate that
the same rule does not a fortiori apply to all legislative duties.8
Although legislative history is not at issue in this case, the majority also contends that its rule is
necessary to fend off the possibility that “[a] State could monetize its entire suite of legislative
history.” Ante, at 1513. Putting aside the jurisprudential debate over the use of such materials in
interpreting federal statutes, many States can, and have, specifically authorized courts to consider
legislative history when construing statutes. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2–4–203(1)(c) (2019); Iowa
Code § 4.6(3) (2019); Minn. Stat. § 645.16(7) (2018); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 12–2A–20(C)(2) (2019);
8
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***
The majority’s rule will leave in the lurch the many States, private parties, and legal researchers
who relied on the previously bright-line rule. Perhaps, to the detriment of all, many States will
stop producing annotated codes altogether. Were that to occur, the majority’s fear of an
“economy-class” version of the law will truly become a reality. See ante, at 1512 – 1513. As Georgia
explains, its contract enables the OCGA to be sold at a fraction of the cost of competing annotated
codes. For example, Georgia asserts that Lexis sold the OCGA for $404 in 2016, while West
Publishing’s competing annotated code sold for $2,570. Should state annotated codes disappear,
those without the means to pay the competitor’s significantly higher price tag will have a valuable
research tool taken away from them. Meanwhile, this Court, which is privileged to have access to
numerous research resources, will scarcely notice. * * *
Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice BREYER joins, dissenting.
Beyond doubt, state laws are not copyrightable. Nor are other materials created by state
legislators in the course of performing their lawmaking responsibilities, e.g., legislative committee
reports, floor statements, unenacted bills. Ante, at 1517 – 1518. Not all that legislators do, however,
is ineligible for copyright protection; the government edicts doctrine shields only “works that are
(1) created by judges and legislators (2) in the course of their judicial and legislative duties.” Ante, at 1508
(emphasis added). The core question this case presents, as I see it: Are the annotations in the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA) done in a legislative capacity? The answer, I am
persuaded, should be no.
To explain why, I proceed from common ground. All agree that headnotes and syllabi for
judicial opinions—both a kind of annotation—are copyrightable when created by a reporter of
decisions, Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 645–650, 9 S.Ct. 177, 32 L.Ed. 547 (1888), but are not
copyrightable when created by judges, Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253, 9 S.Ct. 36, 32 L.Ed.
425 (1888). That is so because “[t]he whole work done by ... judges,” ibid., including dissenting and
concurring opinions, ranks as work performed in their judicial capacity. Judges do not outsource
their writings to “arm[s]” or “adjunct[s],” cf. ante, at 1508, 1509, to be composed in their stead.
Accordingly, the judicial opinion-drafting process in its entirety—including the drafting of
headnotes and syllabi, in jurisdictions where that is done by judges—falls outside the reach of
copyright protection.
One might ask: If a judge’s annotations are not copyrightable, why are those created by
legislators? The answer lies in the difference between the role of a judge and the role of a legislator.
“[T]o the judiciary” we assign “the duty of interpreting and applying” the law, Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923), and sometimes making the applicable
law, see Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 383
N. D. Cent. Code Ann. § 1–02–39(3) (2019); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.49(C) (Lexis 2019); 1 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 1921(c)(7) (2016). Given the direct role that legislative history plays in the
construction of statutes in these States, it is hardly clear that such States could subject their
legislative histories to copyright.
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(1964). See also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). In contrast, the role of the
legislature encompasses the process of “making laws”—not construing statutes after their
enactment. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488, 43 S.Ct. 597; see Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U.S. ––––, ––––, 138 S.Ct.
897, 905, 200 L.Ed.2d 92 (2018) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he legislative power is the power to make
law.”). The OCGA annotations, in my appraisal, do not rank as part of the Georgia Legislature’s
lawmaking process for three reasons.
First, the annotations are not created contemporaneously with the statutes to which they
pertain; instead, the annotations comment on statutes already enacted. See, e.g., App. 268–269
(text of enacted laws are transmitted to the publisher for the addition of commentary); id., at 403–
404 (publisher adds new case notes on a rolling basis as courts construe existing statutes). In
short, annotating begins only after lawmaking ends. This sets the OCGA annotations apart from
uncopyrightable legislative materials like committee reports, generated before a law’s enactment,
and tied tightly to the task of law-formulation.
Second, the OCGA annotations are descriptive rather than prescriptive. Instead of stating the
legislature’s perception of what a law conveys, the annotations summarize writings in which
others express their views on a given statute. . . . The annotations are neutrally cast; they do not
opine on whether the summarized case was correctly decided. See, e.g., OCGA § 17–7–50 (2013)
(case annotation summarizing facts and holdings of nine cases construing right to grand jury
hearing). This characteristic of the annotations distinguishes them from preenactment legislative
materials that touch or concern the correct interpretation of the legislature’s work.
Third, and of prime importance, the OCGA annotations are “given for the purpose of
convenient reference” by the public, § 1–1–7 (2019); they aim to inform the citizenry at large, they
do not address, particularly, those seated in legislative chambers. Annotations are thus unlike, for
example, surveys, work commissioned by a legislature to aid in determining whether existing law
should be amended.
***
Because summarizing judicial decisions and commentary bearing on enacted statutes, in
contrast to, for example, drafting a committee report to accompany proposed legislation, is not
done in a legislator’s law-shaping capacity, I would hold the OCGA annotations copyrightable
and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Notes
1. Understanding the Lines that the Opinions Draw. The opinions in the Public.Resource.Org
(PRO) case all agree that some texts written by legislators or judges are excluded from
copyright protection by the “government edicts” doctrine. However, each of them presents a
different interpretation of that doctrine. Those interpretations may have some twists, but
simplified versions of each can be drawn from brief quotes from each of the three opinions.
Consider these quotes:
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•

The Court: “[O]fficials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of
. . . the works they create in the course of their official duties.”
• Justice Thomas: “[I]t must follow from our precedents that statutes and regulations
cannot be copyrighted, but accompanying notes lacking legal force can be.”
• Justice Ginsburg: “[S]tate laws are not copyrightable. Nor are other materials created by
state legislators in the course of performing their lawmaking responsibilities. [But] the
role of the legislature [does not extend to] construing statutes after their enactment.”
Can you place interpretations of the “government edicts” doctrine drawn from those quotes
in order from the narrowest to the broadest, perhaps thinking of them graphically as three
nested circles in a Venn diagram? Consider the following list of types of works, and assume
that each was written by state legislators within the scope of their government employment.
Which would fall within even the narrowest interpretation of the doctrine; which would fall
outside of that interpretation but within the two others; which only within the broadest
interpretation; and which outside of all three interpretations? (1) A statute currently in force;
(2) A legislative committee report on a bill that was later enacted into law and is currently in
force; (3) A guide to the architecture of the state capitol; (4) A list of judicial opinions that
have interpreted a statute; (5) Correspondence between legislators regarding a bill that was
later enacted into law and is currently in force.
2. The Scope of the “Government Edicts” Doctrine and What Judges and Legislators Do.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts suggests that every word that judges and
legislators produce in their official capacities is potentially important for citizens to
understand what the law is and how it might apply to their conduct. By contrast, in dissent,
Justice Thomas suggests that what judges and legislators do is quite different. He agrees that
every word that judges produce may be important to understand or predict what the law is –
even concurrences and dissents that technically do not have the force of law. However, he
contends, that is not true of legislators, because legislation is different. Do you agree? Does
that depend at least in part on a contested theory of statutory interpretation? For strict
textualists, who believe that only the text of enacted law should be consulted when trying to
decide cases, statements of legislators outside of that text should be irrelevant. Such
statements have not been enacted following the legislative process set forth in state or federal
constitutions, and taking them into consideration would also multiply what citizens need to
learn to know the law. Note that in footnote 8, Justice Thomas suggests that legislative
history may not be protected by copyright in those states that have passed laws explicitly
stating that legislative history is relevant to interpreting statutes. By contrast, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent would exclude all pre-enactment legislative history from copyright
protection, but allow copyright protection for annotations made after enactment.
3. Copyright and the State’s Endorsement of a Privately-Sold Product. The title of the code
at issue in this case – the “Official Code of Georgia Annotated” – suggests that the Georgia
legislature has endorsed the annotations as its guide to the interpretation and application of
the laws that it has passed. As the Opinion for the Court also pointedly notes, “[t]he first page
of each volume of the OCGA boasts the State’s official seal and announces to readers that it is
‘Published Under Authority of the State.’” Can you imagine how a court or other government
office might give some deference or preference to the official annotated code? For example, if
a relevant judicial opinion did not appear in the OCGA, might a court be somewhat more
sympathetic to a lawyer who did not cite that opinion? Conversely, if a relevant opinion did
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appear in the OCGA, might a court be less sympathetic to a lawyer who states that she did
not cite it because it did not appear in a competing annotated code produced by another
publisher? If lawyers are worried about missing anything that might appear in “official
annotations,” won’t they feel compelled to consult the OCGA? Yet under Georgia’s agreement
with Lexis, in order to consult the only government-endorsed annotated code, they must
purchase a product from a private company. How much is the Court’s decision in this case
motivated by a sense that that arrangement – government endorsement and branding of a legal
research tool sold by on private company – is unfair or unseemly?
Notice that endorsement and branding are concepts associated more with trademark law
than with copyright law, and that copyright doctrine may not equipped to deal with all
endorsement concerns. For example, to deem an annotated code to be “official,” the state need
not have entered into a work-made-for-hire contract. It could have accepted an assignment
of copyright, or it could even have let Lexis retain copyright in the annotations, and perhaps
taken a license for certain uses. Without a work-made-for-hire contract, could the Court still
have concluded that the Georgia legislature was the “author” of the annotations for copyright
purposes? On authors’ names as brands, see, e.g., Laura Heymann, The Birth of the
Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377
(2005).
4. Statutory Annotations and the Incentive/Access Paradigm. The Opinion for the Court in
Public.Resource.Org emphasizes the importance of public access to the statutory annotations at
issue in the case. Without tools to access to cases and other materials interpreting the law,
people really won’t be able to understand many laws that they are expected to follow, or know
whether they have been ruled unenforceable. In a society of economic inequality such as ours,
the issue of access is sharpened. If a work is protected by copyright, states the Court, some
citizens will be able to afford only “economy-class” knowledge of the law, whereas others get
“first-class” knowledge.
By contrast, Justice Thomas downplays the restrictions on access, and emphasizes the role
of copyright law in providing an incentive to produce the annotations in the first place.
Thomas notes that copyright does protect similar annotations produced by other private
companies, and asserts that the annotations are only tools to locate helpful interpretations,
not the interpretations themselves. He is worried that without copyright protection, “many
States will stop producing annotated codes altogether,” thus leaving more people with only
an “economy-class version” of the law. This is, of course, an instance of the most prominent
form of argument about whether copyright should exist, and whether it should be
strengthened or weakened in various ways. Which opinion is stronger on this argument? If
you think you would have to know something more to answer that question, what would you
like to know? Could the State of Georgia simply fund an annotated state code with tax
dollars? Would you be more or less worried about state funding of fiction and art and music
than about state funding of statutory annotations?
5. Incentives Other Than Copyright and Public Funding. Lexis makes the OCGA available,
not just in a set of bound hard copies, but through its own online legal research service. How
much does Lexis need copyright to protect the OCGA as presented through that service? To
start to answer that question, you might consider a few other questions. How does Lexis
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control access to its online service? How easy is it to copy the entire OCGA from Lexis’s
website? What kinds of functions (search, hyperlinking, and others) does Lexis provide with
its online OCGA? How convenient are those functions for lawyers, and how easy is it to
duplicate them?
Compare how you might use OCGA on Lexis’s website with how you can use the copy of
the OCGA that Public.Resource.Org has placed online. The latter is available online at
archive.org. Which one is more useful? When we went to take a look at the OCGA on
archive.org, in early August 2020, the version available was the OGCA 2018, which had been
made available in late February and early March of 2019. In the intervening 16 months, the
most popular volume had been viewed 481 times, and the least popular volume had been
viewed 21 times. As of early August 2020, there were about 40,000 active members of the
Georgia bar. Our guess is that many more lawyers access the OCGA through the Lexis
website than on archive.org. Under those circumstances, is it possible that Lexis will agree to
continue to produce the OCGA even though it is in the public domain, and Lexis cannot
prevent it from appearing on archive.org? What impact might that have on the incentive
argument made by Justice Thomas? Conversely, what impact might that have on the “economy
class / first class” argument made by the Chief Justice – aren’t the scans that appear on
archive.org still an “economy-class” research tool as compared to the “first-class” tool available
on Lexis?
6. Executive Branch Officials. The PRO Court considers whether state judges and legislators,
acting in their official capacity, can ever be authors within the meaning of the Copyright Act,
and concludes that they cannot. It does not consider whether executive branch officials, such
as governors and agency heads, can be authors. Clearly, some executive branch officials are
“empowered to speak with the force of law.” Governors are authorized to issue executive
orders that change legal relationships. Agency heads issue regulations with which private
individuals must comply on pain of penalties or legal liability. Under Georgia v. PRO, then, is
anything written by, or as a work-made-for-hire for, such officials in their official capacity,
also in the public domain?

2. Authorship by Other Government Officials and Employees
After Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, government officials who are “empowered to speak with the
force of law” cannot be “authors,” within the meaning of the Copyright Act, for works they create
in the course of their official duties. What about other government officials and employees? The
answer to that question depends upon the government in question.

a. The United States Government
The Copyright Act does contain a specific provision regarding works created by federal
officials and employees. The first clause of § 105(a) of the 1976 Act provides: “Copyright protection
under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government.” 17 U.S.C. § 105.
Undoubtedly, you are all already turning to § 101 to see if “work of the United States Government”
is defined, and indeed it is, as “a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States
Government as part of that person’s official duties.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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Two important results follow from these general provisions. First, from the point of view of
an officer or employee of the United States Government, § 105 operates like the work made for
hire doctrine: it divests the officer or employee of copyright ownership of works of which he or
she would otherwise be considered the author. Like the work made for hire provisions, § 105
contemplates the possibility that the officer or employee could claim copyright “in a work written
at that person’s own volition and outside his or her duties.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 58 (1976). The House Report indicates that “[a] lthough the wording of the definition of
‘work of the United States Government’ differs somewhat from that of the definition of ‘work
made for hire,’ the concepts are intended to be construed in the same way.” (That kind of
legislative history, of course, makes textualists blow steam out their ears.) Note that unlike the
definition of “work made for hire,” the definition of “work of the United States Government” does
not allow agreements that the employee or officer will own copyright in the relevant works. Given
all of this, what is the status of President Trump’s voluminous Tweets? Are they prepared as part
of his “official duties”?
Second, whereas the copyright of works made for hire vests in the employer, United States
Government works enter into the public domain—they are simply “not eligible for copyright
protection.”
An interesting wrinkle to § 105 was recently added by an amendment tucked away deep in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. Section 544 of that Act amends § 105 to
provide that civilian members of the faculties of twelve specified military educational institutions
own copyright in literary works that they produce in the course of their employment for
publication in a scholarly press or journal. See Pub.L. 116-92, § 544, 133 Stat. 1198, 1376 (enacted
December 20, 2019). You may recall that some courts have recognized a “teacher” or “professor”
exception to the work made for hire doctrine that is not found in the text of the Copyright Act.
See the discussion on pages 616 to 618 of the main volume. This recent amendment could be seen
as the first textual acknowledgement of that exception, limited to instructors at specified military
educational institutions.

b. State Governments
The Copyright Act does not contain any specific provision regarding authorship by state
government employees, or ownership of the works that they produce. A search of the Copyright
Office’s registration database reveals many registrations of works claimed to be owned by state
governments as works made for hire. For example, a 244-page book titled “Basic Boating Course:
was registered in 1978 by the State of Maryland as the employer for hire of author Nancy Brake.
Some state laws explicitly authorize state or local agencies to claim copyright in materials they
produce. For example, a California statute provides: “"Any county board of education may secure
copyrights, in the name of the board, to all copyrightable works developed by the board, and
royalties or revenue from such copyrights are to be for the benefit of the board securing such
copyrights.” Cal. Ed. Code § 1044 (West 2019). Other state law has been interpreted to explicitly
forbid state and local agencies from claiming copyright in particular materials. For instances, in
Microdecisions, Inc. v. Skinner, 889 So.2d 871 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 2004), a Florida court of appeals
held that a county property appraiser could not claim copyright in maps created in that office,
because those maps were public records in which Florida law prohibited any assertion of
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copyright without specific statutory authorization.

3. Government Acquisition of Copyright by Transfer
The second clause of § 105(a) of the Copyright Act provides that United States Government
is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest,
or otherwise.” 17 U.S.C. § 105(a). Thus, although the federal government cannot hold copyright
in a work produced by a government employee, it can take an assignment of copyright in a work
produced by an independent contractor. (For examples of this distinction involving copyright in
stamp and coin designs, see the breakout box on p. 628 of the main volume.) This could sometimes
produce an odd incentive to contract work out, couldn’t it? If a federal government agency has its
own employee produce a book or a design, it cannot use copyright law to maintain control over
that work, but if it commissions that work from a private individual, it can take an assignment of
copyright and enforce that copyright against would-be copiers. Should government agencies be
able to hold copyrights and collect licensing fees from private entities and individuals who wish
to use such works? The House Report on the 1976 Act noted one argument against allowing
copyright, namely, that “the public should not be required to pay a ‘double subsidy,’” H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1976). On the other hand, if a government agency received
licensing fees from government-owned works such as photographs or guidebooks, it would in
theory be able to reduce its dependence on tax revenues, wouldn’t it?
Limits on Government Ownership by Transfer in Works that Become Legally Binding. The federal
government is explicitly authorized by § 105 to hold and enforce copyrights that it has received
by transfer, and states are implicitly authorized to do so as well, since the Copyright Act imposes
no restriction on state acquisition of copyrights. However, that does raise the issue of whether
the Supreme Court would allow federal or state governments to assert copyright in materials in
which they had acquired copyright by transfer, and then gave binding legal force or otherwise
designated as official. Suppose, for example, that a private individual or organization had drafted
rules limiting emissions of certain pollutants into the air. A governmental body – which could be
Congress or a state legislature or a regulatory agency – then obtained copyright in that body of
rules by assignment, and enacted it into law or issued it as regulations. Could the government
assert copyright in those rules, now legally binding? Courts would almost certainly hold that it
could not. Yet consider how that issue is not quite resolved by the Supreme Court in Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org. In that case, Georgia happened to enter into a work-made-for-hire agreement
with Lexis, so that under the Copyright Act, Georgia was considered to be the author of the
annotations at issue in that case. That enabled the Public.Resource.Org Court to analyze that case in
terms of authorship, and to decide that the Copyright Act would not recognize Georgia officials
empowered to speak with the force of law as authors of anything they created in their official
capacity.
Under altered facts, if a private individual created an original work consisting of potential
rules or guidelines regarding air pollution, there does not seem to be any doubt that the Copyright
Act would recognize that individual as an author. Suppose that at some later date, a government
obtains copyright in that work by transfer. Then the government gives that work legal force. A
court could simply conclude that no work that is legally binding is under copyright. However, if
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it wanted to tie that conclusion to some other existing copyright law concept, how would it do
so? It seems to stretch copyright doctrine considerably to conclude that the government has
become the author of a work in which we would have previously recognized authorship by a
private individual. One alternative route is to hold that any expression in the rules or guidelines
had merged with unprotectable ideas, since a rule governing conduct is an unprotectable idea,
and there is only one or a very small number of ways of expressing that precise rule. That is a route
taken by Fifth Circuit in the Veeck case, on p. 630 in the main volume. However, you may conclude
that this area of law is not as conceptually crystalline as it could be.

4. Private Ownership of Legally Binding Works.
Lastly, we consider claims of copyright by private individuals or organizations in works that
have become legally binding. Suppose that a private individual, or a private trade organization or
public interest law organization, decides to create language would serve well as a statute or
regulation. A government then adopts that privately-authored work as law. It may have done so
with or without the private individual or organization’s encouragement, but that encouragement
can be construed at most as a non-exclusive license. In this group of cases, the government did
not take an assignment of copyright in the language it made law. Does the individual or
organization still hold copyright in the language, so that it can bring an infringement action
against anyone other than the government that makes and distributes copies of what has now
become law? That is the subject of the next case.

p. 645 – Insert after the existing material in Note 2:
The “incorporation by reference” issue was squarely presented in American Society For
Testing And Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 3431738 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The
defendant in that case, public.resource.org (PRO), is a non-profit organization that seeks to make
the law available to the public. Its slogan is “making government information more accessible.”
In pursuit of that goal PRO uploaded to its website hundreds of different privately authored
technical standards that had been incorporated by reference in either state or federal laws or
regulations. This material was publicly available and frequently downloaded. All of these
materials were protected by copyright. Eventually, a number of standards developing
organizations, including the ASTM (formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials),
sued PRO for copyright infringement. PRO asserted two theories in its defense. First, it claimed
that once standards are incorporated by reference they become “the law” and that, among other
things, the First Amendment makes it impermissible to assert copyright claims to the law.
Second, they relied on the fair use defense.
The DC Circuit confined its consideration to the fair use issue, leaving “for another day”
the issue of whether it is constitutional for copyright protection to apply to private works that
have been incorporated by reference into binding legal materials. On the fair use issue, the
appellate court reversed the summary judgment for plaintiffs that had been entered below. It
found that there were genuine issues of material fact on the fair use issue, and emphasized that on
remand, the trial court would have to proceed standard-by-standard to evaluate the fair use claim.
For standards that were explicitly referenced as binding, it strongly hinted that the defendant
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should be free to make copies. Where the copying was more extensive than that and related to
provisions of standards that were not formally referenced in binding law, the implication was that
fair use would be unavailable. Given the amount of material on PRO’s site, we do not envy the
district court, which will have to invest considerable time and effort to wade through each item
individually. On the other hand, we envy the lawyers their fees.

p. 648 – Replace the existing note 4, and the material in the breakout box on state
and federal immunity, with the following:
4. State Liability for Infringement and Sovereign Immunity. In the absence of permission or
an exercise of eminent domain, a first reading of the statue suggests that the state would be
liable for infringement if it copied privately authored material. Section 501(a) of the Copyright
Act provides that “anyone” who violates one of the exclusive rights of copyright is an infringer.
In 1990, Congress amended § 501(a) to make clear that “anyone” includes “any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State
acting in his or her official capacity,” and to specifically provide that “[a]ny State, and any such
instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this title in the same
manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.” Thus, the Copyright Act
makes clear the intention of Congress to make state governments liable for copyright
infringement. However, in Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020), the Court held that states
could claim immunity against copyright infringement damages judgments under the Eleventh
Amendment, and that Congress’s attempt to make states liable for those judgments was not a
valid exercise of any of its powers. For more on Allen v. Cooper and on state and federal immunity
in conjunction with copyright infringement claims, see the revised note on “State and Federal
Immunity” that is now an insert in this supplement to Chapter 13, at p.1016, below.

Chapter 9: Transactions
C. Transfer Formalities, Revocability, and Transferability Under the 1976 Act
Page 669 — Insert the following as a new note after Note 1:
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1A. Implied Licenses and Tattoos. Imagine, as surely must be the case for some of our readers,
that you have been inked. If you got your tattoo(s) before taking a copyright course it is highly
unlikely you thought to get an assignment of the copyright in that tattoo from the artist who
created it. Every time you take a selfie, however, you are making a copy of the work that
adorns your body, and doing so without a license. Of course, your selfies, saved in your digital
photo album or sent to a few friends, would almost certainly be fair use. But what if you were
a famous athlete, say an NBA star, and you had licensed your image to a video game company,
which replicated you in their game? That was the situation in Solid Oak Sketches, LLC v. 2K
Games, Inc., 2020 WL 1467394 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The plaintiff in that case was not the actual
tattoo artist, but an exclusive licensee who held rights to exploit the tattoo design in various
ways excluding, however, applying the designs to a person’s skin. Defendant had depicted
NBA stars LeBron James, Eric Bledsoe and Kenyon Martin—tattoos and all—in its games,
though the evidence revealed that the tattoos were usually only visible occasionally, usually
out of focus, and not the
center of attention. The
court held that the use of
the tattoos was noninfringing because the
copying was de minimis, a
ruling reminiscent of the
Gottlieb decision that
appears on page 258 of the
main volume.
Of more interest in the
present context was the
court’s further holding
that
“the
tattooists
necessarily granted the
Players
nonexclusive
licenses to use the Tattoos
as part of their likenesses. . . . Therefore, Defendants had permission to include the Tattoos on
the Players’ bodies in NBA 2K because the Players had an implied license to use the Tattoos
as part of their likeness, and the Players either directly or indirectly granted Defendants a
license to use their likenesses.” If the tattoo artist had wanted to specifically reserve rights to
benefit from any subsequent use of the tattoo in advertising, video games, or otherwise, would
there be a way to do that? If so, do you think it happens very often?

76

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4175694

Page 670 – Insert the following as a new paragraph at the end of Note 4:
To confer standing to sue however, the exclusive
license must be valid. One situation in which the
license might be invalid would be where the licensor
did not own the entire copyright interest, but rather
was merely one of several co-owners. This issue
proved fatal to the plaintiff in Tresóna v. Burbank High
School Vocal Music Assoc., 953 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2020),
where a music licensing organization attempted to
sue for unauthorized performances of works by a
High School show choir. Tracing the chain of title of
the plaintiff, the court determined that the licenses
they held to several of the songs in questions had
been granted by fewer than all the copyright owners,
and that therefore they lacked standing to sue. Other
cases have come to the same conclusion.

MAKE THE CONNECTION
As we noted in Chapter 8, a co-owner does not
have the authority to grant an exclusive
license, because that would effectively limit
the other co-owners’ ability to exploit the
copyright themselves. An imperfect analogy to
illustrate the point would be to imagine that
one day while you were out your roommate
granted a third party an exclusive sublease to
your apartment. That wouldn’t be very nice to
you, would it? But it also wouldn’t be
enforceable if both of your names were on the
lease – a co-owner of an interest in land doesn’t
have the power to execute a conveyance that
would exclude the other co-owners, and
copyright law borrows from that rule.

Chapter 10: Copyright Duration and Related Limitations on Transfer
B. Limitations on Transfer
2. Terminations of Transfer
a. “Extension-Windfall-Recovery” Terminations
Page 767 – The last three lines of note 6 should read as follows:
and (2) the holder of the termination power is unable to bargain to remove the uncertainty,
because its only bargaining chip—the power to terminate—cannot [“can” in the main volume]
be effectively given away in return for a more lucrative deal.

Chapter 11: The Reproduction, Distribution, and Adaptation Rights, and the

Visual Artists Rights Act
B. The Right of Distribution to the Public
1. The Meaning of “Distribution to the Public”
Page 812 – Insert the following in place of the third paragraph in Note 6:
Capitol Records sued ReDigi and secured a summary judgment ruling in its favor. On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed, Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.), 2018). The
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district court had relied on two bases for its ruling. First, it held that ReDigi’s process involves
the making of a copy which violated the plaintiff’s reproductions right – a right which is not
limited by the first-sale principle codified in § 109. Second, it noted that because the copies being
resold by ReDigi were not “lawfully made” as required by § 109, the first sale doctrine could not
apply. The court of appeals affirmed on the first ground finding it unnecessary to reach the second.
Judge Leval took a literal view of the concept of reproduction, explaining:
In the course of transferring a digital music file from an original purchaser’s computer,
through ReDigi, to a new purchaser, the digital file is first received and stored on ReDigi’s
server and then, at the new purchaser’s option, may also be subsequently received and
stored on the new purchaser’s device. At each of these steps, the digital file is fixed in a
new material object “for a period of more than transitory duration.” Cartoon Network, 536
F.3d at 127. The fixing of the digital file in ReDigi’s server, as well as in the new purchaser’s
device, creates a new phonorecord, which is a reproduction.
The Second Circuit was not impressed by ReDigi’s efforts to insure that no copies of the music
file remained on the original purchasers computer, noted that “[w]e are not free to disregard the
terms of the statute merely because the entity performing an unauthorized reproduction makes
efforts to nullify its consequences by the counterbalancing destruction of the preexisting
phonorecords.” It also noted that its conclusion was consistent with the views of the Copyright
Office, first expressed in 2001 and reiterated in 2016 (“;a digital file transfer creates a new copy or
phonorecord on the transferee’s computer’) and thus does not qualify for first sale protection. U.S.
Copyright Office, Library of Cong., The Making Available Right in the United States 22, n.94
(2016). The Second Circuit also went on to find that ReDigi’s activities were not protected by the
fair use doctrine.
After the complaint was filed in this case, ReDigi launched “ReDigi 2.0”. That system would have
allowed purchasers to download music files directly onto ReDigi’s servers, and stream the song
whenever they wanted to listen to it. If they wanted to sell the song, the right to access the song
via streaming would simply be transferred or reallocated to the buyer. In this system, no copy of
the song is made (after the initial authorized copy that occurs when the song is first purchased).
Both the trial and appeals court refused to reach the question of the legality of that alternative
version of the service because the complaint only addressed the original version of the system.
However the stipulated judgment in the case forbids ReDigi from operating version 2.0. The
Second Circuit noted in a footnote that “[b]ecause neither we, nor the district court, have decided
whether version 2.0 would infringe, this opinion does not decide on the lawfulness of the use—
by persons who are independent of the Defendants—of systems functioning like version 2.0, at
least to the extent that their systems differ from the aspects of version 1.0 that are adjudicated in
this opinion.” What is your assessment of the legality of a system like ReDigi 2.0?

p. 820 – Insert the following at the end of the first (carry-over) paragraph.
In July of 2018 the Ninth Circuit affirmed this ruling, see Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2018). However, the Ninth Circuit held that for sales that took place prior to the effective
date of the current copyright statute (January 1, 1978), but after the California law became
effective, the California Resale Royalties Act was not pre-empted. As the court summarized, “Our
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decision today means that the CRRA had a short effective life. California’s statute permissibly
coexisted for exactly one year alongside the 1909 Act. Once the 1976 Act took effect, however, the
balance of state versus federal copyright protection shifted and the CRRA was preempted by §
301(a). Thus, plaintiffs at most can only state claims for the period between the CRRA’s effective
date of January 1, 1977, and the 1976 Act’s effective date of January 1, 1978.”

E. Protecting Integrity and Attribution: “Moral Rights” and the Visual Artists
Rights Act
p. 873 – Insert the following after the last paragraph:
Indeed, in one sense, current U.S. copyright law actually includes a provision affirmatively
privileging violations of the right of integrity, at least as regards motion pictures. In 2005
Congress adopted a statute called the Family Movie Act (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 110(11)), which
shields from liability acts that filter out portions of a motion picture (such as scenes involving
nudity, sex, violence or crude language) during a performance, provided the performance is being
made from a lawful copy of the movie, and no new copy is made. Of course, many filmmakers
include such scenes precisely because they feel they contribute to the story they are trying to tell,
and likely feel that the elimination of such scenes destroys or at least alters their artistic vision.
Nonetheless, current U.S. law provides a safe harbor for this kind of on-the-fly alteration. (You
can find a few more details about the Family Movie Act at page 945, where we discuss limitations
on performance and display rights more generally.) Do you think that the Family Movie Act
violates U.S. obligations under the Berne Convention? Is the conduct it authorizes any different
from a viewer hitting the mute button or closing his or her eyes to avoid objectionable content?

p. 893 – Replace the second paragraph with the following:
Four years later, when the case had finally proceeded to a full trial on the merits, the district
court held that the defendants had indeed violated VARA, and awarded the plaintiffs $6.75
million in damages — the maximum statutory damages of $150,000 for each of the 45 destroyed
works of art that the court found were of “recognized statute.” On appeal the Second Circuit
affirmed. Castillo v. G & M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2020).
On the substantive question, the court of appeals held that a work qualified as a “work of
recognized stature” under VARA if it “is one of high quality, status, or caliber that has been
acknowledged as such by a relevant community.” The court expanded on this test as follows:
The relevant community will typically be the artistic community, comprising art
historians, art critics, museum curators, gallerists, prominent artists, and other experts.
Since recognized stature is necessarily a fluid concept, we can conceive of circumstances
under which, for example, a “poor” work by an otherwise highly regarded artist
nonetheless merits protection from destruction under VARA. . . . For that reason, aside
from the rare case where an artist or work is of such prominence that the issue of
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recognized stature need not be tried, expert testimony or substantial evidence of nonexpert recognition will generally be required to establish recognized stature.
The defendant had argued that since it was routine for many of the works at 5Pointz to be
“overpainted” after a short period of time, their temporary nature precluded a finding that they
were of recognized stature. The court rejected this contention, citing various acclaimed works of
art that were also temporary such as acclaimed artist Christo’s installation of over 7500 orange
draped gates in Central Park. The court embraced a flexible, case-by-case approach on this
question saying that although “a work’s short lifespan means that there will be fewer
opportunities for the work to be viewed and evaluated, the temporary nature of the art is not a
bar to recognized stature.”
Given that the plaintiff’s expert witness was credible and that the issue of “recognized stature”
is a question of fact that can only be disturbed on appeal if clearly erroneous, the Second Circuit
saw no reason to set aside the findings below.
On the damage issue, the court found the evidence of defendant’s willful violation of plaintiff’s
rights compelling, and felt that the award of the maximum amount of statutory damages for each
work was a justifiable exercise of the trial court’s discretion. The court noted instances in which
defendant had made misrepresentations to the court with regard to the urgency of demolishing
the building, and cited with approval the trial court’s observation that the plaintiffs “‘conducted
themselves with dignity, maturity, respect, and at all times within the law.’”
The defendants have filed a petition for certiorari which is pending at the time this
Supplement was prepared. In the humble opinion of your authors, the Supreme Court will have
no interest in the matter. The principal individual defendant in the case, Gerald Wolkoff, the head
of G & M Realty, died in July, 2020, and you can find a brief story about him, and the litigation, if
you click here.

Chapter 12: Public Performance and Display Rights
B. The Emerging Importance of the Display Right
p. 941: Insert After Note 1:
1A: Limitations on the Server Test? In two cases decided in 2018 and 2021, judges in the
Southern District of New York have rejected Perfect 10 v. Amazon’s “server test.” In Goldman v.
Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F.Supp.3d 585 (2018), plaintiff Justin Goldman took a
photograph of New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady and Boston Celtics General
Manager Danny Ainge walking down a street together in East Hampton, New York. Goldman
posted the photograph to his private Snapchat Story, accessible only to friends. The
photograph was apparently interesting to sports fans because the Boston Celtics were at the
time trying to recruit star basketball player Kevin Durant, and the photo boosted speculation
that Tom Brady – a football player, not a basketball player – was involved in the recruitment
effort, which would have been quite unusual. Someone with access to Goldman’s Snapchat
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story copied and distributed the photo, and it ended up featuring in several Tweets. The
defendants in the Goldman case, which include, not just Breitbart News Network, but Time
Inc., Yahoo, Gannett, the Boston Globe, and others, did what the Perfect 10 court calls
“framing,” and Goldman calls “embedding.” They created code
SEE IT
that caused Goldman’s photo to appear on their webpages, by
You want to see the photo,
pulling the photo from one of the Tweets that were public at
don’t you? So did we. As of
the time. Thus, although the photo appeared visually on the
this writing, at least one
websites of the defendants’ media outlets, no copy of the photo
Tweet containing the photo
is still publicly available.)
resided on the defendants’ servers – just as no copy of the fullsize Perfect 10 photos resided on Google’s servers in the Perfect
10 case.
Judge Katherine Forrest, however, rejected a “server test” that would have resulted in a
ruling for the defendants. She noted that the definition of “display” in the Copyright Act – “to
transmit . . . a . . . display of the work . . . by means of any device or process” – does not include
any requirement of possession of a copy of a work. The defendants all took “took active steps
to put a process in place that resulted in a transmission of the photos so that they could be
visibly shown,” most often by writing the
FOOD FOR THOUGHT
code that would pull the photo from a
On the same day that the District Court opinion in
Tweet and place it in the middle of their
Goldman was announced, February 15, 2018, Google
webpages. Thus, they were involved in announced that it was changing the way its Image
“transmitting a display” of Goldman’s Search works. As you know from Perfect 10 v. Amazon
photo whether or not that photo was (and probably from your own use) an image search
stored on their servers. Judge Forrest also initially returns thumbnail versions of images. Clicking
argued that the Supreme Court’s opinion on a thumbnail results in the display of a somewhat
larger version of that photo, but still not full-size. Until
in the Aereo case, excerpted in the main February 15, 2018, you could then click on a “View
volume of the casebook on p. 909, Image” button and see the full-size image, without the
supported the plaintiffs, because it refused context of the website on which it originally appeared.
to draw distinctions based on “invisible Google removed the “View Image” button. Here’s the
tweet in which it announced that change:
technological details” and instead focused
on the functionality of the service from a
user’s point of view. Here, a visitor to the
defendants’ websites typically would not
know or care where Goldman’s photo was
stored. Finally, although Forrest clearly
doubts that Perfect 10 was correctly
decided, she also distinguished the facts in
Goldman from those in Perfect 10. Perfect 10 Do you think that the Goldman opinion seriously
increased the risk that Google Image Search with a
involved display of photos by a search “View Image” button infringed the display right of the
engine that was assisting the user to find owners of copyright in the images? Did removing the
and navigate to webpages, and the full-size “View Image” button, but keeping the “Visit” button,
photo was visible to the user only if the remove that risk? (All major browsers allow you to
user took the affirmative act of clicking on right-click on an image and display it out of context in
a new window. Is that a problem?)

81

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4175694

the thumbnail. “This is manifestly not the same as opening up a favorite blog or website to
find a full color image awaiting the user, whether he or she asked for it, looked for it, clicked
on it, or not.” Goldman, 302 F.Supp.3d at 596.
In July 2021, Judge Jed Rakoff, also of the Southern District of New York, decided to follow
Judge Forrest in rejecting the “server rule.” In Nicklen v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. 2021
WL 3239510 (S.D.N.Y.), Canadian photographer Paul Nicklen made a video of a starving polar
bear and posted it on his Instagram account. The defendant
SEE IT
Sinclair Broadcast Group embedded that video in online articles
Paul Nicklen co-founded a
without Nicklen’s permission, and Nicklen sued for copyright conservationist photography
infringement. Judge Rakoff denied Sinclair’s motion to dismiss. organization called Sea
He concluded that “[t]he Copyright Act’s text and history Legacy. To see the video of
establish that embedding a video on a website ‘displays’ that the starving polar bear as
video, because to embed a video is to show the video or posted on the website of that
organization, click here.
individual images of the video nonsequentially by means of a
device or process.” Judge Rakoff acknowledged that
“[p]roponents of the server rule suggest that a contrary rule would impose far-reaching and
ruinous liability, supposedly grinding the internet to a halt.” However, he concluded, those
were just speculations, and the alternative provided by the server rule is no more palatable,
because under that rule, “a photographer who promotes his work on Instagram or a filmmaker
who posts her short film on YouTube surrenders control over how, when, and by whom their
work is subsequently shown – reducing the display right, effectively, to the limited right of
first publication that the Copyright Act of 1976 rejects.”
Isn’t the real complaint of Goldman and Nicklen that “embedders” are removing their
content from the context in which they chose to display it, and substituting another context
that potentially creates income, not for them, but for the embedders? Does copyright law have
good language for talking about substitutions of context?
In late 2021 and early 2022, a District Court in the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the server test
articulated in Perfect 10. See Hunley v. Instagram, LLC, 2021 WL 4243385 (N.D. Cal.); Hunley
v. Instagram, 2022 WL 298570 (N.D. Cal.). Thus, the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit
remain at odds over this issue.

C. Limitations on the Public Performance and Display Rights
p. 945 – Insert the following after paragraph (g):
h. The Family Movie Act of 2005
To accommodate viewers who want to view popular movies, but who are uncomfortable
with explicit scenes of violence or sexual activity, or with coarse language, Congress added
section 110(11) to the copyright statute in 2005 by adopting the Family Movie Act, P.L. 109-9 (Title
II). It provides immunity from infringement liability for filtering “mature content” from movies.
Specifically, it declares that it is not an infringement to make limited portions of a motion picture
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“imperceptible” during a performance in, or transmitted to a private home, provided that the
performance is being made from an authorized copy of that motion picture. The statute also
immunizes developing and distributing software for home use that can accomplish the same
results, once again, provided that the software does not make a new copy of the movie. In other
words, the immunity extends only to “editing on the fly” to remove objectionable content.
In Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017), the court
considered the scope of the section 110(11) limitation. The defendant in that case, a company
called VidAngel, offered a filtering service to consumers. In the business model challenged in the
lawsuit, VidAngel did this by purchasing multiple DVD copies of popular movies. It used one of
those discs to make a “master” copy (bypassing any copy controls on that disc). This copy was
broken into small segments which VidAngel tagged for objectionable types of content, such as
nudity, drug use, racial slurs and the like. The other discs were kept in inventory and nominally
“purchased” by subscribers, although those discs were physically retained by VidAngel, and were
routinely “sold-back” to VidAngel for the price paid, minus one dollar per day. Subscribers would
then select filters and VidAngel would transmit the movie to them, using the master copy on its
server while suppressing the relevant snippets corresponding to the selected filters. The other
copies of the DVD discs apparently sat in the vault unused.
The court found that these activities were infringing and were not shielded by section
110(11), and thus affirmed a preliminary injunction against VidAngel. The company argued that it
had complied with the Family Movie Act limitations because it began its multi-step filtering
process using an authorized DVD. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that “the most natural
reading of the statute is that the filtered performance or transmission itself must be ‘from’ an
authorized copy of the motion picture.” Since VidAngel’s transmissions came from the copies it
had made and stored on its servers, the court concluded that they could not rely on the defense.
The court bolstered this analysis by observing that
VidAngel's interpretation would create a giant loophole in copyright law, sanctioning
infringement so long as it filters some content and a copy of the work was lawfully
purchased at some point. But, virtually all piracy of movies originates in some way from a
legitimate copy. If the mere purchase of an authorized copy alone precluded infringement
liability under the FMA, the statute would severely erode the commercial value of the
public performance right in the digital context, permitting, for example, unlicensed
streams which filter out only a movie's credits.
In the wake of the legal defeat VidAngel has sought protection under the bankruptcy laws,
which has the effect of freezing the litigation described above. It has also filed its own suit in Utah
federal court against a different group of copyright owners than those who sued it in California.
It has also revised its filtering process – it now uses a stream-based technology, rather than
decrypting and copying from DVDs -- and is seeking a declaratory judgment that its new practices
are legal. Presumably it thinks that suing in a more socially conservative state where many
residents might favor filtering technologies will provide it with a more positive reception for its
arguments. The caption of that pending case is VidAngel LLC v. Sullivan Entertainment Group,
Docket No. 2:17-cv-00989 (D. Utah).
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E. The Digital Performance Right for Sound Recordings
P. 977 – Replace the entirety of Chapter 12.E., pp. 977-987, with the following:
E. Digital Streaming of Music After the Musical Works Modernization Act
In the main body of the casebook, this section of Chapter 12 is devoted to exploring the
digital audio transmission right for sound recordings. That exclusive right was added to the
Copyright Act by Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (“DPRA”), and
codified as § 106(6), with elaborations in § 114. (Notice that “digital audio transmissions” can
include over-the-air broadcasts as well as transmissions over the internet, and we are using
“streaming” in that broad sense as well.)
Digital audio transmissions are no longer a nascent technology that obtained a new
exclusive right. Rather, they now represent the predominant form of enjoying music in the United
States. Digital streaming of music has largely replaced both sales of physical media like CDs, vinyl,
and cassettes, and sales of digital downloads. In 2018, 75 percent of the revenue from recorded
music in the United States – $7.4 billion of the $9.8 billion total – came from streaming. Only 11%
($1.15 billion) came from physical media sales, and only 10% ($1.04 billion) from downloads. (The
tiny remainder – 3% – came from synchronization licenses – licenses to use sound recordings in
video and movies.) See Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA 2018 Year-End Music
Industry Revenue Report (hereinafter “RIAA 2018 Report”). The dominance of digital streaming
will almost certainly only increase.
Because of the dominance of digital music streaming, and because of recent legislation in
that area, we think it is important to give you an overview of how copyright licensing for digital
streaming will now work, both for sound recordings and for musical works. The recent legislation
is Orrin G. Hatch – Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (“MMA”), which was signed into
law by President Trump on October 11, 2018, and consists of three separate Titles. Title I, which
is known separately as the “Musical Works Modernization Act” or MWMA, focuses mainly on
musical works licensing, but also has some provisions that affect the licensing of sound
recordings. Title III, known separately as the “Allocation for Music Producers Act,” is directed to
sound recording licensing. (Title II, known separately as the “Classics Protection and Access Act,”
grants new federal rights in pre-1972 sound recordings, while further preempting existing state84
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law rights. We will introduce that legislation in the following section, Chapter 12.F.) The
overview we will present will largely be from the perspective of someone who would like to start
a business that streams music to the public. If you wanted to do that, what permissions would
be necessary, and how would you obtain them, given the kind of streaming that you wanted to
do?
1. Streaming and Paying for Sound Recordings: The Three Categories of Digital Audio
Transmissions. We’re going to start with the details of licensing sound recordings for streaming
purposes. Historically, of course, if you wanted to broadcast or otherwise perform musical sound
recordings, you would only have to pay for use of the musical works, which you would do through
a PRO like ASCAP. Sound recordings had no public performance rights. The DPRA did not grant
full public performance rights to sound recordings. They can still be played by venues like shops
and restaurants and analog radio stations without any license. However, the DPRA did add a
right for one particular type of public performance of sound recordings: digital audio
transmissions, which are digital transmissions of sound without any accompanying images.
As amended by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the DPRA divides digital audio
transmissions into three categories: exempt transmissions, statutory-license transmissions, and
negotiated-license transmissions. Thus, if you want to stream music, your first step would be to
figure out which of those categories encompasses the streaming you want to do. The boundaries
of the three categories are codified in some very long and torturous language in § 114 of the
Copyright Act. (Although you are used to looking for definitions of copyright terms in § 101, § 114
includes its own set of definitions in § 114(j); that’s how complicated it is.)
a. Exempt transmissions and free radio broadcasters. Your streaming activity would
qualify as an exempt transmission, for which no sound-recording permissions or royalties are
required, if you were engaging in a non-interactive, nonsubscription broadcast transmission. See
17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A). Section 114’s definition of “broadcast transmission” requires you to be an
entity licensed by the Federal Communications Commission. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j). That means
that this category is reserved for businesses that are operating what most of us think of as “oldfashioned radio stations” – free, over-the-air broadcasts – and that either want to broadcast overthe-air digitally (one popular version of which is known as “HD Radio”) or to stream audio over
the internet. Recall that these old-fashioned radio stations have never had to pay for their analog
broadcast of sound recordings. The “exempt transmissions” category can be seen in part as a
concession to this longstanding radio station business model, allowing such stations to move into
digital broadcasting or internet radio without having to pay new royalties. You may wonder
about the fairness of favoring old, entrenched industry participants. But you may also realize that
such favoritism is sometimes a political necessity to get legislation passed, and of course those
participants also have arguments about why they should be treated differently. Thus, if you’re
operating an FCC-licensed radio station, you will likely be able to venture into digital
broadcasting or internet radio without having to worry about getting permission from the owner
of copyright in the sound recordings. You will just have to pay for performing the musical works,
about which more below.
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b. Statutory-license transmissions and noninteractive services. If you are not an FCClicensed radio station, you will have to obtain permission and pay royalties to stream sound
recordings. If you meet the four pages of requirements in § 114(d)(2), you will be able to take
advantage of a statutory license, under which you can pay a government-determined fee to obtain
permission to stream. We can’t cover all four pages of requirements here, but we can tell you that
the general purposes of those requirements are to ensure that a streaming service does not come
too close to substituting for purchasing music, and that it does not do too much to facilitate user
copying.
The single most important distinction that affects eligibility for a statutory license is that
between interactive services and non-interactive services. The classic interactive service is an
on-demand service – a service that allows users to choose exactly which song to listen to at any
given time. The classic non-interactive service offers music programming like an old-fashioned
radio station – programming that may stay within a general genre of music, but over which a
listener has no influence or advance knowledge. As you might imagine, however, there are degrees
of interactivity in between those two poles, like the service for which Pandora became famous,
which lets the user create a “personal radio station” based on one or more recording artists, and
then influence the contents of that channel by liking or not liking songs that are played. The
“interactive” category in § 114 covers some forms of interactivity beyond a pure on-demand service,
so if you were unsure about what kind of service you were offering, you would want to consult
the definition in § 114(j)(7). (Pandora’s classic service is designed to stay within the “noninteractive” category.) The Arista Records case at page 977 of the casebook, in this subsection,
provides a good illustration of the various twists and turns involved in this categorization.
If your service qualifies for the § 114 statutory license, you will be in good company. Other
existing services that use the § 114 statutory license include satellite radio services like SiriusXM;
internet radio services like TuneIn and iHeartRadio; services that stream music into businesses
and elevators like Mood Music (formerly Muzak); services that provide audio-only channels on
cable television, like Music Choice (which a student once told one of your authors that “only old
people listen to”); public radio stations and networks like National Public Radio; and many
smaller commercial, noncommercial and religious services.
An organization called
SoundExchange was created to collect the § 114 statutory license fees, so you would want to
consult its service provider pages to register, obtain permission and make royalty payments.
Statutory licenses generated about $1.2 billion in recording industry revenues in 2018, accounting
for about 12% of total industry revenues, and about 16% of streaming revenues. (That, of course,
means that negotiated interactive streaming licenses generated much more revenue, as we will see
below. But it also means that the § 114 statutory license generated more than either sales of
physical media or digital downloads.)
Rate Standards. How much will you have to pay for your statutory license? Section 114
statutory license rates are set by the Copyright Royalty Board, following standards established by
statute. As you might imagine, those standards and the resulting rates are a matter of great
interest to the relevant industry participants, and have sometimes generated intense dispute. One
standard used in statutory licenses is the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard. Under that
standard, the Copyright Royalty Board has to try to estimate what the rate would be if the parties
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were bargaining in a competitive market – a task that is at least conceptually reasonably simple,
if practically difficult. An alternative statutory rate standard directs the Copyright Royalty Board
to set rates in order to achieve four goals:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public.
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his or her creative work and the
copyright user a fair income under existing economic conditions.
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the
product made available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution,
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the
opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their communication.
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on
generally prevailing industry practices.
17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1). If you are guffawing and snorting at the absurdity of figuring out exactly
what rate will perfectly accomplish all of those goals, then you are in good company – or at least
in our company. What you do need to know is that rates set under that four-part standard have
historically been lower than rates set under the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard. For many
years, § 114 provided that the digital streaming services that were already in existence at the time
the DPSA was enacted, such as SiriusXM, Mood Music (Muzak), and Music Choice, had to pay
rates determined under the four-part standard, while newer services had to pay rates under the
“willing buyer, willing seller” standard. See 17 U.S.C. § § 114(f)(1)(B), 114(f)(2)(B) (2018). The
MWMA, however, abolishes that distinction, and sets all rates using the “willing buyer, willing
seller” standard, see MMA § 103(a)(1) (2018) – a change welcomed by recording companies and
the newer digital streaming services, and which may be reflected in your monthly cable TV bill or
subscription fee for SiriusXM in due course.
Distribution of Royalties. There is one more thing you should know about the flow of
royalties under § 114 statutory licenses, although it does not directly affect you if your only
involvement is operating a streaming service. Section 114 establishes by statute how the royalties
from § 114 licenses will be distributed among categories of industry participants: 50% to the
owners of copyright in the sound recordings; 45% to featured recording artists (those individuals
or groups most prominently featured on a recording); 2 ½% to a fund for nonfeatured musicians;
and 2 ½% to a fund for nonfeatured vocalists. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2). That distribution is to be
made regardless of any prior contractual arrangements. That should give you a little pause – wow,
whatever happened to freedom of contract? However, it has its immediate precedent in the Audio
Home Recording Act (discussed in the casebook main volume on pages 494-495), and its more
distant precedent in the arrangements of the legacy PROs, ASCAP and BMI, which distribute 50%
of musical work public performance royalties to music publishers, and the other 50% to individual
composers and authors.
Notice that the distribution set up in § 114(g) does not include any percentage for
producers, mixers, or sound engineers (all of whom we will call “producers” here, for the sake of
convenience). That is the case even though it has been recognized since federal protection was
granted to sound recordings that people who serve in those roles can make copyrightable
contributions. Title III of the MMA, the Allocation for Music Producers Act (“AMP”), amends §
87

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4175694

114(g) to include some acknowledgement of producers, but that acknowledgement falls short of
an unconditional mandate of a percentage of § 114 royalties. Instead, AMP requires
SoundExchange to make distributions of § 114 royalties to producers if directed to by the owners
of copyright or by the featured artists (something that SoundExchange was already informally
doing). It also creates a complicated scheme whereby producers may be able to get 2% of the § 114
royalties from pre-1995 sound recordings. Those sound recordings, of course, are those that were
made before digital audio transmission royalties existed, so that producers could not have
anticipated such royalties and did not contract for them. However, AMP provides producers the
2% share only if they file a request asking for it, and only if the featured artists don’t object, so it
is hardly a guarantee.
c. Negotiated licenses and interactive services. Finally, if your streaming service is going
to be an interactive service, or will otherwise fail to qualify for the statutory license, then you have
to go to each recording company and negotiate licenses to stream the sound recordings in which
they own copyright. That is what on-demand streaming services – Spotify, Apple Music, Amazon
Music Unlimited, Pandora Premium, You Tube Music, and others – all do. The recording industry
is quite concentrated. In 2018, the “Big Three” record labels accounted for 71% of global recording
industry revenue, with Universal Music garnering 31%, Sony Music Entertainment 21%, and
Warner Music 18%. See Mark Mulligan, 2018 Global Label Market Share: Stream Engine. That is
in some sense an advantage: you will be able to stream a lot of songs without having to conclude
dozens or hundreds of deals. In another sense, however, it may be a disadvantage – if Universal
Music knows that your service will have a huge gap without its catalog of recordings, it may drive
a hard bargain. In some cases, the license agreements have included equity stakes in the streaming
service, which, in the case of Spotify at least, turned out to be very lucrative for the recording
industry. See Lucas Shaw, Record Labels Reap More Than $1 Billion Selling Spotify Stakes,
Bloomberg Quint, May 7, 2018. In 2018, paid subscriptions to on-demand streams were the single
most important source of recording industry revenues, generating about $5.4 billion, over half of
the total industry revenues of $9.8 billion, and over three-quarters of total revenues from
streaming. Advertising-supported free on-demand services like Spotify Free added an additional
$760 million in revenue. See RIAA 2018 Report.
2. Streaming and Paying for Musical Works. If you have figured out how to pay for the
sound recordings you want to stream, you are doing well, but you are only halfway done. You also
have to pay for the musical works. Even though many songs today have never been “notated” (that
is, written out in sheet music), because they were created as sound recordings in a recording
studio, the ghost of sheet music inhabits each sound recording. For every musical sound recording
digitally streamed you have to pay separately for the sound recording (unless you are exempt as
discussed above) and the musical work, even if the composer and the performer are the same
person. And if that doesn’t have you tearing out your hair, we will see that the MWMA makes
interactive streaming services pay twice for a single stream of a single musical work.
a. Public performance rights and PROs. All streaming services must pay for public
performance rights for the musical works they stream. This is a continuation of the oldest of
music licensing traditions, under which theaters, restaurants, and other public venues, as well as
radio and television stations, must pay for the musical works that they publicly perform. The
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entities that grant most public performance licenses and collect fees for streaming are the same
performing rights organizations that we introduced in the previous section of this chapter –
ASCAP, BMI, SESAC, and GMR – which act on behalf of composers, authors, and music
publishers. Recall that in case of dispute, the rates charged by ASCAP and BMI are set, not by the
Copyright Royalty Board, but by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
(“SDNY”), a legacy of an antitrust consent decree dating from the 1940s. However, § 114 does have
something to say about how that court must set rates for public performances of streamed musical
works.
Back in 1995 when the DPSA first established the digital audio transmission right for
sound recordings, music publishers were afraid that streaming services might convince the court
that ASCAP and BMI rates should be lower, now that streaming services were going to be paying
for both sound recordings and musical works. They therefore successfully lobbied for § 114(i),
which prohibited the court from considering royalties that streaming services paid for sound
recordings when determining rates to be paid ASCAP and BMI for musical works. Be careful what
you ask for. With § 114(i) in place, recording companies were able to get the Copyright Royalty
Board to set higher rates for sound recordings than music publishers could get the SDNY to set
for musical works. Music publishers would have liked to show the SDNY that the sound
recording rates were higher, but the very provision for which they lobbied – § 114(i) – prevented
them from doing so. Thus, they went back to Congress, and lobbied for Congress to replace §
114(i) with a provision that allowed the SDNY to consider rates for sound recordings when setting
rates for musical works in conjunction with digital audio transmissions. Sections 103 (b) and (c)
of the MWMA do just that.
b. Mechanical licenses for interactive streaming. Section 115, you will recall, creates the
oldest statutory license in the Copyright Act, dating from 1909. Historically, it has applied to the
activity of making and distributing phonorecords containing “covers” of musical works – not the
first recording of a musical work released (like Toto’s 1982 recording of “Africa”), but the second
or third or hundredth (like Weezer’s 2018 recording of that song). Thus, if you want to make and
distribute CDs – or cassettes or vinyl or music boxes – that contain a new sound recording of a
musical work, and another recording of that musical work has already been released, then you do
not have to negotiate with the owner of copyright in that musical work for a license. Rather, you
can take advantage of the § 115 statutory license, and pay a statutory fee (now also set by the
Copyright Royalty Board). That license is known colloquially as the “mechanical license” because
it historically pertained to making objects that could be played on machines like record players,
player pianos, and music boxes.
In 1995, the DPSA amended § 115 to provide that the mechanical statutory license also
covered “digital phonorecord deliveries.” That term clearly encompassed permanent downloads,
which made sense. When someone purchases and downloads a song from a service like iTunes,
that purchaser obtains possession of a permanent copy (technically speaking, a phonorecord) of
a sound recording of a musical work. Having possession of that permanent copy on a computer
(as a file residing on the hard drive), or on a phone or an iPod, is very similar to having possession
of a permanent copy on a CD.
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If download services like iTunes have to pay for mechanical licenses, do streaming services
also have to pay for mechanical licenses? Should the term “digital phonorecord delivery” be read
to include streaming? If you followed the traditional logic of the exclusive rights, what would
your answer be? Before reading any further, we suggest that you consider that question while
perusing the list of exclusive rights in § 106.
Done that? Here’s where we think the traditional logic would lead. Mechanical licenses
are associated with the reproduction and distribution rights. They are all about making
permanent copies. Streaming services provide performances of sound recordings and musical
works, not permanent copies. Therefore, they should therefore implicate only the public
performance right, and should require public performance licenses, not mechanical licenses.
Reproduction and performance, as we have considered them up until now in this casebook, are
simply two different things. True, unlike traditional analog broadcasting, streaming over the
internet requires making “buffer copies” that may be in existence for a few seconds. Recall,
however, that in Cartoon Network LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (p. 37 in the
Second Edition of this casebook), the Second Circuit held that such buffer copies should not be
consider “fixed” within the meaning of the Copyright Act, and therefore do not implicate the
reproduction right. You may also be aware that some streaming services use digital rights
management to blur the distinction between reproduction and performance. For example,
Spotify, Apple Music, and Amazon all offer some subscribers the opportunity to listen to songs
offline. That feature requires having a copy (technically, a phonorecord) of the song on your
device, and that copy may stay on the device for days or months – long enough that the Cartoon
Network court would undoubtedly deem it to be “fixed,” and therefore to implicate the
reproduction right. While such a copy will be unplayable if your streaming subscription lapses –
that’s the DRM protection that makes it a little different than a copy that is owned outright – it
is extremely unlikely that a court would hold that the copy is not fixed merely because it may
become inaccessible at some point in the future. However, under the MMA, all interactive
streaming is treated as reproduction requiring mechanical licensing, whether or not offline
listening is available. As a purely conceptual matter, that may leave you scratching your head.
Conceptual coherence aside, however, there are at least two practical considerations that
could weigh in favor of making interactive streaming subject to a mechanical license as well as a
public performance license. First, as long as you have a good broadband internet connection, ondemand streaming is, from the user experience perspective, indistinguishable from playing a local
copy. You can play the same song 50 times in a row on Spotify or Amazon Music Unlimited, just
as you can if you have that song on your phone as an iTunes download or if you own a physical
CD of the song. Therefore, on-demand streaming will likely substitute for owning copies, drying
up traditional mechanical license fees, and there should perhaps be a replacement stream of
income derived from a user’s “access to a song whenever (and however much) I want it”
experience.
Second, and just as importantly, mechanical license royalties have traditionally been set,
collected, and distributed quite differently from public performance royalties. Public performance
royalties go through ASCAP and BMI, with all of their antitrust history and court-determined
rates, and are split 50/50 between publishers and songwriters. Mechanical license royalties go
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through either the Harry Fox Association or the Copyright Office, with rates determined by the
Copyright Royalty Board or its predecessors, and 100% of those royalties go initially to music
publishers, to be further distributed by them according to their contractual obligations. If no
mechanical royalties are due from on-demand streams, then as listeners migrate from buying
copies to on-demand streaming, a larger and larger percentage of revenue is channeled through
PROs, and is subject to court-supervised rates and the 50/50 split. Moreover, under the antitrust
consent decree, ASCAP and BMI have to continue to provide access to their catalogs while a rate
dispute is being litigated, even though no royalties will be paid until the judgment is issued. See
U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace 94 (2015).That means that if
streaming giants like Spotify and Apple Music dispute rates, a very substantial percentage of
public performance revenue to music publishers could be significantly delayed.
However, there is an enormous practical problem to making on-demand streaming subject
to mechanical licenses. The entire administrative machinery set up for handling mechanical
licensing was based on the assumption that no one would be seeking to obtain more than about a
dozen licenses at one time. Historically, that assumption held true: If you were a musician who
wanted to release a CD (or a downloadable album) of cover versions of songs composed by others,
then you might need, at most, 10 or 12 mechanical licenses. If, however, you are Spotify or Apple
Music, and you are setting up an on-demand streaming service, and that service is held to be
subject to mechanical licensing, you will need millions of mechanical licenses. (As of this writing,
Spotify claims to have a library of about 35 million songs, and Apple Music claims to have about
45 million.) To make matters worse, while, as we noted above, the recording industry is quite
concentrated, with almost three-quarters of annual revenue in the hands of the “Big Three,” the
music publishing industry is somewhat less concentrated, and many of the mechanical licenses
will be for older musical works whose copyright owners are very difficult to ascertain and locate.
Because of the legal uncertainty of whether the Copyright Act required mechanical
licenses for interactive streaming, and because mechanical licenses were so difficult to obtain in
the quantities that streaming services needed them, those services went ahead and added many
songs to their libraries without obtaining mechanical licenses. (You will perhaps have realized
by now that many successful digital distribution companies have gotten where they are by
barging ahead with their business plans and cleaning up the copyright issues later.) That
subjected those streaming services to potential liabilities of hundreds of millions of dollars in
statutory damages for copyright infringement if it turned out that they used musical works
without all of the required permissions. Spotify, in particular, has faced several lawsuits seeking,
in the aggregate, about $2 billion.
That is a rather long-winded windup to the major provisions of the MWMA, but now it
is finally time to unveil them. First, the MWMA provides that interactive streaming is subject to
mechanical licensing as well as public performance licensing. It defines the term “digital phonorecord
delivery” to include interactive streaming, and also notes that interactive streaming can
simultaneously be a public performance. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(e)(10) (as amended by MMA §
102(a)(5)). Conceptual coherence loses; practical considerations win. The MWMA allows
interactive streamers to use the § 115 statutory license, but subjects them to somewhat different
procedures than those applicable to record companies that want to make and distribute
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recordings on physical media or via downloads. Thus, if your streaming service is classified as
interactive, you’re going to have to pay for both mechanical licenses and public performance
licenses; if it’s classified as non-interactive, you will only have to pay for public performance
licenses.
Second, the MWMA empowers the Copyright Office to designate a new nonprofit
“Mechanical Licensing Collective” (“MLC”) that will collect and distribute interactive streaming
mechanical license royalties. MMA § 102(a)(4) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(3)). On July 8, 2019,
the Copyright Office designated the imaginatively-named “Music Licensing Collective, Inc.” as
the MLC. See Library of Congress, U.S. Copyright Office, Designation of Music Licensing
Collective and Digital Licensee Coordinator, 84 Fed. Reg. 32274 (July 8, 2019).
Crucially, the MLC will offer a blanket license similar to that offered by PROs like ASCAP
and BMI. MMA § 102(a)(4) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(1). Streaming services will be able to
pay one fee to obtain mechanical licenses for every musical work administered by the MLC, and
the MLC will sort out the distribution of those receipts to copyright owners – including
identifying the correct owners. Streaming services will have to pay royalties whether or not the
owners can currently be found. If the owners can’t be found within three years after the payment
is made, the MLC will be able to distribute that money proportionally among copyright owners
registered with the MLC.
Third, the MWMA makes the MLC responsible for creating and maintaining a database
of musical works that contains, for each musical work, its title; copyright ownership information;
contact information for the owners; and identifying information for sound recordings in which
the musical work is embodied. Id. (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(3)(E)).
Fourth, the Copyright Royalty Board will continue to set rates for mechanical licenses, but
the MWMA amends § 115 to move from the “four-factor” rate standard introduced above to a
“willing buyer, willing seller” standard. Id. (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F)). As explained
above, that is likely to result in somewhat higher rates.
Finally, the MWMA provides a retroactive limitation of streaming services’ liability for
failure to pay mechanical license fees. In any such lawsuit filed against a streaming service after
January 1, 2018 – which, you will note, is 10 months before the MMA passed – the plaintiffs will
be limited to recovering the § 115 license rates due, so long as the streaming service does a few
things to qualify for that limitation. Id. (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(10)). That removes the
potentially enormous liability for statutory damages for copyright infringement. Spotify has now
settled the largest lawsuits filed against it before 2018, and so it no longer needs to worry about
its past failures to pay for mechanical licenses.
The MWRA clearly makes the process for paying for mechanical licenses for digital music
streaming much easier than it was. But should mechanical licenses be necessary for music
streaming at all? If you don’t think you know enough to answer that question, what more would
you like to know? Overall, do the rules for licensing music streaming – both of sound recordings
and of musical works – now seem to make sense? If not, what changes would you propose?
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F. State-Law Public Performance Rights for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings
P. 987 – Replace this entire section with the following:
F. Rights in Pre-1972 Sound Recordings: State Law and the Classics Protection and Access
Act
Before 1972, federal copyright law did not protect sound recordings at all. When Congress
extended copyright protection to sound recordings in the Sound Recording Act of 1971, it did so
only prospectively, limiting the protection to sound recordings that were “fixed, published, and
copyrighted” on or after February 15, 1972. Thus, sound recordings fixed before that date
continued to be protected only under state law. In 1994, in order to comply with the obligations
of the United States under the Berne Convention, Congress provided for retroactive federal
copyright protection of pre-1972 sound recordings that were of foreign origin. See 17 U.S.C. §
104A(h)(6)(ii). However, under the somewhat complicated rules of the Berne Convention and of
§ 104A of the Copyright Act, the vast majority of sound recordings that have commercial value in
the United States are of domestic origin, rather than foreign origin, and were therefore still
protected only under state law.
Owners of copyright in pre-1972 sound recordings have obtained many state-law
judgments against those who have reproduced and distributed copies of sound recordings
without permission, and prosecutors have obtained state criminal convictions as well. However,
state-law remedies are often cumbersome, and there is a serious question of whether state
protections include any public performance rights, a question that has become more and more
important in the era of music streaming. The Sound Recording Act of 1971 itself quite purposely
omitted a federal public performance right for sound recordings. The Digital Performance Right
in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 only partially filled that hole when it granted sound recordings
protected under federal law a right to public performance “by means of a digital audio
transmission.” Thus, old-fashioned analog radio broadcasters have never paid owners of
copyright in sound recordings when they played them on the air, and continue not to do so.
More recently, many companies that started streaming pre-1972 sound recordings online,
or broadcasting them digitally, decided not to pay the owners of those recordings either, taking
the position that state-law protection of those older recordings did not include any public
performance rights. The litigation that ensued over whether state law grants public performance
rights to pre-1972 sound recordings did not go well for plaintiffs. After some early wins in federal
courts, the plaintiffs lost when the federal courts certified questions to state courts in New York
and Florida. Those courts both ruled that the law of their states did not extend public
performance rights to pre-1972 sound recordings. See Flo & Eddie Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 28 N.Y.
3d 583 (2016); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 229 So.3d 305 (Fla. 2017). In a case with a
somewhat complicated procedural history, the Ninth Circuit eventually ruled in August 2021 that
California law did not grant public performance rights to pre-1972 sound recordings. See Flo &
Eddie, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc, 9 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2021)..
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Meanwhile, owners of pre-1972 sound recordings and streaming services were both active
in lobbying Congress, and their efforts resulted in a legislative compromise that includes some
retrospective federal protection for pre-1972 sound recordings. That legislation arrived on
October 11, 2018 as the Classics Protection and Access Act (“CPAA”), enacted as Title II of the
Orrin G. Hatch – Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Public Law 115-264. Somewhat oddly,
the CPAA as enacted does not fold pre-1972 sound recordings into existing copyright protections.
Rather, it creates a scheme of “quasi-copyright” or “neighboring rights” for pre-1972 sound
recordings to be codified in a new Chapter 14 of the Copyright Act. That scheme parallels, in most
but not all respects, the copyright rights and remedies provided in earlier chapters of the
Copyright Act. The first subsection of the only section in Chapter 14, § 1401(a)(1), provides that
anyone who acts with respect to a sound recording in any way that would violate any of the
exclusive rights under § 106, or the anti-circumvention and rights management information
protections under §§ 1201 and 1202, will be subject to the remedies under §§ 502 through 505 and
1203, “to same extent as” an infringer of copyright. That means that owners of pre-1972 sound
recordings now have almost all of the same rights and remedies as those of more recent recordings
protected by copyright. The sole exception is criminal remedies, which the Copyright Act
provides in § 506, a section that is intentionally omitted from incorporation into § 1401.
To round out the near-mirroring of copyright protection, the CPAA provides that federal
rights in sound recordings will be subject to most of the limitations and exceptions in Chapter 1
of the Copyright Act, including § 107 fair use, § 108 library and archive uses, § 109 first sale, § 110
public performance exceptions, and § 112(f) ephemeral copies. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(f)(1)(A). Secondary
liability for uses of pre-1972 sound recordings is also made subject to the four “safe harbors” in §
512 of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 1401(f)(3).
To obtain statutory damages and attorney’s fees, owners of rights in pre-1972 sound
recordings need not and cannot follow the registration requirements under § 412 of the Copyright
Act, since the CPAA does not technically extend copyright protection to those recordings.
However, those enhanced remedies will be available only to rights owners who file a document
with the Copyright Office that identifies the title, artist, and rights owner of the sound recording.
17 U.S.C. § 1401(f)(5). Although that document will provide much of the same information that a
registration application does, the filing provision does not include a deposit requirement, and thus
the CPAA establishes a precedent for extending enhanced remedies without a deposit to add to
the collection of the Library of Congress, and without examination by the Copyright Office.
How long will owners of copyright in pre-1972 sound recordings enjoy the rights granted
by the CPAA? The Act provides for staggered terms, depending upon when copies of the sound
recordings were originally publicly distributed. See 17 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2). Sound recordings that
were published before 1923 will enjoy these new federal rights only until December 31, 2021.
Sound recordings first published between 1923 and 1946 will get protection until 100 years after
their first publication, and thus their terms will begin to expire at the end of 2023 (for recordings
published in 1923) and will do so every year until the end of 2046 (for recordings first published
in 1946). Sound recordings first published between 1947 and 1955 will get protection for 110 years
after first publication, and thus their terms will expire between the end of 2057 and the end of
2065. The terms of sound recordings first published between 1956 and 1972 will all expire on
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February 15, 2067, and thus those recordings will receive terms of between 95 years (for the early
1972 recordings) and 110 years (for the 1956 recordings) after first publication. Previously
unpublished recordings will also be protected until February 15, 2067.
Those staggered terms seem awfully complicated, don’t they? Like many complicated
provisions, they represent a compromise. Drafters of an earlier version of the CPAA had granted
federal protection to all sound recordings, no matter how old, until February 15, 2067. Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, that was the date on which pre-1972 sound recordings would become
subject to federal copyright law, and thus have their terms limited, even though protection under
state law had extended indefinitely. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1976) (providing for preemption of
state law regarding pre-1972 sound recordings on February 15, 2067); Capitol Records v. Naxos of
America, 4 N.Y. 3d 540, 559-560 (2005) (discussing perpetual state common law protection in the
absence of federal preemption). Others argued that sound recordings should receive only the term
of copyright enjoyed by other works protected by federal law, which would mean that all sound
recordings published before 1923 would immediately fall into the public domain when the CPAA
passed, and those published in or after 1923 would all get protection until the end of 95 years from
the year of first publication.
Under the compromise, most sound recordings will receive a longer term than they would
have had they been federally protected from first publication. However, most of those recordings
will also become free for public use sooner than they would have under previous law. The CPAA
preempts state law for all activities that take place with respect to sound recordings after the
effective date of the Act (with the possible exception of “nonsubscription broadcast
transmissions,” of which more below). See CPAA § 202(a)(1)(amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(c)). Thus,
while before the enactment of the CPAA sound recordings would have remained under state law
protection until 2067, under the CPAA once the federal term ends state law protection will be
largely or entirely unavailable as well. The practical upshot: you can now pass out to your friends
as many copies of the records that Enrico Caruso published in his lifetime as you would like, and
you will not be potentially liable under state law.
Yet another twist of the CPAA is that it does not render entirely moot litigation about
potential state-law liability for public performance of sound recordings. First, the CPAA has very
narrow preemptive effect for some activities that took place with respect to pre-1972 sound
recordings before the effective date of the Act. In that regard, it allows broadcasters to treat
certain categories of pre-CPAA digital audio transmissions as if they were already governed by
federal law, and to pay any royalties due and thereby escape state-law liability. See 17 U.S.C. §
1401(e). (The digital audio transmissions that are eligible for that treatment are “exempt
transmissions” and “statutory-license transmissions,” not “negotiated-license transmissions” – see
Chapter 12.E. above in this supplement for a discussion of those categories.) That does not affect
any potential state-law liability for pre-CPAA public performances that were not digital audio
transmissions, nor does it affect the negotiated-license transmissions made by on-demand
streamers like Spotify and Pandora Premium. However, as mentioned above, owners of pre-1972
sound recordings have lost their cases regarding public performance rights under New York,
Florida, and California law, and it seems unlikely that they will try anywhere else.
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Second, as far as post-enactment activities are concerned, the CPAA generally preempts
state law, but it provides that it has no effect on possible federal preemption of potential statelaw liability for “nonsubscription broadcast transmissions” that are not covered by § 1401, i.e., that
are not digital audio transmissions. See CPAA § 202(a)(1) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 301(c)). That
means that there might still be nonpreempted state-law liability for analog or audiovisual public
performances of sound recordings. While your casebook authors believe that a court would likely
hold that state-law liability for public performances of at least post-1971 sound recordings are
preempted by the Copyright Act, the CPAA states that that issue should be decided as if the
CPAA didn’t exist. And while we are on the subject of coordination of the CPAA with other
provisions, we should mention that the CPAA does not acknowledge anywhere that pre-1972
sound recordings of foreign origin have been protected by federal copyright since 1995 under §
104A of the Copyright Act. Thus, courts may be called on to reconcile § 1401 with § 104A.
There are a number of other twists and turns to the CPAA, so if you come across an issue
involving a pre-1972 sound recording in real life, we advise you to go to the statute and read it
carefully. However, we think we have already presented enough twists and turns to make you
queasy. That is the nature of contemporary copyright legislation: complex negotiations between
industry players, resulting in complex provisions.

Chapter 13: Remedies
A. Damages: Compensation and Restitution
Page 1016 – At the bottom of the page, add the following box:

State and Federal Immunity
Whether state and federal governments can be sued for copyright infringement is a complicated
topic. The moving parts include federal statutes, Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, and
Takings Clause jurisprudence. Here’s a brief introduction.
Attempted Federal Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity. In 1990, Congress enacted
amendments to the Copyright Act that purport to abrogate state sovereign immunity in copyright
infringement lawsuits, rendering states that are defendants in those suits subject to the same
remedies as private parties, including damages. See Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990,
Pub. L. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511) (hereinafter “CRCA”). In the
late 1990s, the Supreme Court held that similar attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
federal patent and trademark lawsuits were not a valid exercise of any of Congress’s constitutional
powers. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(Patent Act); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)
(Lanham Act). At that time, however, the Court did not consider whether Congress’s attempt to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in copyright lawsuits was valid.
Two decades later, in Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020), the Court held that Congress’s attempt
to subject states to the full range of copyright infringement remedies failed in much the same way
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as its attempts with regard to patent and trademark infringement. The Court reaffirmed its earlier
holding in the Florida Prepaid cases and in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), that Congress
can never abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Article I powers, including its powers
under the Commerce Clause or the Intellectual Property Clause. Rather, Congress can only
abrogate state sovereign immunity under its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, which
prohibits the states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” To exercise that power, Congress must identify state conduct that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, and then must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 639. Before passing the CRCA, Congress did
commission Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman to prepare a report on state infringements of
copyright. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1006. However, the Allen Court concluded that the report did not
identify a pattern of state copyright infringement significant enough to justify wholesale
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Id. at 1006-1007. Thus, the CRCA was not a valid exercise
of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment powers, and states can continue to claim Eleventh
Amendment immunity as copyright infringement defendants. Id However, there are two
important qualifications to that immunity.
First, local governments are not considered to be covered by state sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). Thus, the Florida Prepaid cases would not
prevent damages actions against cities or towns for copyright infringement.
Second, a quirky but venerable rule allows actions for injunctive relief against state officials even
though damages actions against the state are unavailable. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
In the context of copyright law, that means that a copyright owner can sue for an injunction
banning future infringement, even though damages for past infringement are unavailable. For
example, in Hairston v. North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University, 2005 WL 2136923
(M.D.N.C.), the defendant state university reproduced in a number of university publications a
photograph of four men at a lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, taken on the thirtieth
anniversary of their famous civil rights sit-in at that counter. The author of that photograph sued,
seeking both money damages and injunctive relief. The Magistrate Judge in Hairston concluded
that the plaintiff could not sue the university for money damages, but could sue state university
officials to prevent future use of the photograph in university publications. See id. at 8; see also
Salerno v. City University of New York, 191 F.Supp.2d 352, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (allowing a copyright
infringement suit for injunctive relief against state university officials to proceed).
The Takings Clause Route. Given this state of affairs, readers with a good memory of first-year
property law might have an idea for a clever workaround. Here’s the concept: If a state (or state
agency) engages in act of infringement, the copyright owner would first secure an injunction
against continued use of the work under the “Ex Parte Young” rule described above.. Then, the
owner would file what is known as a “reverse condemnation” proceeding in state court seeking
money damages for the past use of the work.
A reverse condemnation case is a claim under principles of the law of eminent domain. The U.S.
Constitution, as well as the Constitution in every state, forbids state governments from taking
private property without just compensation. When the government wants to seize tangible
property, such as real estate, for a public purpose like the construction of a highway, it brings a
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suit to “condemn” the property and establish the fair price to be paid to the owner. If, however,
the government simply takes the property without asking, the owner can file suit seeking the
compensation owed. That is what is meant by “reverse condemnation.” Moreover, unlike
copyright suits which must be filed in Federal court, where the states have Eleventh Amendment
immunity, reverse condemnation cases can and usually are filed in state courts, and the states
cannot claim immunity from such suits in their own courts because the constitutional taking
clauses act as waivers of any possible immunity.
So will this work as a way to get monetary damages for state government copyright infringement?
Probably not.
A recent case explains why. In Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764 (Tex.
2021), plaintiff was a professional photographer who had taken several aerial photographs of the
city of Houston. The folks at the University of Houston’s Business School decided that one of
those photos would look good on several of its web pages, so it began displaying downloaded
copies of the photo without seeking Mr. Olive’s permission. Because the University of Houston
is a public institution, the State of Texas was, technically, the infringing party. Years later, when
Olive discovered that his photo was on the school’s website, he contacted them and they
immediately removed it. The University, however, did not pay Mr. Olive for their long-time use
of the image prior to his communication. Olive then brought a reverse condemnation suit in state
court claiming that the use of his picture was a governmental taking of property and seeing
compensation.
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the infringement of copyright on the facts
presented did not rise to the level of a “taking” requiring compensation. It began by noting that
all government action may tend to reduce the value of private property somewhat. Zoning laws,
for instance, prevent certain uses that might make property more valuable. Even constructing a
bus stop on the street adjacent to one’s home might reduce the value of the property. Thus to
qualify as a taking “per se,” the government action must significantly interfere with the rights of
exclusive ownership.
In the case of copyright infringement the copyright owner retains the right to exclude all
others from using the work and, of course, to license or assign the work for money. As the court
put it “[a]llegations of copyright infringement assert a violation of the owner's copyright, but not
its confiscation, and therefore factual allegations of an infringement do not alone allege a taking.”
Can you imagine any situations where the effects of state government infringement would be so
severe as to amount to a virtual destruction of the value of the copyright? What if a state
University decided to reproduce a text book without obtaining a license from the copyright
holder, and made the copies available for free to anyone in the state who wanted them, both
students and non-students alike—would that effectively destroy the value of the copyright?
There is another branch of eminent domain and takings law that involves “regulatory
takings.” In these cases courts use a multi-factor test in an attempt to assess the burden a
government action or regulation places on the rights of the property owner. The plaintiff in the
Olive Photography case did not plead a regulatory taking, and so the court refused to consider that
possibility. It’s an unfair question since we haven’t set out any of the regulatory taking factors,
but do you think that might have succeeded?
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Suing the Federal Government for Copyright Infringement. The federal government is immune
from suit unless it consents to be sued. Since 1960, however, it has consented to be sued for
copyright infringement—with some limitations—as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b). Under §
1498(b), a copyright infringement suit against the United States must be brought in the United
States Court of Federal Claims, and remedies are limited. Injunctions may not be issued nor costs
or attorneys’ fees awarded. The statute does allow “reasonable and entire compensation as
damages for . . . infringement.” Thus, for example, in Steve Altman Photography v. United States, 18 Cl.
Ct. 267 (1989), the court (then called the United States Claims Court) awarded a photographer
$1500 when a federal government agency’s use of his photographs exceeded the scope of the
license he had granted it. Section 1498(b) also allows statutory damages, but only “the minimum
statutory damages set forth in [17 U.S.C.] section 504(c),” which suggests that awards can be
made only at the bottom of the statutory range. Given the absence of an injunctive remedy against
the federal government, the combined effect of the copyright statute and § 1498 is effectively to
create a compulsory license in favor of the federal government, allowing it to use materials under
copyright without securing permission, but subject to judicially determined “compensation.”

Chapter 14: Invoking Judicial Power: Jurisdiction, Venue, Standing,

Limitations, Preemption, Choice of Law and Related Issues
C. Attorney’s Fees
Page 1027 – Change the section title to read as follows:
C. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
Page 1054 – Add the following new note after Note 6 at the bottom of the page:
7. Other Costs. While attorney’s fees are usually the largest litigation expense, there are many
other costs associated with carrying on a copyright case (or any other type of case). There are
filing fees that must be paid to the clerk of the court; fees that must be paid to marshals for
serving process; charges for the printing of transcripts; fees for interpreters where necessary;
duplication costs for documents; and payments to expert witnesses, including both those
appointed by the court and those voluntarily retained by the parties. Section 505 of the
copyright statute provides that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs
by or against any party.” In Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873 (2019), the Supreme
Court considered whether the reference to “full costs” in the copyright statute was limited to
recovery of only those items listed in the general federal costs recovery statute codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920. In that case Oracle had won a substantial verdict against Rimini for
copyright infringement. The district court also ordered Rimini to pay over $28 million in
attorney’s fees, about $3.5 million in traditional costs, and an additional $12.8 million for other
litigation expenses such as expert witness fees, jury consultant fees and amounts spent on ediscovery. These latter items are not included in the general cost-recovery statute, and so
Rimini challenged that portion of the award. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Kavanaugh held that absent specific statutory language to the contrary, a reference to “costs”
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is limited to only those costs itemized in the general cost-recovery statute. Offering up a
linguistics seminar, he noted:
The adjective “full” in § 505 . . . does not alter the meaning of the word “costs.” Rather,
“full costs” are all the “costs” otherwise available under law. The word “full” operates in
the phrase “full costs” just as it operates in other common phrases: A “full moon” means
the moon, not Mars. A “full breakfast” means breakfast, not lunch. A “full season ticket
plan” means tickets, not hot dogs. So too, the term “full costs” means costs, not other
expenses.
Do you think Congress should amend the cost-recovery statute to provide prevailing parties
with recovery of the kinds of expenses at issue in Rimini Street? Imagine the situation of a
defendant who prevails after being unreasonably accused of copyright infringement. If the case
were as complex as the one in Rimini Street, that defendant would have to absorb almost $13
million dollars in expenses out of pocket to defend itself. That certainly could impose
considerable pressure to settle. On the other hand, a successful plaintiff is effectively
undercompensated if much of its damage or profits recovery must be used to cover litigation
expenses. Finally (on the third hand), would allowing recovery of these kinds of expense
encourage both sides to engage in extravagant spending during the lawsuit, in the expectation
that it could shift the costs to the other party, and if so, would that be a good thing?

F. Preemption
p. 1110 – Add at the conclusion of Note 1:
In that regard, consider the following language from a recent Fifth Circuit decision
[T]he Copyright Act preempts more than it protects. Ultraflo Corp. v. Pelican Tank Parts, Inc., 845
F.3d 652, 656 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 2266, 198 L.Ed.2d 699 (2017).
Specifically, § 301(a) “preempts state protection of works that fall within the subject matter
(that is, the scope) of copyright, regardless whether the works are actually afforded protection
under the Copyright Act.” Id. (citing Spear Mktg., Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank, 791 F.3d 586, 596–96
(5th Cir. 2015)); see also United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453,
1463 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[S]cope and protection are not synonyms. . . . [T]he shadow actually cast
by the Act's preemption is notably broader than the wing of its protection.”). That means
the Copyright Act can preempt a state law claim even if the intellectual property lands in one
of § 102(b)'s exclusions. Ultraflo, 845 F.3d at 656; Spear, 791 F.3d at 596–97.
Motion Medical Technologies, L.L.C. v. Thermotek, Incorporated, 875 F.3d 765, 773 (5th Cir. 2017).

p. 1117: Insert after end of first sentence:
More recently, in a case involving paid downloads of photographs of former student-athletes,
the Ninth Circuit followed the analysis and preemption conclusion of Dryer. See Maloney v.
T3Media, Inc., 853 F.3d 1004 (2017).
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